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ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS: TRUST LAW'S
RACE TO THE BOTTOM?
Stewart E. Sterkt
INTRODUCTION
Stephan Jay Lawrence had a problem. An MIT graduate, a suc-
cessful options trader, and a major player on national securities ex-
changes, Lawrence faced financial ruin in early 1991 as a result of the
margin deficit his firms had generated on Black Monday, October 19,
1987.1 Although Lawrence's personal assets remained substantial, he
had been mired for forty-two months in an arbitration proceeding
over the size of his margin deficit.2 His prospects in the arbitration
apparently looked bleak, and an unfavorable award would wipe out
his personal fortune.3
Lawrence addressed his problem by transferring, on January 8,
1991, between four and seven million dollars-ninety percent of his
assets-to a trust in Jersey, Channel Islands,4 ajurisdiction whose trust
law is known to be unfriendly to creditors.5 Less than a month later,
Lawrence further amended the trust in order to transfer it to the even
more debtor-friendly Mauritius, an island nation located on "the
other side of the world."6
On March 15, 1991, the firm Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (Bear,
Stearns) -Lawrence's adversary in the arbitration proceeding-was
awarded over twenty million dollars.7 Now Bear, Stearns had a prob-
t Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The
author would like to thank David Carlson, Joel Dobris, Katy Filner, Myriam Gilles, Melanie
Leslie, and Chuck Yablon for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Kara Savid for inval-
uable research assistance.
1 See Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence), 227 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1998).
2 Seeid.
3 See id. at 912.
4 See id. at 912-14.
5 See Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 699 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (detailing the history ofJersey trust law, and particularly the 1989 amend-
ment which reversed the prior law that held that a gift into trust was fraudulent with re-
spect to creditors if the settlor retained the power to dispose of the assets transferred into
trust); PAUL MATrHEWS & TERRY SOWDEN, THE JERsEY LAw OF TRUSTS § 5.46, at 65 (3d ed.
1993).
6 In re Lawrence, 227 B.R. at 912 n.11 (noting that "Mauritian law appears to be even
more 'debtor-friendly' than [the law of] the Jersey Channel Islands" and that "Mauritius
has the added benefit of its location-the other side of the world").7 See id. at 911.
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lem: How could it collect even part of its award when legal title to
Lawrence's assets rested in the hands of a trustee with no connections
to the United States and with offices on the other side of the world, in
a country whose trust law imposes criminal penalties on any person,
including the trustee, who discloses information about a Mauritius
trust?8
Stephan Lawrence's efforts to avoid his creditors-euphemisti-
cally called "asset protection planning" by its practitioners-have be-
come increasingly common in recent years.9 Although determining
with any precision the value of assets that debtors have transferred
offshore to avoid creditor claims is nearly impossible, conservative esti-
mates exceed one trillion dollars.' 0 One lawyer, prominent in the as-
set protection business, represents that his firm alone has clients with
more than three billion dollars in asset protection trusts."
Asset protection trusts have not been limited to major players in
the financial world. Lawyers have marketed offshore trusts to physi-
cians and other professionals as protection against malpractice judg-
ments or divorce claims.' 2 Furthermore, as a recent Ninth Circuit
case illustrates, con men have used offshore trusts to stash their gains
in entities beyond the reach of the investors they have defrauded.' 3
Entrepreneurial lawyers and professional trustees, like those who rep-
resented Stephan Jay Lawrence, have recognized that trusts need not
be localized entities and that a settlor can avoid onerous regulations
by locating the trust in a more favorable jurisdiction.' 4 To the extent
8 See id. at 912 n.l1.
9 Indeed, the industry has spawned its own journal, the Journal of Asset Protection,
which has published four volumes to date.
10 See Debra Baker, Island Castaway, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 54, 55 ("Experts estimate
that $1 trillion to $5 trillion is currently being held offshore."); David D. Beazer, The Mys-
tique of 'Going Offshore' UTAH BJ., Dec. 1996, at 19, 19 (estimating that $5 trillion pass
through offshore financial centers).
11 See Asset Protection Trusts: What You Need to Know Now, BCD News and Comment,
Nov. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, LEGNEWS Library, ALLNWS file (statement of David L.
Lockwood, a principal in Engel, Reim & Lockwood PC).
12 See, e.g., Deborah Grandinetti, Protect YourAssets-Set Up a Trus, Ma. ECON., Apr.
26, 1999, at 80, 80; see also Riechers v. Riechers, 679 N.Y.S.2d 233, 235 (Sup. Ct. 1998)
(describing how a physician created a Cook Islands trust, allegedly in response to malprac-
tice lawsuits and later contending that the trust assets were unavailable to his wife in di-
vorce proceedings). Indeed, a leading proponent suggests that asset protection planning
is appropriate for individuals with a liquid net worth of $1,000,000 or perhaps as little as
$500,000. See Roundtable Discussion, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 797 (1999) (state-
ment of Barry S. Engel).
13 See FrC v. Affordable Media, L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999). For an ex-
tended discussion of the landmark Affordable Media case, see infra Part III.A.4.
14 See, e.g., Pierce H. McDowell, III, Trust Forum Shopping: The Next Generation, TP. &
Esr., Aug. 1997, at 10, 14:
In today's shrinking world of high speed travel, wire transfers, video
conferences, facsimiles, electronic mail and families spread across the
globe, it has become apparent that it is not nearly so important to choose
1036 [Vol. 85:1035
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trust assets, such as cash or securities, are intangible, only legal fictions
enable us to assign a physical location to the assets. Moreover, even if
the assets are tangible and fixed in a location, like real property is, no
legal rule prevents a trust situated in one state from holding property
located in another.
Entrepreneurial states have begun to take advantage of the mo-
bility of trusts by creating legal regimes designed to attract trust set-
tlors from other states.15 The leaders in the competition for trust
business have been offshore jurisdictions, such as the Cook Islands,
Belize, and the Bahamas. 16 Recently, several American states have be-
gun to compete aggressively: Delaware' 7 and Alaska' 8 enacted statutes
that make it substantially easier for a trust settlor to shield assets from
potential creditors. The competition, however, has extended beyond
asset protection statutes. Several states, including Alaska and Dela-
ware,' 9 have eliminated long-standing limitations on the duration of
trusts, permitting the creation of "Dynasty Trusts" which can last for-
ever.20 Montana has enacted provisions that will permit foreign trust
the trust institution down the street as trustee. In fact, to do so may be
negligent.
But seeJoel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or,
We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REv. 543, 558-59 (1998) (observing
the "'invasion' of outsiders"-brokers and out-of-state institutions-into the world once
dominated by local bankers).
15 The popular press has noted this competition. See, e.g., Carolyn T. Geer, Is Your
Trust Well Placed?, FoRBEs,June 16, 1997, at 190, 190 ("[C]ompetition is heating up among
states eager to attract trust business.").
16 SeeJames T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme, 102
Com. LJ. 138, 140-43 (1997) (listing Cook Islands, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Gibralter,
Turks & Caicos Islands, Bermuda, Nevis, and Belize as popular offshore jurisdictions);
Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating it Too, 47
RUTGER S L. REv. 11, 62 (1994) (listing the "Bahamas, Belize, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands,
Cyprus, Gibralter, and the Turks and Caicos Islands" as popular offshore jurisdictions).
17 See DEL. CODE AmN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-3576 (Supp. 1998). The legislative history ac-
companying the 1998 amendment to Delaware's Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act in-
cludes the following statement:
The Act is intended to supplement the existing provisions of the Quali-
fied Dispositions in Trust Act, 12 Del. C. § 3570 et seq., to enhance the
dispositive and administrative options available to trust settlors and to trust-
ees of existing trusts. These new features should make Delaware a more
attractive jurisdiction for establishing trusts that are protected, under cer-
tain defined conditions, from claims of a settlor's creditors.
Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, 1998 Del. Laws 843 (H.B. 747) (synopsis).
18 See AsAsKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 1998) (restricting creditors' rights to satisfy
their claims out of trust property).
19 See id. § 34.27.050(a) (B); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3535.
20 See Donald Fink& Richard English, Trusts That Last Forever, N.J. LJ., May 26, 1997,
at 27, 27 (listing South Dakota, Idaho, Wisconsin and Delaware as states allowing perpetual
trusts); Al W. King III et al., Dynasty Trusts: Mhat the Future Holds for Today's Technique, TR. &
Esr., Apr. 1996, at 28, 30 (listing South Dakota, Delaware, Idaho and Wisconsin as states
that allow perpetual trusts); McDowell, supra note 14, at 10 (listing Alaska, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, South Dakota, and Wisconsin as states that permit perpetual trusts). Ari-
20001 1037
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
settlors to obtain an extraordinary degree of privacy with respect to
their transactions and will insulate trusts created under the statute
from foreign judgments.2'
Competition among the states for trust business through the crea-
tion of favorable legal environments is not a new phenomenon. States
have long competed for corporate charters by offering attractive gov-
ernance structures. The effects of this competition have generated
voluminous commentary. William Cary started the debate by arguing
that interstate competition for corporate charters was a "race for the
bottom," with the various states-Delaware in particular-reducing
the protection available to shareholders and others in order to attract
corporate managers, who ultimately decide where to charter the cor-
poration.22 Others disagreed, concluding that jurisdictional competi-
tion leads to rules that reduce transaction costs and ultimately
increase shareholder value.23 For these commentators, jurisdictional
competition in corporate law results in a "race to the top," not to the
bottom.
In recent decades, legal scholars have moved beyond corporate
law to evaluate the effect of interjurisdictional competition in other
areas of law, including banking law,24 environmental law,25 income
zona has recently joined the list. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901(A) (3) (West Supp.
1999).
21 See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-8-101 to -603 (1999). For an exhaustive discussion of
the statute, including the interplay between the statute and federal money laundering leg-
islation, see David Aronofsky, Montana's Foreign Capital Depository Act: A Financial Pie in the
Rocky Mountain Sky or a Sensible New Assets Attraction Approach?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
711 (1999).
22 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 705 (1974); see also Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31
Bus. L w. 1125, 1125 (1976) (building on Cary's view that the state chartering system has
weaknesses and urging federal chartering at major corporations); Joel Seligman, The Case
forFederal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REv. 947,971-74 (1990) (building on
Cary's proposal for limited federal preemption of state corporate law).
23 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977); see also ROBERTA RoMANo, THE GENIus OF AMERI-
cA COR'ORATE LAW 14-24 (1993) (finding the empirical data more consistent with
Winter's conclusions than with Cary's conclusions); cf. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puze 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 225, 265-73 (1985) (finding that a
change in domicile resulting from a reincorporation does not have a negative effect on the
price of a company's stock).
24 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CoRiE. L. REv. 677 (1988); Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregula-
tion: The Paradox of Financial Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 65 (1996); Kenneth E. Scott,
The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1977);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case
for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FoRDHsm L. Rv. 1133 (1990).
25 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
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taxation, 26 local-government law,2 7 bankruptcy,28 and family law.29
Broad claims that competition among jurisdictions leads to more effi-
cient regulation have prompted closer examination of the premises
necessary to sustain those claims.30
Trust law presents an especially appropriate vehicle for the study
ofjurisdictional competition. Unlike competition in other areas, the
competition among states for trust business has become visible and
tangible.3 1 Moreover, unlike corporate law, the field of trust law re-
mains wide open; no jurisdiction has yet obtained the dominant posi-
tion and first mover advantages, which Delaware enjoys in the market
for corporate charters.3 2
This Article begins the study ofjurisdictional competition in trust
law. Its focus is on the development of so-called asset protection
trusts, like the one used by Stephan Jay Lawrence, which permit the
trust settlor to retain substantial control over, and derive significant
benefit from, the trust property, while shielding that property from
creditor claims. Part I explores the changes in the law of trusts that
competition among jurisdictions has generated. Part II then identi-
fies imperfections in the competitive process-externalities and
agency costs-that undermine the claim that interstate competition
will generate efficient trust law rules. Part I explores how the ex-
isting legal framework, including the broad power of bankruptcy
courts, constrains competition among states with respect to asset pro-
tection trusts; existing constraints, such as choice-of-law rules and na-
tionwide bankruptcy jurisdiction, should, in the long run, reduce the
26 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REv. 413, 458-61 (1996).
27 See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit"as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Uncon-
stitutional Conditions Doctrine 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 506-28 (1991); Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part H-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. Ray. 346, 350-51 (1990); Robert
C. Erickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analyis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 402-
03 (1977); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use
Exactions, 45 VAND. L. Rmv. 831 passim (1992).
28 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 Tax. L. Ray. 471 (1994).
29 See, e.g.,Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAT_ L. REv. 745 (1995).
30 See William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. ToRomrro
L.J. 401 (1994); William W. Bratton &Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics ofJurisdic-
tional Competition: Devolutionamy Federalism in a Second-Best World; 86 GEo. L.J. 201 (1997);
Thomas W. Merrill, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 621, 640 (1994).
31 One commentator reported, for instance, that South Dakota's "governor is actively
involved in promoting a legislative task force to enhance his state's prowess in the area of
trust legislation". McDowell, supra note 14, at 14.
32 See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715, 720
(1998) (discussing how "Delaware's first mover advantage in corporate law" leaves other
states with "weak incentives to develop corporate law innovations").
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attractiveness of legislative competition, especially for American
states.33 Finally, Part IV examines what changes in the American legal
regime would be necessary to diminish incentives for settlors like Ste-
phan Jay Lawrence to transfer assets to offshore trusts. Ultimately, in
a world in which assets are so easy to transfer, criminal penalties may
be the only effective weapon available to the states, or Congress, to
stem the growth of offshore trusts.3 4
I
WHAT HAS JURISDICIONAL COMPETITION WROUGHT?:
ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
A. Background Law
1. The Historical Development of Spendthrift Trusts
The prominent role that trusts play in creditor avoidance should
not be surprising. Born by accident,35 the Anglo-American trust has
endured because it has proven to be a powerful tool for accomplish-
ing a wide range of objectives. Long recognized as a useful device for
gratuitous transfers, particularly the transmission of wealth between
33 As we shall see, Stephan Jay Lawrence's actions in creating and concealing his off-
shore trust resulted in the denial of a bankruptcy discharge. See Goldberg v. Lawrence (In
re Lawrence), 227 B.R. 907, 915-18 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).
34 Cf Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1, 3 (1996) ("In contempo-
rary society, governments enforce law by essentially two mechanisms: incarceration and
liability.").
35 As Professors Hansmann and Mattei have recently emphasized, civil law countries
never developed a precise analog to the trust, but continental European law has developed
"various special purpose institutions that serve as substitutes for the trust in certain well-
defined situations." Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Compara-
tive Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 434, 442 (1998).
The origins of the Anglo-American trust are closely tied to the development of the
Court of Chancery and to the division of jurisdiction between law courts and courts of
equity. The law courts had been unwilling to enforce trust-like obligations, leaving benefi-
ciaries with little protection against dishonest trustees. SeeJ.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF
ENGLIsH FEUDAuSM, 1215-1540, at 156-58 (1968) (noting that legal enforcement of uses
was very difficult to obtain and that easy enforcement would have removed the incentives
for creating them because the law courts' recognition of the ownership interest of benefi-
ciaries would have undermined the legal fiction that permitted evasion of feudal incidents
and the prohibition on wills of land). But cf. R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1503, 1504-11 (1979) (documenting ecclesiastical enforcement of uses
in the period before the rise of the Court of Chancery). Ultimately, however, the chancel-
lor became willing to enforce trust obligations for which no remedy was available in the law
courts. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRusTs, § 3, at 9-10 (6th ed. 1987). Hence, the interests of
the trust beneficiary became known as equitable, rather than legal, interests. By increasing
the security available to trust beneficiaries and trust settlors, the availability of equitable
relief made the trust device considerably more popular. For a more extensive discussion of
the growth of the trust, see 2 D.E.C. Yale, Introduction to LORD NOTrINGHAM's CHANCERY
CAsEs (D.E.C. Yale ed., Seldon Society 1961).
1040 [Vol. 85:1035
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generations, 36 the trust has also become an important commercial in-
strument.37 The trust's success has, in large measure, been attributa-
ble to its flexibility; because the essence of the trust is the separation
of legal from beneficial ownership, no inherent limitations exist on
the purposes for which a trust may be created. A trust settlor has little
reason to create a trust unless some obstacle-often a legal obstacle-
makes it less practical for the settlor to use some other device to ac-
complish his objectives. Thus, it should not be surprising that, since
their conception, settlors have often used trusts to avoid otherwise ap-
plicable legal rules.
As early as the fourteenth century, landowners employed the
"use"-the precursor to the modem trust-both as a tax avoidance
device and as a way to escape English primogeniture rules at a time
when the law did not yet recognize wills of land.38 During the same
era, some landowners employed uses to keep their lands "out of the
clutches of creditors.13 9
As trust settlors used trusts to avoid legal rules, new legal rules
evolved to constrain trust settlors. Thus, in 1376 and 1377, the British
Parliament enacted statutes that diminished the attractiveness of the
use as a creditor-avoidance device.40 The Statute of Uses,41 enacted in
1535, eliminated the use as a tax avoidance device and restored the
king's power to collect feudal incidents.42 The give and take between
36 SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Com-
mere, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1997).
37 See id. at 166 (noting that, in the United States, "most of the wealth that is held in
trust... is placed there incident to business deals" and concluding that "over 90% of the
money held in trust in the United States is in commercial trusts as opposed to personal
trusts").
38 See BEAN, supra note 35, at 132-33 (noting that the emergence of uses by the middle
of the fourteenth century enabled landowners both to evade feudal incidents and to devise
land as they wished).
Franciscan friars also employed uses to avoid the religious prohibition on property
ownership. See F.W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARv. L. REv. 127, 130 (1894). Indeed,
Maitland attributes the origins of the use to the needs of the Franciscan friars. See id
Bean, by contrast, argues that uses appeared in England before the Franciscans gained
prominence. See BEAN, supra note 35, at 129.
39 BEA, supra note 35, at 137; see also id. at 135 (discussing reasons for the employ-
ment of uses by leading English landowners in the fourteenth century).
40 See 1 Rich. 2, ch. 9 (1377) (Eng.) (invalidating enfeoffnents made by landowners
"to Lords and other great Men of the Realm" in order to dissuade adverse claimants from
pursuing claims against the land); 50 Edw. 3, ch. 6 (1376) (Eng.) (giving creditors the right
to execute on land and chattels of debtors who "give their Tenements and Chattels to their
Friends, by Collusion thereof to have the Profits at their Will"). See generally BEAN, supra
note 35, at 125-26 (discussing regulation of uses by the English Parliament in the late
fourteenth century).
41 27 Hen 8, ch. 10 (1535) (Eng.).
42 See id. By its terms, the Statute of Uses converted the beneficiary's equitable estate
into a legal estate, making it impossible for the feudal tenant to evade the incidents of
feudal tenure by employing the use device. See BEAN, supra note 35, at 287-88. See generally
2000] 1041
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property owners (represented by their lawyers) and the state has been
an ongoing one: lawyers adapt trusts to serve their clients' goals, and
the state reacts by imposing constraints. Sometimes, as with the Stat-
ute of Uses, the constraints have been statutorily imposed, while in
other instances, as with the Rule Against Perpetuities, the constraints
have developed through the common law process. 43
The process did not stop in the sixteenth century. Since the late
nineteenth century, trust settlors have been creating spendthrift
trusts, designed to prevent the beneficiary's creditors from attaching
or garnishing the beneficiary's interest in the trust and to prevent the
beneficiary from assigning his trust interest.44 Courts and legislatures
have responded to this device with constraints of varying severity,45
but spendthrift trusts have nevertheless become widely accepted.
The rationale for enforcing spendthrift trusts has been that the
trust property belongs not to the trust beneficiary, but to the trust
settlor. Because the settlor has no obligation to transfer the property
to the beneficiary, the settlor is entitled to transfer it to the beneficiary
subject to conditions, including the condition that the property be
shielded from the beneficiary's creditors.46
W.S. Holdsworth, The Political Causes Which Shaped the Statute of Uses, 26 HARv. L. Rxv. 108
(1912) (describing the politics surrounding the passage of the Statute of Uses).
43 See generallyJee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (M.R. 1787) (discussing the reasons
for the Rule Against Perpetuities).
44 A typical spendthrift provision might read: " 'The interests of my trust beneficiary,
whether in trust income or trust principal, shall not be capable of assignment anticipation,
or seizure by legal process.'" JOEL C. DoBms & STEWART E. STERK, RrrcHE, ALFORD &
EFLAuD's ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATEuAs 518 (1998).
45 Spendthrift provisions in trust instruments have had a controversial history. See
DoBRIS & STER, supra note 44, at 522. Enforcement of spendthrift provisions has aroused
fierce objections from many commentators, most notablyJohn Chipman Gray, who wrote:
The general introduction of spendthrift trusts would be to form a privi-
leged class, who could indulge in every speculation, could practise every
fraud, and, provided they kept on the safe side of the criminal law, could
yet roll in wealth. They would be an aristocracy, though certainly the most
contemptible aristocracy with which a country was ever cursed.
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 174 (1883). For a mod-
em attack, see Paul G. Haskell, Teaching Moral Analysis in Law School, 66 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1025, 1047 (1991) ("Testator's use of the spendthrift provision, and the law which
upholds it, are not morally defensible.").
Although the majority of American states enforce spendthrift provisions, see DoBRIS &
STER., supra note 44, at 522, most hold them invalid against particular classes of claimants,
particularly children claiming support and spouses claiming alimony. See, e.g., Bacardi v.
White, 463 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959). More-
over, a number of states refuse to protect from a money judgment any interest in a spend-
thrift trust exceeding the beneficiary's needs for education and support. See, e.g., CAL.
PROB. CODE § 15307 (West 1991); N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.4 (Consol. 1979).
Until recently, states universally refused to enforce spendthrift provisions for the benefit of
the settlor of the trust. See, e.g., Ware v. Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137, 138-39 (Mass. 1954); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156.
46 Judicial enforcement of spendthrift trusts can be traced to two leading decisions:
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), and the
1042 [Vol. 85:1035
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2. Self-Settled Spendthift Trusts
Despite vociferous opposition,47 the spendthrift trust has become
an entrenched feature of American trust law.48 However, two barriers
have until recently made trusts nearly useless for the settlor who seeks
to insulate trust property from the claims of his own creditors. First,
even more entrenched than spendthrift trust doctrine itself is the rule
that a spendthrift provision for the settlor's own benefit is unenforce-
able.49 Second, fraudulent transfer law protects creditors against a
gratuitous transfer, whether to a trust or to another individual, if the
transfer is made to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors. 50
The rule that a settlor may not create a spendthrift trust for his
own benefit rests in part on the belief that property owners would
otherwise use self-settled trusts to mislead creditors5 ' and in part on
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Broadway National Bank v. Ad-
ams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882). In Adams, the court wrote:
The founder of this trust was the absolute owner of his property. He had
the entire right to dispose of it, either by an absolute gift to his brother, or
by a gift with such restrictions or limitations, not repugnant to the law, as he
saw fit to impose.... His intentions ought to be carried out, unless they are
against public policy.
. He [the settlor] has the entire jus disponend4 which imports that he
may give it absolutely, or may impose any restriction or fetters not repug-
nant to the nature of the estate which he gives. Under our system, creditors
may reach all the property of the debtor not exempted by law, but they
cannot enlarge the gift of the founder of the trust, and take more than he
has given.
Adams, 133 Mass. at 173-74.
47 See GRAY, supra note 45, at 173-74.
48 See RESrATE7ENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). A
few states continue to hold spendthrift provisions unenforceable. See, e.g., Industrial Nat'l
Bank v. Budiong, 264 A.2d 18, 21 (RI. 1970) (citing the English rule invalidating the
spendthrift provisions of a trust).
Extending spendthrift trust doctrine even further than most other states, a New York
provision makes all trusts spendthrift, unless an express provision authorizes assignment of
beneficial interests. See N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5(a) (1).
49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTs § 58(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999) ("A re-
straint on the voluntary and involuntary alienation of a beneficial interest retained by the
settlor of a trust is invalid."). For recent cases illustrating the rule, see Speed v. Speed, 430
S.E.2d 348, 348-49 (Ga. 1993) and Costerv. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d 802, 808-09 (Iowa 1991).
50 The Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570) (Eng.), which rendered invalid
transfers made with the "[endj purpose and intent to delay[ ] h[i]nder or defraud[ ]
creditors," is often identified as the foundation for modem fraudulent transfer law. Today,
most American jurisdictions have adopted either the UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr, 7A-
2 U.LA 266 (1999), promulgated in 1984 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, or its predecessor, the UNIF. FRAUDULENT CoNvEYANca Acr, 7A-2
U.L.A. 2, promulgated in 1918.
51 As Bogert notes in discussing the rule that spendthrift provisions in self-settled
trusts are unenforceable,
To hold otherwise would be to give unexampled opportunity to unscrupu-
lous persons to shelter their property before engaging in speculative busi-
ness enterprises, to mislead creditors into thinking that the setflor still
owned the property since he appeared to be receiving its income, and
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the fact that the "image of benevolent paternalism is absent when the
settlor of the trust is also the beneficiary."52 That is, although courts
and legislatures have had some sympathy for property owners seeking
to protect their imprudent or profligate children, the notion that
property owners ought to be able to protect themselves against their
own profligacy, at the expense of their creditors, has been much
harder to swallow.5 3 Moreover, under traditional principles, a trust
settlor may not avoid the invalidity of spendthrift provisions in self-
settled trusts by creating, instead, a discretionary trust; when a settlor
creates a trust and gives the trustee discretion to make payments to
the settlor, the settlor's creditors may reach the maximum amount the
trustee would be entitled to pay to the settlor.5 4
3. Fraudulent Transfer Law
Creditors may reach a settlor's beneficial interest in a trust even if
the settlor did not intend to defraud creditors with her initial transfer
into the trust. Suppose, however, the settlor creates a trust in which
she disguises her beneficial interest. Imagine, for instance, an irrevo-
cable trust in which the settlor declares herself trustee, retains discre-
tion to make income payments among her three children, and
reserves the power to appoint the principal from among her children
at the time of her death. In this case, the legal limitations on self-
settled trusts would not apply, because the settlor has not retained an
enforceable beneficial interest in the trust. Moreover, the settlor's
creditors would not be entitled to reach the children's interests. On
the other hand, the settlor could use her power to allocate income
and appoint the principal to assure that her children are attentive to
her needs and desires.
Fraudulent transfer law, however, may enable the settlor's credi-
tors to invalidate her transfer to the trust. Since 1570, Anglo-Ameri-
thereby to work a gross fraud on creditors who might place reliance on the
former prosperity and financial stability of the debtor.
BOGERT, supra note 35, § 40, at 155-56.
52 Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419, 424 (9th Cir. 1991).
53 But see Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1, 83-84 (1995).
54 See RESrATEMENT (T~mD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); see also
Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 172-74 (Conn. 1942); Dzikowski v. Edmonds
(In re Cameron), 223 B.R. 20, 24 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998); RESTATEMENT (SEcom) OF
TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959). In Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 473
N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 1984), the court noted:
It is irrelevant that in creating the discretionary trust for her benefit
the settlor did not intend to defraud her creditors or was solvent at the time
of the creation of the trust. It is against public policy to permit the settlor-
beneficiary to tie up her own property in such a way that she can still enjoy




can jurisdictions have held invalid transfers made with "the End,
Purpose, and Intent, to delay, hinder or defraud Creditors."55 How-
ever, proving the debtor-transferor's state of mind has always been dif-
ficult. Thus, English courts quickly developed a sense for "the signs
and marks of fraud," which would serve as adequate proof of intent to
defraud. 56 The Statute of Elizabeth, together with the "badges of
fraud" identified in Twyne's Case, remains the foundation of modem
American fraudulent transfer law. Today, most American states have
enacted some version of either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act 57 (UFCA) or the more modem Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act58 (UFTA). 59 Both statutes protect creditors against transfers
designed to insulate debtor assets from creditor claims. 60
Section 4 of the UFTA, entitled "Transfers Fraudulent as to Pres-
ent and Future Creditors," provides that specified transfers are fraud-
ulent towards a creditor "whether the creditor's claim arose before or
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred." 61 Thus,
the statute clarifies that a transfer may be fraudulent as to a creditor
with no claim outstanding against the transferor at the time of the
transfer.62 Both the statutory language and history of the UFTA, sup-
55 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570) (Eng.). For a historical discussion of fraudulent conveyance
law, see Peter A. Alces & Luther M. DorrJr., A Critical Analysis of theNew Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Ac4 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 527, 529-37 (1985).
56 Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 812 (Star Chamber 1601).
57 UNiV. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Acr, 7A-2 U.LA 2 (1918).
58 UNiF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr, 7A-2 U.LA 266 (1999).
59 See id.; UNir. FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCE Acr, 7A-2 U.LA 2.
60 See UNIF. FRAuDuLENT TRAN sra AcT prefatory note, 7A-2 U.LAK 269 ("Both Acts
declare a transfer made... with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors to be
fraudulent.").
61 Id. § 4(a).
62 The UFrA defines a "creditor" as "a person who has a claim." Id. § 1(4). The
UFTA defines "claim" as "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judg-
ment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Id. § 1(3).
The comment to secion 1(4) of the statute establishes that the statutory definition
was not intended to change prior law:
The definition of "creditor" in combination with the definition of
"claim" has substantially the same effect as the definition of "creditor"
under § 1 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. As under that Act,
the holder of an unliquidated tort claim or a contingent claim may be a
creditor protected by this Act.
Id. § 1 cmt. 4. Although the statute does not specify when a person must have a claim in
order to qualify as a creditor within the meaning of the statute, only two plausible alterna-
tives exist: the person has a claim either at the time or after she makes the allegedly fraudu-
lent transfer. The statute expressly excludes the first alternative. See id. Hence, under the
statute, a person apparently can qualify as a creditor even if she had no legal rights against
the transferor at the time of the transfer.
For the contrary interpretation, see John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent
Transfers: When a Claimant Doesn't Have a Claim, When a Transfer Isn't a Transfer, When Fraud
Doesn't Stay Fraudulent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset
Protection Planner, 22 DEL.J. Cop. L. 955, 975-88 (1997). Sullivan argues that "[u]nless the
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port the view that a transfer can be fraudulent even if the transferor
had no creditors at the time of the transfer. Therefore, so long as a
creditor can prove that the settlor transferred property into trust with
the intent to defraud some present or future creditor, any creditor-
even one whose claim had not arisen, and was not anticipated, at the
time of the transfer-may set aside the transfer.
The creditor still must prove, however, that the transfer is fraudu-
lent within the meaning of the statute. Section 4(a) (1) defines as
fraudulent with respect to creditors any transfer that a debtor makes
"with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
plaintiff has a legal 'right,' he does not hold a 'claim' and, therefore, is not a 'creditor.'"
Id. at 976. Similarly, he argues that the statute contemplates that only a debtor can make a
fraudulent transfer and that if a transferor is not liable on a claim at the time of the trans-
fer, "he is not a 'debtor,'" and the UFTA is inapplicable. Id. at 977. Sullivan's argument,
however, begs the timing question; he implicitly assumes-without offering any analysis of
the point-that when the statute refers to debtors and creditors, the statute means debtors
and creditors at the time of the transfer. That assumption, however, is inconsistent with
the text of section 4(a), which explicitly contemplates that a creditor's claim may arise
"before or after the transfer was made." UNit. FRAUDULENT TRANSFEs Acr § 4(a) (emphasis
added).
This construction of the UFTA is consistent with its predecessor, the UFCA, which
remains the law in a number of states. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcE ACT, 7A-2 U.LA.
2 (listing six states). The UFCA explicitly declares that specified conveyances are "fraudu-
lent as to both present and future creditors." Id. § 6. The Prefatory Note to the UFTA
makes it clear that the drafters of the new statute did not intend to change that aspect of
the UFCA See UNi. FRAUDULENT TRANSFEAcr, 7A-2 U.L.A. 269 prefatory note. The Pref-
atory Note indicates that "[t]he basic structure and approach of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act are preserved in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act." Id. More specifi-
cally, the Prefatory Note provides more specifically that "[e]ither an existing or subsequent
creditor may avoid a transfer or obligation for inadequate consideration when accompa-
nied by the financial condition specified in § 4(a) (2) (i) or the mental state specified in
§4(a) (2) (ii)." Id.
The sparse case law generally supports the principle that a person who has no claim at
the time of a transfer can later have a fraud claim against the transferor. See United States
v. Chapman, 756 F.2d 1237, 1241 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding a transfer fraudulent under
Texas law as to the U.S. government when made with the intent to avoid future tax claims,
even though transferor had incurred no tax liability at the time of transfer); Spanier v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 623 P.2d 19, 24-25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (holding a
conveyance that left a business with "unreasonably small capital" to be fraudulent as to a
creditor who did not contract with transferor until after the transfer); David v. Zilah, 90
N.E.2d 343, 345 (Mass. 1950) (finding a conveyance to transferor's son fraudulent with
respect to a future creditor).
Courts certainly have asserted that a transfer may be fraudulent only as to persons who
have claims at the time of the transfer. Those assertions, however, generally have been
made in the dicta of cases involving claims that arose before the time of the transfer. See,
e.g., United States v. Brickman, 906 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that the
United States was a creditor of a transferor who made a transfer after incurring tax liability
but before the Internal Revenue Service issued an assessment of that liability); Dunham v.
Dunham, 910 P.2d 169, 171-72 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting, in dictum, that the
Idaho UF'TA applies only to claims that arise before the allegedly fraudulent transfer is
made). The Brickman court stated that "[tfo set aside transfers as fraudulent conveyances,
the United States must establish that its rights as a 'creditor' were impaired at the time the
conveyances were made." Brickman, 906 F. Supp. at 1172.
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debtor."63 Because proving actual intent is notoriously difficult, sec-
tion 4(b) lists a number of factors-known as "badges of fraud"64-
which courts may consider in determining actual intent. Among
those factors are whether "the debtor retained possession or control
of the property transferred after the transfer,"65 whether "the transfer
was of substantially all of the debtor's assets," 66 whether "the debtor
removed or concealed assets," 67 and whether the debtor received con-
sideration "reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred."68
However, even if the creditor cannot prove actual fraud under
section 4(a) (1) of the statute, the creditor may be able to set aside the
transfer into the trust on the ground of constructive fraud. Section
4(a) (2) of the UFTA deems a transfer fraudulent as to a creditor if the
debtor fails to receive consideration reasonably equivalent in value, so
long as the debtor
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a trans-
action for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasona-
bly small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her]
ability to pay as they became due.69
Thus, if a settlor transfers property into trust while engaging in a busi-
ness in which liability claims are likely, such as malpractice claims
against a physician or lawyer, the settlor's future creditors may be able
to set aside the transfers for constructive fraud, unless the settlor can
establish that she has obtained adequate liability insurance. 70
B. The Advent of Offshore Asset Protection Trusts
Until the 1980s, the offshore trust industry was largely English.
Centered in former British colonies, the industry used trust laws based
on those of England and drew many clients from the United Kingdom
and other Commonwealth countries. 7' These offshore jurisdictions
attracted trusts, in some measure, because they operated as tax havens
63 UNiF. FRAUDULPNT TRANSFER Acr, § 4(a) (1).
64 Id. § 4(b) cmt. 5.
65 Id. § 4(b) (2).
66 Id. § 4(b)(5).
67 Id. § 4(b) (7).
68 Id. § 4(b) (8).
69 Id. § 4(a) (2) (i)-(ii).
70 See Sullivan, supra note 62, at 998-1001 (arguing that insurance generally negates
fraudulent intent).
71 See Antony Duckworth, The Offshore Trust in Transition, in INTERNAAToNAL ESTATE




for residents of England, Australia, and New Zealand. 72 Most of the
tax advantages for American settlors, however, disappeared with the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.73 In an attempt to curtail
the use of foreign trusts to avoid American income taxes, the Act pro-
vided that the IRS would treat for income tax purposes the assets of
most foreign trusts settled by Americans as the settlor's assets.74
Offshore trusts nevertheless remain popular with some American
settlors, because financial institutions in these former British colonies
retain the English tradition of bank secrecy.75 As a result, offshore
trusts continue to be useful to settlors committed to tax evasion rather
than tax avoidance. If American auditors cannot trace transactions
between offshore banks and their clients, the offshore trust becomes
an attractive way to launder money to avoid American tax obliga-
tions.76 Starting in the mid-1980s, however, several offshore jurisdic-
tions identified a new source of trust business: clients seeking to avoid
not taxing authorities, but creditors.
Consider the Cook Islands' International Trusts Act of 1984. By
its terms, the statute applies only to international trusts, not to trusts
established for the benefit of residents of the Cook Islands-a sure
sign that the purpose of the statute was to attract foreign capital.77 To
that end, the statute includes numerous measures that make the Cook
Islands a favorite trust situs for settlors seeking to avoid creditor
claims. First, the statute makes self-settled spendthrift trusts fully en-
forceable. 78 Second, the statute provides that creditors may not reach
72 See id. at 136 (also explaining that tax authorities in England, Australia and New
Zealand disapproved of these trusts and have closed them to the offshore trust industry).
73 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
74 See 26 U.S.C. § 679 (1994). This provision was enacted as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 679, 90 Stat. 1520. For a more extensive discussion of
this provision, see Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing on the
Cake? , 15 VA. TAx Rxv. 399, 410-12 (1996).
75 See Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally
Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. C~am. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 679 (1982).
76 See id. at 681-86 (relying on testimony at congressional hearings to illustrate the
potential for using offshore tax havens to evade tax liability). An American company seek-
ing to deduct fraudulent expenses might make payments to an offshore company for serv-
ices allegedly rendered. See id. at 681-82. The offshore company, in turn, might be owned
by an offshore trust whose beneficiaries are the owners of the American company. See id. at
683. No record of payments from the offshore company to the offshore trust would be
available to American auditors, and the auditors would find it difficult to establish whether
the offshore company performed any services for the payments it received. See id.
77 See International Trusts Act (1984) § 2(1) (1996) (Cook Islands).
78 Section 13(F), entitled "Spendthrift beneficiary," provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, and notwithstanding any rule of law or
equity to the contrary, it shall be lawful for an instrument or disposition to
provide that any estate or interest in any property given or to be given to
any beneficiary shall not during the life of that beneficiary, or such lesser
period as may be specified in the instrument or disposition, be alienated or
pass by bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation or be liable to be seized, sold,
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the settlor's interest in an international trust even if the setflor retains
a right to revoke the trust.79 As a result, once a settlor's assets enter a
Cook Islands international trust, the settlor's creditors may not attach
the settlor-beneficiary's interest.
Third, although the law of the Cook Islands was founded on Eng-
lish law, including the Statute of Elizabeth's prohibition on fraudulent
transfers,80 the statute now virtually precludes creditors from attacking
a transfer into a Cook Islands international trust as a fraudulent con-
veyance.8' Under the statute, even if a creditor proves that the settlor
intended to defraud by transferring assets into a trust, the creditor
may not reach the trust assets unless the settlor was insolvent at the
time the creditor's claim arose.8 2 Moreover, even in the rare case in
attached, or taken in execution by process of law and where so provided
such provision shall take effect accordingly.
(2) Where property is given subject to any of the restrictions contained
in subsection (1), the right to derive income from such property by a bene-
ficiary and any income derived therefrom shall not pass by bankruptcy, in-
solvency or liquidation or be liable to be seized attached or taken in
execution by process of law.
Id. § 13(F).
79 Section 13(C), entitled "Retention of control and benefits by settlor," provides:
An international trust and a registered instrument shall not be de-
clared invalid or a disposition declared void or be affected in any way by
reason of the fact that the settlor, and if more than one, any of them,
either-
(a) retains, possesses or acquires a power to revoke the trust or
instrument;
(b) retains, possesses or acquires a power of disposition over
property of the trust or the subject of the instrument;
(c) retains, possesses or acquires a power to amend the trust or
instrument;
(d) retains, possesses or acquires any benefit interest or property
from the trust or any disposition or pursuant to the instrument;
(e) retains, possesses or acquires the power to remove or appoint
a trustee or protector
(f) retains, possess or acquires the power to direct a trustee or
protector on any matter;
(g) is a beneficiary, trustee or protector of the trust or instru-
ment either solely or together with others.
IM § 13(C).
80 Indeed, the High Court of the Cook Islands has recently reiterated that the Statute
of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570) (Eng.), remains in force with respect to domestic trans-
actions in the Cook Islands. See 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass'n v. Orange Grove Part-
ners, Plaint No. 208/94 (High Court of the Cook Islands 1995).
81 See International Trust Act (1984) § 13(B) (1996) (Cook Islands).
82 Section 13(B) deals with fraud. Although the statute as drafted includes a number
of inconsistencies, the drafters made some points abundantly clear. First, subsection (1)
makes an international trust subject to creditor claims only if the creditor can prove "be-
yond reasonable doubt" (a) that the settlor made a transfer "with principal intent to de-
fraud the creditor" and (b) that the transfer rendered the settlor "insolvent or without
property by which that creditor's claim (if successful) could have been satisfied." Id.
§ 13(B) (1). Subsection (2) goes on to provide that if, at the time the settlor made the
transfer to the trust, the fair market value of the settlor's property (exclusive of property
relating to the trust) "exceeded the value of the creditor's claim," then the transfer shall be
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which a transfer to an international trust is deemed fraudulent, the
Cook Islands statute imposes a short statute of limitations on creditor
claims: the creditor must bring the action within one year from the
date of the fraudulent transfer.83 As a result, if the settlor of a Cook
Islands trust is solvent when she transfers assets into the trust, the
transfers will not, under Cook Islands law, be voidable at the behest of
creditors. Finally, the statute expressly provides that no Cook Islands
court shall enforce or recognize a foreign judgment against a Cook
Islands trust, or a settlor, trustee, or beneficiary of the trust, if the
judgment is based upon application of a law inconsistent with the
statute. 84
Many offshore jurisdictions embrace to varying degrees these
three features of the Cook Islands statute-authorization of self-set-
tled trusts, evisceration of fraudulent transfer protection, and refusal
to enforce foreign judgments. 85 Although a desire to launder money
may, to some extent, explain the popularity of offshore trusts, these
new asset protection provisions are undoubtedly responsible, at least
deemed not to have been made with intent to defraud the creditor. Id § 13(B) (2). More-
over, subsection (4) provides that a transfer into an international trust shall be deemed not
to have been made with intent to defraud a creditor if the "disposition of property took
place before that creditor's cause of action [against the settlor] accrued." Id. § 13(B) (4).
Subsection (4) would appear to make subsection (3) superfluous, because subsection (3)
provides that a disposition to an international trust shall not be fraudulent as against a
creditor if "the disposition takes place after the expiration of 2 years from the date that
creditor's cause of action accrued." Id. § 13B(3).
83 See id. § 13(B) (3) (b) (providing that a transfer shall not be fraudulent if the credi-
tor fails to bring a cause of action "before the expiration of I year from the date such...
disposition took place").
84 See id. § 13(D). The Cook Islands High Court, however, has not given to the stat-
ute the broad construction its drafters intended. In an important opinion, the court held
that a California judgment entitled a creditor to prevent removal of assets from a Cook
Islands trust. In a particularly disingenuous sentence, written after the court found some
ambiguity in the statute, the court concluded: "It should not be lightly assumed that Parlia-
ment intended to defeat the claims of creditors by allowing international trusts to be used
to perpetrate a fraud against a creditor." 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass'n v. Orange
Grove Partners, Plaint No. 208/94 (High Court of the Cook Islands 1995).
85 One commentator reported that twelve offshore jurisdictions have enacted statutes
designed to attract asset protection trusts. See Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and Drafting
Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, 23 Esr. PLAN. 65, 65 (1996). For a catalogue of protections
available in a number of popular offshore jurisdictions, see Lorenzetti, supra note 16, at
140-43.
The consensus appears to be that, with the possible exception of Belize, the Cook
Islands statute remains the most attractive to asset protection planners. One commentator
has noted that while "[t]he Cook Islands adopted at least some version of fraudulent con-
veyance law [,J Belize (the former British Honduras) did not even try." Thomas Moers
Mayer, ShelteringAssets in 1994, in REAL ESrATE WoRKoUTs AND BA,RucurCEs 1994, at 375,
446 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. N-402, 1994).
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in part, for the one trillion dollars or more currently held in offshore
trusts8 6
C. Delaware and Alaska Enter the Fray
Since 1997, two states-Alaska and Delaware-have begun to
compete for asset protection trusts.8 7 Neither state offers trust settlors
the range of protection available in the Cook Islands and other off-
shore jurisdictions. Both states, however, offer the following advan-
tages not available offshore: ease of access to the trust's assets, lower
costs associated with trust creation, and greater political stability than
some offshore locations.88 Hence, less asset protection may be neces-
sary to attract trusts into these states.
1. The Alaska Statute
In 1997, the Alaska legislature amended its trust law to permit a
trust settlor to include an enforceable restriction on the power of
creditors to reach the settlor's discretionary interest in the trust princi-
pal or income, provided the following four conditions are met: (1) the
transfer into the trust was not fraudulent; (2) the settlor did not re-
serve a right to revoke; (3) the trust instrument does not require any
distribution of the trust income or principal to the settlor; and (4) the
settlor is not, at the time of transfer, in default by thirty or more days
on payments due under a child supportjudgment or order.8 9 Thus, if
a settlor creates a discretionary trust, under which the trustee has ab-
86 See Baker, supra note 10, at 55 (estimating that $1 trillion to $5 trillion currently are
being held offshore trusts); Lorenzetti, supra note 16, at 140 (reporting estimates that $1
trillion were held in offshore asset protection trusts in 1994).
87 See Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the Asset
Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32 VAN-o. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 831, 850
(1999); see also Mark L. Silow, Is It Now Possible to Buy American Version of Asset Protection
Trusts?, LEcAL INTELuGENcER, Sept. 9, 1997, at 7, 7 ("In apparent response to (the] loss of
business opportunity, the states of Alaska and Delaware have each recently enacted legisla-
tion intended to make trusts established in those states more attractive for [asset protec-
tion] purposes.").
88 See Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Direction in Estate Plan-
ning. North to Alaska, TR. & EST., Sept. 1997, at 48, 54 (discussing advantages of Alaska trusts
over offshore trusts). The Blattmachrs also speculate that American courts might be less
likely to treat the creation of an Alaska trust as an attempt to secrete assets than they would
with respect to a foreign trust. See Eric Henzy, Offshore and "Other" Shore Asset Protection
Trusts, 32 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 739, 740-41 (1999) (noting that Alaska or Delaware trusts
might cost between $6,000 and $12,000 to create, as opposed to the estimated $18,500 to
create an offshore trust); Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra, at 54.
89 See Ar.AsA STAT. § 34.40.110(a)-(b) (1998). These sections provide:
(a) A person who in writing transfers property in trust may provide that the
interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be either voluntarily or invol-
untarily transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to the benefi-
ciary by the trustee. In this subsection,
(1) "property" includes real property, personal property, and interests
in real or personal property;
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solute discretion to distribute all or part of the income to the settlor,
the settlor's creditors may not reach the trust principal unless the
transfer into the trust was fraudulent. This provision represents a sig-
nificant departure from the prevailing treatment of self-settled discre-
tionary trusts.90
Moreover, Alaska's fraudulent conveyance law is not creditor-
friendly. Alaska has adopted neither the UFTA nor its predecessor,
the UFCA. 91 Alaska's fraudulent conveyance statute requires proof of
actual fraud and includes no conception of constructive fraud.92 Also,
it extinguishes any fraudulent transfer claim after four years from the
time of the transfer, even if the creditor's claim did not arise until
after the transfer;93 thus, if the settlor creates a trust, anticipating and
seeking to avoid possible future liability, the settlor will succeed so
long as the liability does not arise-or the creditor does not sue-
within four years after the settlor makes the transfer of property into
the trust.
Finally, consider the ease with which a trust settlor can arrange to
have Alaska law applied to the trust. Under the Alaska statute, a provi-
sion in the trust instrument selecting Alaska law "is valid, effective, and
conclusive" if at least some of the assets are deposited in the State and
administered by an Alaska resident or Alaska banking institution.94 So
long as one of the trustees is an Alaska resident or banking institution,
(2) "transfer" means any form of transfer, including deed, conveyance,
or assignment.
(b) If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this sec-
tion, the transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is
created, a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, or another person
from satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary's interest in the trust, unless
the
(1) transfer was intended in whole or in part to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors or other persons under AS 34.40.010;
(2) trust provides that the settlor may revoke or terminate all or part of
the trust without the consent of a person who has a substantial beneficial
interest in the trust and the interest would be adversely affected by the exer-
cise of the power held by the settlor to revoke or terminate all or part of the
trust; in this paragraph, "revoke or terminate" does not include a power to
veto a distribution from the trust, a testamentary special power of appoint-
ment or similar power, or the right to receive a distribution of income,
corpus, or both in the discretion of a person, including a trustee, other
than the settior;
(3) trust requires that all or a part of the trust's income or principal, or
both, must be distributed to the settlor; or
(4) at the time of the transfer, the settlor is in default by 30 or more
days of making a payment due under a child support judgment or order.
Id.
90 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
91 See Summers v. Hagen, 852 P.2d 1165, 1169 n.5 (Alaska 1993).
92 See ALAsKA STAT. § 34.40.010; see also id. § 34.40.090 (providing that fraudulent in-
tent "is a question of fact, and not of law").
93 See id. § 34.40.110(d).
94 Id. § 13.36.035(c). This section provides:
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a nonresident individual or a non-Alaska banking institution may
serve as a co-trustee.95
In 1998, Alaska amended the statute to make it even more attrac-
tive to trust settlors. First, the legislature enacted a provision that al-
lows the settlor of an existing trust established in another state or
foreign jurisdiction to change the trust's situs to Alaska.96 At the same
time, the legislature made it clear that a fraudulent transfer into an
Alaska trust would not be set aside in toto, but "only to the extent
necessary to satisfy the settlor's debt to the creditor or other person at
whose instance the trust or property transfer is voided or set aside."97
2. The Delaware Statute
In 1997-the same year Alaska's legislature enacted its asset pro-
tection statute-Delaware's legislature enacted the Qualified Disposi-
tions in Trust Act.98 This statute disallows any action brought "for an
attachment or other provisional remedy against property that is the
A provision that the laws of this state govern the validity, construction,
and administration of the trust and that the trust is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of this state is valid, effective, and conclusive for the trust if
(1) some or all of the trust assets are deposited in this state and are
being administered by a qualified person; in this paragraph, "deposited in
this state" includes being held in a checking account, time deposit, certifi-
cate of deposit, brokerage account, trust company fiduciary account, or
other similar account or deposit that is located in this state;
(2) a trustee is a qualified person who is designated as a trustee under
the governing instrument or by a court having jurisdiction over the trust;
(3) the powers of the trustee identified under (2) of this subsection
include or are limited to
(A) maintaining records for the trust on an exclusive basis or a nonex-
clusive basis; and
(B) preparing or arranging for the preparation of, on an exclusive ba-
sis or a nonexclusive basis, an income tax return that must be filed by the
trust; and
(4) part or all of the administration occurs in this state, including phys-
ically maintaining trust records in this state.
Id. The statute goes on to define "qualified person" to mean:
(A) an individual who, except for brief intervals, military service, at-
tendance at an educational or training institution, or for absences for good
cause shown, resides in this state, whose true and permanent home is in this
state, who does not have a present intention of moving from this state, and
who has the intention of returning to this state when away;
(B) a trust company that is organized under AS 06.25 and that has its
principal place of business in this state; or
(C) a bank that is organized under AS 06.05, or a national banking
association that is organized under 12 U.S.C. 21-216d, if the bank or na-
tional banking association possesses and exercises trust powers and has its
principal place of business in this state.
Id. § 13.36.390(1).
95 See id. § 13.36.320(a).
96 See AIAsKA STAT. § 13.36.043.
97 d. § 13.36.310(b).
98 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570-3576 (Supp. 1998). The statute was enacted as part
of 71 Del. Laws 159 (1997).
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subject of a qualified disposition" in trust, subject only to Delaware's
fraudulent conveyance statute.99 The statute defines a transfer in trust
as a "qualified disposition" even if the trustee or trustees retain discre-
tion to make payments of income or principal to the trust settlor.100
The Delaware statute permits nonresidents to act as trust advisers with
authority to remove and appoint qualified trustees, or "to direct, con-
sent to or disapprove distributions from the trust."10 1 In this respect,
the Delaware statute is like the Alaska statute, and unlike the law of all
other American jurisdictions.
On the other hand, if the trust settlor has an absolute right to
receive trust principal, the statute implicitly suggests that the disposi-
tion would not be treated as a "qualified disposition," and creditors
would be able to attach the trust property.102 In this respect, too, Del-
aware's statute resembles the Alaska statute. But in one important re-
spect, the Delaware statute appears to be more protective of trust
settlors than the Alaska statute: in Delaware, the settlor may retain an
absolute right to income and still be able to shield trust assets from
creditors.'03 In other words, the Delaware statute authorizes self-set-
tled trusts that are spendthrift as to income. However, the Delaware
99 Id. § 3572(a).
100 See id. § 3570(6) (requiring only that the transfer be to a "qualified trustee... by
means of a trust instrument"); see also id. § 3570(8) (stating that a qualified trustee is a
person who (1) if a natural person, is a resident of Delaware or, if not a natural person, is
an institution authorized by the state to act as a trustee, and (2) maintains custody of some
of the property in the state, maintains records for the trust, "or otherwise materially partici-
pates in the administration of the trust").
101 Id. § 3570(8) (c). A "trust instrument" within the meaning of the statute must in-
corporate Delaware law, must be irrevocable, and must provide that the interest of the
transferor or other beneficiary "may not be transferred, assigned, pledged or mortgaged."
Id. § 3570(9). The statute does not explicitly define "irrevocable," but provides:
[A) trust instrument shall not be deemed revocable on account of its inclu-
sion of [the following provision]:
4. The transferor's potential or actual receipt of principal if
such potential or actual receipt of principal is either in the sole dis-
cretion of a qualified trustee or qualified trustees or is pursuant to an
ascertainable standard contained in the trust instrument ....
See id. § 3570(9) (b). Therefore, the existence of trustee discretion to make payments of
principal to the settlor does not make the trust revocable and does not remove the trust
proceeds from the statutory protection against creditor claims.
102 See id. § 3570(9) (b). This section expressly provides that the trust shall not be
treated as revocable merely because the trustee has discretion to make principal payments
to the settlor. See id. § 3570(9) (b) (4). The failure of the drafters to list as exceptions trusts
in which the trustee is required to make principal payments to the settlor creates the strong
inference that, if the settlor retains an absolute right to the distribution of the trust princi-
pal, courts will treat the trust as revocable, rendering the transfer not a qualified
disposition.
103 See id. § 3570(9) (b) (providing that an instrument will not be deemed revocable
"on account of... [t]he transferor's potential or actual receipt of income, including rights
to such income retained in the trust instrument"). Unlike paragraph (4) of § 3570(9) (b),
paragraph (3) includes no language requiring that the transferor's right to income be
within the discretion of the trustee. Ordinary principles of statutory construction, there-
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statute includes an express exemption for claims for support or ali-
mony in favor of a spouse or child, claims for distribution of property
in favor of a spouse, and claims for "death, personal injury or property
damage on or before the date of a qualified disposition."10 4 The
Alaska statute includes no comparable exemption.
Finally, the Delaware statute, like the Alaska statute, permits cred-
itors to reach trust assets if the creditor can demonstrate that the
transfer into trust was fraudulent. 105 Also, like the Alaska statute, the
Delaware statute imposes a four-year limitation period on fraudulent
transfer claims, measured from the time the setfior made the qualified
distribution.10 6 Unlike Alaska, however, Delaware has adopted the ac-
tual- and constructive-fraud provisions of the UFTA, 10 7 which may
make it substantially easier for a creditor to prove fraud in Delaware
than in Alaska.
II
DOES INTERSTATE COMPETITION ASSURE
OpTMAL TRUST LAws?
The evidence this Article has presented so far establishes that a
number ofjurisdictions, both domestic and foreign, compete for trust
business.' 08 Is this an area in which a form of Gresham's law ap-
fore, lead to the conclusion that in Delaware, a settlor may insulate an income interest in
trust from creditor claims even if the income interest is absolute rather than discretionary.
104 Id. § 3573.
105 See id. § 3572. Like the Alaska statute, the Delaware statute was amended in 1998.
The 1998 amendments did not significantly change the protections created the previous
year. See 71 Del. Laws 343 (1998).
106 SeeDEL. CODEANN. tit. 12, § 3572(b). If the claim arose before the qualified dispo-
sition was made, but the disposition could not reasonably have been discovered until later,
the creditor has an additional one year "after the qualified disposition was or could reason-
ably have been discovered by the creditor." Id. § 3572(b) (1).
107 See id. §§ 1304(a)(1)-(2) (1999).
108 Although the focus here is on asset protection trusts, a number of states have also
begun to compete for trust business by abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities, thereby
making it possible for a settlor to create a "dynasty" or "perpetual" trust that avoids estate
taxation, as well as permitting a settlor to retain greater "dead hand" control of property.
Idaho and Wisconsin, for example, have long disregarded the Rule Against Perpetuities.
See IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1999). The South Dakota
legislature has taken the same path. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 43-5-4 (Michie 1997). South
Dakota's action was part of its aggressive campaign to attract trust and banking business to
the state, a campaign which included the repeal of its interest rate ceiling on consumer
credit cards, see Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation,
3 YALEJ. ON REG. 201,215-16 (1986), and its rejection of a state income tax, see Pierce H.
McDowell, III, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for Generations to Come, Ta. & EsT., OcL
1993, at 47, 48. See also McDowell, supra note 14, at 14 (noting that South Dakota's gover-
nor was pushing a task force to expand legislative prowess in enacting trust legislation).
Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, and Illinois also have substantially watered down or abol-
ished the Rule Against Perpetuities. See ALAsKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a) (3) (Michie 1998);
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901 (West Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (Supp.
1998); 765 ILu COMp. STAT. ANN. 305/4 (West Supp. 1999). Other states may follow. In-
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plies?10 9 Will bad, inefficient, or unfair trust law drive out the good?
Or does jurisdictional competition constrain inefficient trust law, as-
suring survival only of the "fittest" trust law? Or does the existence of
competition provide little insight on the relative wisdom of various
trust law regimes? This Part considers these questions.
A. Are States Rational Maximizers?
Within the private sector, competition among firms generates ef-
ficient production of goods when each firm continues to produce
goods until its cost of producing an additional good equals the price a
purchaser is willing to pay for the good. At that point, production of
additional goods is no longer worth the firm's while. So long as firms
are price takers, they all will make the same choice: produce goods
until marginal cost equals price. As a result, a firm will produce a
good if and only if a buyer is willing to pay the marginal cost of pro-
ducing the good. The premise of this analysis, of course, is that each
firm will act in its self-interest and maximize its revenue. If firms rou-
tinely failed to act in their own self-interest, competition could not
generate efficient levels of production.110
Similarly, for competition among states to generate efficient trust
law, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition is that the state (whether
it be Alaska, Delaware, or the Cook Islands) act in its own self-interest
when it considers what legal regime to adopt. However, the premise
that states act rationally in their self-interest is more questionable than
the premise that business firms do so.
The first problem is defining a state's self-interest. Like the busi-
ness firm, the state is a collective entity, comprised of agents and prin-
cipals. In a business firm, however, the principals and their interests
are generally well-defined. The principals are the stockholders each
of whose interests is the same: to maximize the return on their invest-
ments. From this particular premise we reasonably can move to the
more general premise that a firm's self-interest is to maximize share-
holders' return, subject only to agency-cost problems."' For states,
deed, ProfessorJoel Dobris has recently written that "[t]here is room to speculate that the
rule is on its last legs in New York, too, as people are going to other states to create perpet-
ual dynasty trusts." Dobris, supra note 14, at 571-72.
109 Cf Cary, supra note 22, at 672 (suggesting that Gresham's law explained the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's corporate law decisions).
110 Economists need not assume that all firms act in rational self-interest. Some firms
may not be profit maximizers, but through a Darwinian natural-selection process, those
firms disappear from the market. See Edward Rubin, Rational States, 83 VA. L. Ray. 1433,
1438 (1997). If, however, no firms acted rationally, it would be difficult to assert that com-
petition generates efficient levels of production.
111 See id. at 1438-39 (discussing "agency" and "transmission" problems as independent
constraints on a firm's efficiency, and defining transmission problems as errors that occur
when managers transmit instructions to subordinates for implementation).
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however, this analysis is more complicated. First, who the state's prin-
cipals are is not clear; should they include only its current residents
(citizens or voters), or should they encompass potential or future resi-
dents? Second, unlike the interests of profit-maximizing sharehold-
ers, the interests of the state's principals may be at odds with one
another, regardless of how we define that class. Economist Kenneth
Arrow's theorem suggests that no nontyrannical mechanism exists for
aggregating individual preferences into a single and consistent social
preference." 2
The literature on interjurisdictional competition generally simpli-
fies these problems by assuming that it is possible to identify a "repre-
sentative [resident] consumer"-much like the shareholder in a
business firm-whose interests the state should maximize.' 1 3 Alterna-
tively, the literature assumes a welfare-maximizing state, presumably
one that makes its decisions based on a Kaldor-Hicks, cost-benefit
analysis that sums up costs and benefits to all of its residents.1 4
Defining a state's self-interest, however, is only a preliminary step.
In order to claim that competition will generate efficient regulation,
one must establish that state officials-the agents-act in the interests
of state residents. Public choice theory, however, suggests that govern-
ment officials lack the incentives to maximize the aggregate welfare of
112 See 1 KENN=T J. Aiutow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, in CoLLECFED
PAPERS OF KENNErs" J. ARRowv: SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUSTICE 1, 4-7 (1983).
113 Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Allocative and Distributive Implications of
Local Fiscal Competition, in Co rrnoN AMONG STATES AND LocAl Govu ERNmrnrs 127, 130
(Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) [hereinafter Oates & Schwab, Allocative
and Distributive Implications] (assuming that local government's objective is to maximize the
utility of a representative resident consumer); see also Wallace E. Oates & Robert M.
Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?,
35J. PuB. EcoN. 333, 339-41 (1988) (analyzing the interests of a "representative consumer"
by using a "media-voter" model).
Peter Enrich criticizes this view, arguing that "government's role is to provide those
services that the citizenry deems valuable but that the market is rn-suited to value properly."
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 HAuv. L. REv. 378, 403 (1996). So long as capital is mobile,
however, government cannot, in a competitive environment, impose a tax on capital
greater than the local benefit the capital generates, because the capital will simply move to
anotherjurisdiction. Hence, as Oates and Schwab point out, "all local taxes become bene-
fit taxes." Oates & Schwab, Allocative and Distributive Implications, supra, at 131.
The representative-resident model-although problematic because of the likely differ-
ences in preferences among residents-is somewhat more plausible for local governments
if we assume that residents dissatisfied with the preferences of their neighbors will exit to
other municipalities. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL.
ECON. 416, 419 (1956); see also infra text accompanying notes 116-39 (discussing how cor-
porate charters steer firms).
114 Cf Revesz, supra note 25, at 1220-21 (acknowledging that not all jurisdictions may




the state's residents.115 If government officials are motivated in large
measure by the desire to maintain and improve their political posi-
tions, they may seek to attract businesses favored by organized groups,
even if the costs of such businesses, which may be spread throughout
the entire population, exceed the benefits the supporting groups de-
rive. 116 Similarly, officials who believe they can directly capture the
gains associated with entrance of a new business-for instance,
through campaign contributions-may encourage entrance of the
new business despite the significant costs it may generate. Moreover,
even a relatively conscientious official might overestimate the value of
a business due to the considerable publicity it would generate to bring
or retain the business within the state.1 7
By contrast, the same official might underestimate the costs asso-
ciated with bringing or retaining the business, which are often spread
over time, because those costs would generate less public attention.
Furthermore, the official may recognize that the public is unlikely to
blame her for providing too much incentive because it cannot pre-
cisely ascertain how much incentive is necessary to lure a business into
the state.118 On the other hand, if the official offers too little incen-
tive, and the business is lost, the public is more likely to hold her re-
sponsible for this outcome. 1 9 Hence, systematic bias may exist that
leads state governments to provide too much incentive to attract new
businesses into the state.
115 In particular, public choice theorists recognize the tendency of government offi-
cials to overvalue the interests of small but organized groups, while undervaluing the inter-
ests of consumer and taxpayer groups. The classic works remain JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TuLLocK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) and MANCUR OLsON, Ja, THE LOGIC
OF COLLEcrIvE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GOODS (1965).
116 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 246 (discussing the assumption in some
models of government action that officials will assure that "the controlling voting coalition
... enjoys most of the public goods benefits while sharing the taxation burden with disen-
franchised local citizens").
117 See Enrich, supra note 113, at 393-94. Enrich states: "By taking visible steps to en-
courage economic growth, [elected officials] can take credit for subsequent economic suc-
cesses, whatever their actual causes, and avoid blame for any losses ofjobs to other states
that otherwise would have been attributed to them if they had failed to act." Id. at 394
(footnote omitted).
118 See Enrich, supra note 113, at 395 ("Forecasts both of the foregone revenues from
business tax incentives and of their countervailing economic benefits... are notoriously
open to debate .... ."); cf. Andrew Reschovsky, How Closely Does State and Local Government
Behavior Conform to a Perfectly Competitive Model?, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOvERNmzNTs, supra note 113, at 147, 147-48 ("Governments tend to be particularly sensi-
tive to the demands of businesses because they have no way of judging the credibility of
threats to leave .. ").
119 See Nonna A. Noto, Trying to Understand the Economic Development Official's Dilemma,
in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GovERNMENTs, supra note 113, at 251, 254 (not-
ing that officials are subject to more criticism for denying a concession and losing a firm
than for giving too generous a concession and wasting resources); see also Enrich, supra
note 113, at 393-94 (describing the intense pressure on officials to attract business).
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Some, but not all, of the agency problems associated with state
action are ameliorated when government officials act by general legis-
lation rather than individualized deal making. Arrow's theorem ap-
plies to all forms of government action: no neutral way exists to
aggregate citizen preferences, regardless of context. The general ag-
gregation problem does not, however, generate a particular systemic
bias with respect to incentives for new businesses. Nonetheless, the
practical political problems that lead officials to provide excessive in-
centives are far worse when officials engage in individualized deal
making than when they use general legislative processes.1 20 When a
state offers incentives through general legislation, the capacity of indi-
vidual enterprises to secure special benefits is significantly reduced.12'
So long as enterprises must meet statutory requirements, state officials
will earn less public credit, and take less public blame, for the migra-
tion of firms into and out of the state. At the same time, state officials
will be less able to use the bargaining process to curry political favor
with new enterprises.
Why, then, would state officials act by general legislation rather
than through individualized negotiation? When a state seeks to at-
tract many separate enterprises, each of which generates a relatively
small benefit, the cost of negotiating with each enterprise might well
exceed the value generated by the enterprise, even when officials take
into account the personal benefit they might derive from a deal. In
this situation, general legislation is a more attractive alternative: the
legislature drafts one attractive statute, and then waits for the returns.
Corporation statutes furnish the most obvious example of general
legislation designed to attract business into the state. Delaware and
other states could have offered corporate charters to companies on
individualized terms, as most states did until the late nineteenth cen-
tury.12 2 But in light of current demand for corporate charters, and
the limited advantage that states would derive from each charter, the
costs of individual negotiation would likely swallow the advantages a
120 State officials may well offer overly generous incentives even by general legislation.
A possible example is state takeover legislation, which is general in form, but which a major
local firm facing a hostile takeover bid often stimulates. See RoMAo, supra note 23, at 57.
The point is a comparative one: the ability to tailor incentives to particular firms generates
more rents for public officials to capture.
121 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Forward: Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 29-31 (1988)
(arguing that reducing discretion in granting state charters reduces the "level of intrigue"
and that selective incorporation gives political actors a greater opportunity to extract eco-
nomic rents); Sterk, supra note 27, at 852 (concluding that government officials have more
opportunity to discriminate in favor of particular developers when government acts
through deal making rather than rule making).
122 For a discussion of the special chartering system and its demise, see Henry N. But-
ler, Nineteenth-Centuy Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J.
LEc.L S=r. 129, 138-63 (1985).
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state derives from incorporation. 123 Moreover, incorporating compa-
nies would have an incentive to avoid states that chose to follow the
individualized negotiation model, with its attendant negotiation costs,
in favor of states that opted for general legislation. 124
The recent wave of trust legislation appears to follow the same
model. The benefit that Alaska or the Cook Islands derives from any
single trust is small-perhaps even smaller than the benefit that Dela-
ware derives from reincorporation of a single additional firm. By pro-
viding general legislation attractive to trust settlors, jurisdictions hope
to persuade many trusts to relocate, thus generating significant aggre-
gate benefits. The competition for trust business, however, differs
from the competition for corporate charters in one significant re-
spect: Filling the state government's coffers does not appear to be a
major factor motivating trust-friendly jurisdictions. Delaware, of
course, generates a significant percentage of state revenue from cor-
porate charter fees. 125 Jurisdictions seeking to become trust havens,
on the other hand, appear content to draw business to local financial
institutions and lawyers, even without direct benefit to the public
fisc. 1
2 6
The basic point is this: there is more reason to believe that state
officials are acting in the interest of the state, and not merely in their
private interest when they enact trust legislation of general applica-
tion, than when they engage in individualized deal making. The con-
123 Some dispute exists in the literature about the gains available to states from individ-
ualized corporate charters. Lawrence Friedman has contended that the process of individ-
ualized chartering took up more legislative time than it was worth to the legislators. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 172, 447 (1973). Henry Butler, how-
ever, criticized Friedman, contending that the gains remained significant until jurisdic-
tional competition wiped them out. See Butler, supra note 122, at 134, 146-63.
124 Butler traces the demise of special charters to interstate competition, first spawned
by NewJersey's liberal general incorporation statute, which was enacted in 1875. See But-
ler, supra note 122, at 156-63.
125 See ROMANo, supra note 23, at 6 (stating that "a substantial portion of the state's tax
revenue-averaging more than 15 percent from 1960 to 1999-is derived from incorpora-
tion fees").
126 Another plausible explanation for enactment of asset protection trust legislation
focuses not on competition for new business but on regulatory capture: Organized interest
groups, including the bar and trust companies, seek legislation that will enable them to
generate more business, even at the expense of other local residents (particularly credi-
tors). Regulatory capture has also been advanced as an explanation for corporate legisla-
tion favorable to corporate managers. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate
Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8
C,4ozo L. Rxv. 759, 762-64 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an
Interest-Group Theoy of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. RE V. 469, 485 (1987). So long as
trust capital is mobile, however, competition would drive states to enact trust legislation
favorable to trust settlors even without regulatory capture. If the legislation was not suffi-
ciently favorable, settlors would move their trusts to other states, provided, of course, that




cerns about official self-dealing that arise when officials act in a deal-
making mode are significantly less pressing. Hence, the primary ques-
tion for consideration is whether competition among the states aligns
the interests of the individual states with the interests of the nation (or
in a global context, the world), or whether competition among the
states makes all of the states worse off than they would be under some
form of multistate coordination.
B. The Effects of Competition
When William Cary examined the state of corporate law in 1974,
he concluded that, in its quest to attract corporate charters, Delaware
had developed a corporate law that was unduly tilted in favor of cor-
porate managers and was inadequately protective of corporate share-
holders.12 7 Gary argued that other states had little choice but to
follow Delaware's lead; if they did not offer similar benefits to corpo-
rate managers, local corporations would simply move to Delaware.128
Thus, Cary reasoned that even if each state would prefer to impose
more stringent regulations on corporate managers, competition for
charters precluded the states from doing so.129 In Cary's view, compe-
tition among states was a "race for the bottom" that made all share-
holders worse off.'3 0 Gary's proposed cure was federal regulation-in
the case of corporate law, a set of minimum federal standards to be
superimposed on top of state corporate law.' 3 '
Over the succeeding quarter century, the academic literature has
generally discredited Gary's argument. Ralph Winter observed that if
Gary were correct, and Delaware law were unattractive to sharehold-
ers, the result should be lower earnings and share prices in Delaware
corporations, reflecting reduced investor confidence in manage-
ment. 32 Because management has a strong incentive to keep earn-
ings and share prices high, it would in turn seek to reincorporate in a
state whose laws were more conducive to higher earnings and share
prices. As a result, Winter argued, the competition for corporate
charters would tend toward optimal corporate-law regimes.1 3'
The argument that interjurisdictional competition leads to more
efficient government regulation did not begin with Winter. In a 1956
article, economist Charles Tiebout argued that competition among
municipalities could generate optimal provision of public goods be-
cause potential residents would "shop" among municipalities for the
127 See Carey, supra note 22, at 666.
128 See id. at 666-67.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 705.
131 See id. at 700-03.
152 See Winter, supra note 23, at 256.
133 See id. at 290.
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one that offered their preferred mix of public goods.' 34 Each munici-
pality would seek to attract new residents so long as additional resi-
dents generated more benefits than cost, allowing it to provide its
bundle of services at the lowest average cost.13 5
By adapting Tiebout's hypothesis to corporate law, Winter
spawned an extensive literature on competition for corporate char-
ters. Much of the literature identifies structural problems that pre-
vent interstate competition from generating a race to the top, 36 but
Winter's article has nevertheless shifted the debate. First, empirical
studies that examine the effect of reincorporation on share prices
mushroomed, testing Winter's hypothesis that corporations would typ-
ically reincorporate in states that offered laws more favorable to share-
holders.137 These studies generally confirm Winter's hypothesis.138
Second, the literature on corporate federalism has caused advocates
of federal regulation to accept the burden of demonstrating why cor-
porate law should not be left to state regulation. 3 9
Tiebout's influence in the legal literature has extended well be-
yond the debate over corporate charters. Richard Revesz has argued
that federal environmental law takes insufficient account of the advan-
tages of competition among states. 140 Vicki Been has suggested that
competition among municipalities will limit their ability to impose on
developers exactions that would distort the housing market.141 Clay
Gillette has argued that state competition for business facilitates "eco-
nomic integration for the benefit of the nation as a whole," making
federal intervention undesirable. 42 In general, the argument in each
134 See Tiebout, supra note 113, at 418-20.
135 See id. at 419-20.
136 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIScHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUcruRE OF
CORPORATE LAw 222-23 (1991) (concluding that, although interjurisdictional competition
will not lead to a race to the top, state regulation of corporate law will be more efficient
than federal regulation); RoMANo, supra note 23, at 52-59 (identifying agency problems
that might lead corporate managers to support, and state legislators to enact, inefficient
anti-takeover legislation); William W. Bratton &Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1861, 1876-1903 (1995)
(framing the debate over charter competition and proposing "a modified description of
the system").
137 See RoMANo, supra note 23, at 225; Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Rele-
vance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. Rnv. 1 (1989); Peter
Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus
Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
138 See RoMANo, supra note 23, at 14-24 (summarizing empirical research).
139 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HAv. L. REv. 1435 (1992).
140 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 2341, 2342-44 (1996); Revesz, supra note 25, at 1210-12.
141 See Been, supra note 27, at 478.
142 Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause,
82 MiNN. L. Ray. 447, 448 (1997).
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area has been that, if state government decision makers make rational
judgments about the costs and benefits of attracting new businesses,
each state will compete "up to the point when the marginal benefits of
additional industry no longer exceed the marginal costs."143
Taken to its extreme, the argument suggests that competition
among states will result in an efficient level of regulation in each state,
making federal regulation counterproductive. The general claim that
interjurisdictional competition will lead to efficient regulation, how-
ever, is a claim that requires heroic assumptions. Tiebout himself
identified several of these assumptions: (1) that economic actors can
costlessly move from one jurisdiction to another in pursuit of pack-
ages of public goods they find attractive; 44 (2) that actors have ade-
quate information about government policies and practices;145 and
(3) that enough competing jurisdictions exist to ensure alternative ju-
risdictions offering precisely the same mix of public goods and serv-
ices;146 if a particular state offers a bundle of public goods and services
that no other state duplicates, that state is in a position to extract eco-
nomic rents from firms seeking that specific bundle.
Beyond the assumptions Tiebout identified, the claim that in-
tejurisdictional competition generates efficient regulation also re-
quires state officials to act as entrepreneurial decision makers, seeking
to maximize the interests of state residents.147 To the extent that state
143 d. at 489. As a result, communities would essentially act as price takers, unable to
derive benefits from new businesses through redistributive taxation. See Oates & Schwab,
Allocative and Distributive Implications, supra note 113, at 128.
144 See Tiebout, supra note 113, at 419.
145 See id. at 420.
146 See id. at 421. For Tiebout-style competition to generate efficient regulation, the
number ofjurisdictions must be sufficiently high to permit an economic actor dissatisfied
with an inefficient rule promulgated by one jurisdiction to move to another jurisdiction
without giving up the kinds of benefits offered by the firstjurisdiction. For most economic
actors shopping among jurisdictions, however, a number of public goods, of which law is
only one, will be relevant factors in making a choice. Eachjurisdiction will offer a "bundle"
of public goods from which the economic actor may choose. If the bundles offered are
significantly different across jurisdictions, any individual state may be able to introduce an
inefficient rule without risking the loss of existing firms or residents, because those firms
or residents may prefer the other elements in thejurisdiction's bundle. To eliminate this
potential for inefficiency, multiple jurisdictions that offer virtually the same bundle must
exist. However, as the number of public goods in the bundle increases, the number of
jurisdictions necessary to offer the efficient array of public goods quickly skyrockets and
approaches the number of economic actors in the system. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHoIcE II 157 (rev. ed. 1989); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 223-24.
147 As Bratton and McCahery observe, nothing in the Tiebout model technically re-
quires state officials to act as entrepreneurs; if they fail to do so, the state would theoreti-
cally lose its entire population to other jurisdictions whose officials produce public goods
more efficiently. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 235-37. To the extent, how-
ever, that imperfect mobility would prevent inefficiently run states from disappearing, any
model suggesting that interjurisdictional competition will generate efficient regulation
must assume entrepreneurial state officials seeking to maximize the economic welfare of
existing residents. This conception of state officials, however, is problematic. See, e.g., Ju-
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officials behave as imperfect agents of state residents, the potential for
inefficiency remains. 148 Furthermore, as the corporate literature
makes clear, the claim that jurisdictional competition promotes effi-
cient regulation also assumes that the private actors choosing among
jurisdictions themselves behave as perfect agents of their principals. 149
Finally, the claim that jurisdictional competition generates efficient
regulation assumes that the regulatory decisions of a state have no
effects that spill over into other states; if regulation generates external-
ities, state officials acting in the interests of their state have little rea-
son to take them into account.150
By now it should be evident that the conditions necessary to en-
sure that interjurisdictional competition generates efficient regulation
will never hold true in practice. This does not mean, however, that
regulation at the state level is inevitably inefficient. First, the question
begs for a baseline: inefficient compared to what? Inefficiencies at the
state level might be outmatched by inefficiencies generated by regula-
tion at the national level. Second, the absence of the conditions nec-
essary for competition to generate efficient regulation reveals nothing
about the efficiency of a particular regulation. Tiebout's goal was to
refute the conventional wisdom that assessing whether a government
was providing an efficient level of public goods was impossible. 51 If
Tiebout's assumptions do not hold, we are back to educated guess-
lius Margolis, Public Policies for Private Profits: Urban Governmen in REDISTRIBUTION
THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 289, 289 (Harold M. Hochman & George E. Peterson eds., 1974)
(arguing that economic models of government actors are "different" from those of market
actors); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Govern-
men in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLC SERVICES: TIE TIEBOUT MODEL AFrax TwNr-FrvE
YEARS 55, 75 (George R. Zodrow ed., 1983) (concluding that "empirical work in this area
has too uncritically accepted median voter models or monopoly models which assume the
governments maximize 'economic welfare'").
Bratton and McCahery identify models that posit government decision makers as max-
imizers of real estate values or tax revenues, but they correctly note that such models do
not generate an entrepreneurial state. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 237-38
("[O]ne cannot assume an entrepreneurial state.").
148 SeeJohn E. Chubb, How Relevant Is Competition to Government Policymaking?, in CoM-
PETTION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra note 113, at 57, 60-61 (noting the
weakness of the "black boxes" model of state government); Rubin, supra note 110, at 1451
(recognizing the potential for inefficiency).
149 Cary's critique of Delaware regulation rests on the premise that corporate manag-
ers seek to maximize their own interests, which might conflict with those of shareholders.
Cary observed that "[m] anagements want freedom from bothersome stockholders." Cary,
supra note 22, at 699. He concluded that "[mlanagement should not be omnipotent" and
that "[c]orporate charters and bylaws should not be molded for its benefit." Id. at 698.
Winter, by contrast, concluded that the capital market, the product market, and the
market for corporate control discipline managers to act in the interest of their principals,
the shareholders. See Winter, supra note 23, at 289.
150 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 231-33; Revesz, supra note 140, at 2343.
151 Richard Abel Musgrave, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, 53 Q.J.




ing-unverified by market forces-about the relative efficiency with
which governments provide public goods, including laws.
Nonetheless, in this nonidealized world of imperfect market disci-
pline, will the states generate more efficient regulation than a na-
tional government subject to fewer market constraints?152 The answer
depends on the extent to which real world conditions diverge from
the assumptions underlying Tiebout's model. If externalities are a se-
rious problem, state regulation may generate perverse results. Simi-
larly, if firms choosing among jurisdictions face considerable
bundling problems, or if significant constraints on mobility exist, in-
terjurisdictional competition is unlikely to provide a comparative ad-
vantage for state regulation. On the other hand, if the regulatory
issues concern primarily a discrete group of well-informed economic
actors, who enjoy considerable mobility and are concerned about a
small set of regulatory issues, competition among states may generate
better results than a nationally imposed regulatory scheme, at least
when externalities are not of paramount importance. 153
C. Jurisdictional Competition and Trust Law
In some ways, trust law would appear ideally suited for regulatory
competition. Trusts are extraordinarily mobile. For a California trust
to relocate to Alaska, no individual has to change her domicile. A
trust can relocate to Alaska without the use of bricks or mortar. In-
deed, a trust qualifies as an Alaska trust so long as one of the trustees
is an Alaska resident or trust company, some of the assets are depos-
ited in Alaska, and trust records are maintained in Alaska. 154 Thus, a
setflor can create an Alaska trust by creating a trust in California, nam-
ing herself as co-trustee with an Alaska trust company, opening a small
account in an Alaska bank, and having the trust company maintain
records. Few of the trust assets need to be moved to Alaska, and the
152 In a world economy, even the federal government is subject to some market con-
straints (e.g., the Cook Islands International Trusts Act). See supra text accompanying
notes 75-84.
153 Bratton and McCahery list factors to be considered in evaluating the claim that
competition among jurisdictions generates relatively better results than centralized
regulation:
A claim that competitive benefits redound from the vesting of regulatory
authority at the junior level will be more plausible when: (1) the regulation
is unbundled, (2) the regulation implicates no substantial interconnections
with other jurisdictions or with later consumers, (3) all actors affected by
the regulation are highly mobile, (4) all actors are well-informed, and (5)
competitive pressures registered by all actors affected by the regulation de-
termine its content. To the extent that one or more [of] these variables
does not obtain, the case for competitive benefits weakens.
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 262-63.
154 See ALAsKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (1998).
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arrangement would involve little more effort for the settlor than creat-
ing a trust with a local California trust company.
As with corporate charters, all that changes is the situs of the
trust.155 Moreover, trust settlors with significant assets are likely to be
well informed by their lawyers about the relative advantages that com-
peting jurisdictions afford. Because the trust may have little connec-
tion with the chosen state, the trust settlor is unlikely to be concerned
about the more general package of public goods and services the state
provides. The settlor's only real concern is with the trust's legal sta-
tus-the laws governing the trust.-56 The jurisdiction's bundling of
goods and services, therefore, is unlikely to be a significant impedi-
ment to regulatory competition.'5 7
Externalities, however, pose a significant difficulty for a regula-
tory-competition model of trust law. In particular, neither the state
government nor the settlor has any incentive to represent the interests
of out-of-state creditors-including out-of-state taxpayers-in devising
the state's regulatory regime. As a result, there is good reason to be-
lieve that competition among the states for trust business will not gen-
erate efficient regulation. To illustrate the point, consider first an
isolated jurisdiction which can attract no foreign trust funds and from
which no potential trust monies can escape. Suppose this jurisdiction
must choose between two rules, one permitting creditors to reach set-
flors' beneficial interests in their trusts and the other permitting set-
tlors to insulate their beneficial interests from creditors' claims.
Settlors are better off if they have the option to create self-settled
155 For present purposes, we will assume that a settlor who creates an Alaska trust ob-
tains all of the benefits of Alaska law with respect to all issues surrounding the trust. A
similar assumption is often made with respect to corporations in that courts typically in-
voke the internal affairs doctrine to apply the law of the state of incorporation to issues
involving a corporation's rights and liabilities. See GTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69, 89-90 (1987); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNucr OF LAws § 302(2) (1971);
P.John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice ofLaw, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1, 17-18 (noting the preva-
lence of application of the law of the state of incorporation even after the revolution in
choice-of-law theory).
On the other hand, even in corporate law, the law of the state of incorporation may
not apply. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFuar OF LAws § 302 CmLt. g, illus. 1 (1971).
And, as we shall see in Part III, infra, it is not at all clear that creating an Alaska trust will
inevitably provoke the application of Alaska law.
156 Cf Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 266-67 (noting that, when competition
involves the sale of legal status like corporate charters, information, mobility, and bundling
do not significantly inhibit regulatory competition). Bratton and McCahery conclude that
provision of legal status "leads to a two-party transaction resembling a conventional sale of
goods," thereby solving "the problem of the entrepreneurial government actor." Id. at 267.
157 Of course, a jurisdiction might bundle a rule permitting creation of perpetual
trusts with another rule limiting the settlor-beneficiary's protection against creditors, or
vice versa, but if we assume a high number of potential competing jurisdictions compared




spendthrift trusts. On the other hand, creditors are as a class better
off if settlors do not have that option.
Is choosing between the two possible rules a zero-sum game, an
allocation of a fixed sum of monies between the two classes of partici-
pants, settlors and creditors? With respect to contract creditors, the
answer may be yes, because the parties can reallocate rights between
themselves when they enter into their contractual relationship. 58
With respect to tort creditors, however, the answer is no. Permitting
trust settlors to insulate their assets from creditor claims promotes
riskier settlor behavior, because settlors will be aware that they will not
bear the full costs of their actions.' 59
To illustrate, suppose the settlor is a physician deciding how
many tests to run on a patient. If the physician runs insufficient tests
and misdiagnoses the patient, she risks malpractice liability, which will
either require payment out of pocket or an increase in malpractice
insurance premiums. If, however, the physician can insulate her as-
sets from patient claims, she can afford to ran fewer tests, because she
will not bear the full costs of malpractice liability.160
Suppose this risky behavior generates a net cost to the state, per-
haps in the form of lost productivity or additional resources devoted
to medical care. How will the state account for that loss in deciding
what legal treatment is appropriate for self-settled spendthrift trusts?
Assume that enforcing spendthrift provisions in self-settled trusts in-
158 For a discussion of the disparate positions of voluntary and involuntary creditors,
and an argument that involuntary creditors generally should enjoy priority over secured
creditors, who have had the opportunity to protect themselves by contract, see Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. Rw. 1887 (1994).
159 Corporate scholars have extensively discussed the.incentive to reduce precautions
in a regime of limited liability. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlim-
ited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879, 1882-83 (1991); David W.
Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 CoLUM. L. Rav. 1565, 1584-85
(1991); S. Shavell, TheJudgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 45, 45-46 (1986).
Even the prime defenders of limited liability do not dispute this incentive effect. Instead,
they argue either that limited liability generates corresponding benefits, see, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. Ray. 89,
93-97 (1985), or that attempts to abandon limited liability would be practically impossible,
seeJoseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective,
102 YA.E LJ. 387, 390 (1992).
160 One might argue that, especially in the medical malpractice context, the potential
tort victim-the patient-can require the potential tortfeasor to insure or to take addi-
tional precautions with respect to diagnosis or treatment. See Leebron, supra note 159, at
1584 & n.65. If the tort victim can take the costs of the tortfeasor's behavior into account,
the tortfeasor's avoidance of liability will produce efficiencies. See id. at 1584. The assump-
tion that the potential victim can take into account the risks of tortious activity is, however,
an heroic one, especially in the classic tort case in which the potential victim has no prior
information regarding the risks she faces. See id. at 1584 n. 65. Even in malpractice cases,
in which the potential victim has some relationship with the potential tortfeasor, the pro-
fessional's greater expertise makes it unlikely that the victim could account for risk as well
as the professional could.
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creases the benefit of each trust dollar by one cent. Assume further
that enforcing those provisions imposes a cost of two cents for each
trust dollar-one cent reflecting the ex post loss to victims injured by
the settlor's risky behavior (precisely balancing the one cent gain to
trust settlors) and one cent reflecting the ex ante cost of increased
risky behavior. If our isolated jurisdiction were simply assessing costs
and benefits, it would presumably refuse to enforce spendthrift provi-
sions in self-settled trusts, because aggregate costs exceed aggregate
benefits.
Now abandon the assumption of an isolated jurisdiction, and as-
sume instead that each state is free to lure trust business from other
states. In considering trust legislation, a state concerned only with the
interests of its own residents will not care about the distribution of
resources between out-of-state creditors and out-of-state settlors, nor
will it care about the potentially riskier behavior of out-of-state settlors,
resulting from enforcement of spendthrift provisions in self-settled
trusts. The state's principal concern will be the benefit its trust com-
panies derive from additional trust business within the state.
Suppose the state concludes that by enforcing spendthrift provi-
sions in self-settled trusts, it would attract additional trust dollars from
both out-of-state settlors and local settlors. Suppose, in addition, the
state assumes that three quarters of the total dollar volume will come
from out of state. Furthermore, suppose the state estimates that it will
derive one-half cent of benefit from each trust dollar settled within
the state by an out-of-state settlor.161 Should the state, under these
circumstances, enforce self-settled spendthrift trusts?
Note the calculations facing state officials: A rule enforcing
spendthrift provisions will affect both trusts created by local residents
and trusts created by out-of-state settlors. As we assumed in the iso-
lated-jurisdiction scenario, with respect to local residents, enforcing
spendthrift provisions generates a loss to the state of one-cent on each
trust dollar. On the other hand, with respect to out-of-state settlors,
enforcing spendthrift provisions generates a gain of one-half cent per
trust dollar. However, since the number of trusts created by out-of-
state settlors will be three times the number of trusts created by local
161 The marginal benefit that the state derives from each additional trust dollar need
not be constant. The discussion assumes only that the average benefit derived from each
trust dollar, at the stated quantity of trust dollars, is one-half cent per dollar. This one-half
cent represents the increased revenue local banks and lawyers will generate as the result of
additional trust business. The one-half cent figure is, of course, arbitrary. The amount
could be larger or smallerjust as the percentage of trust volume from out of state could be
greater or smaller than three quarters. The numbers are chosen merely to demonstrate
the incentives that jurisdictional competition creates, not to predict whether the prospect




residents, the state will still gain more than it loses by enforcing spend-
thrift provisions.
To illustrate, let x equal the total dollar volume of trust business
that the state will generate if it enforces self-settled spendthrift trusts.
The volume of trust business settled by local settlors is .25x; the vol-
ume settled by out-of-staters is .75x. On trusts settled by locals, the
state will generate a total loss of .0025x (.01 loss per trust dollar times
.25x local trust business). On trusts settled by out-of-staters, the state
will generate a total gain of .00375x (.005 loss per trust dollar times
.75x local trust business). The state would therefore generate a net
gain of .00125x by enforcing self-settled spendthrift trusts (.00375x -
.0025x), because the cost of such a policy, measured by the riskier
behavior of trust settlors, would largely fall out of state.162
This analysis also explains why smaller states, like Alaska and Del-
aware, rather than larger commercial states, like California and New
York, have taken the lead in developing asset protection trusts. 1 63 The
larger the state, the higher the percentage of trusts created by local
settlors, and, hence, the more likely local creditors will be harmed by
enforcement of self-settled spendthrift trusts. In other words, smaller
states are in a better position to export the costs associated with self-
settled spendthrift trusts.
However, with perfect mobility of capital, large states will ulti-
mately follow small states to embrace asset protection trusts.164 Fail-
ure to follow will result in a loss of trust business to states enforcing
162 Professors Macey and Miller have argued that Cary's race-to-the-bottom characteri-
zation of Delaware corporate law rests on a similar assumption:
[Cary] implicitly posits that Delaware legislators have an incentive to enact
statutes that are harmful to shareholder welfare when doing so will attract
additional revenue from franchise taxes to the state. Although the costs of
such a scheme are distributed over shareholders located throughout the
country, the group that enjoys the benefits from these increased charter
revenues-presumably lower state taxes and increased state services-con-
sists exclusively of the Delaware legislators' constituents.
Macey & Miller, supra note 126, at 475 (footnote omitted).
163 In the corporate literature, the conventional explanation for the role of small states
in competing for trust business has been that small states, particularly Delaware, can gener-
ate a larger percentage of state revenue from corporate charters than large states with
much larger budgets. Bratton and McGahery note:
The explanation prevailing for Delaware probably applies across the board.
Corporate franchise fees comprise fifteen percent of Delaware's tax base;
the same cash flow, however, would be a trivial percentage of the tax base of
a large state. Given a limited market, competitive success has a larger per-
centage impact on the smaller budget of a small jurisdiction. Political and
financial incentives to create (or enter) a legal product market arise when
there is the possibility of a significant payoff.
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 30, at 267; see also Carney, supra note 32, at 718-19 (noting
the importance of franchise fees to a small state like Delaware).
164 See, e.g., Dobris, supra note 14, at 571-72 (noting that even NewYork might change
its rule to permit perpetual trusts to avoid loss of business to other states).
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self-settled spendthrift provisions, without accompanying deterrence
of risky behavior by local trust settlors. 165 Even if both states would be
better off if they both refused to enforce self-settled spendthrift trusts,
neither would have an incentive-other than by binding compact-to
depart from the enforcement of spendthrift provisions.
In game theory terms, the decision by all states to enforce spend-
thrift provisions constitutes a Nash equilibrium.166 The following ma-







Define the situation in which neither state enforces spendthrift provi-
sions as the baseline, represented by a payoff of 0 to each state. As-
sume that the increase in risky behavior generated by routine
enforcement of spendthrift provisions would generate a loss of 1 to
the smaller state and a loss of 3 to the larger state, reflecting the
greater overall activity in the larger state. Thus, if both states enforce
spendthrift provisions, the payoff to the states is (-1, -3) reflecting only
the increase in risky behavior in each state.
Next, let us make assumptions about the effect on each state of
migration of trust business from one state to the other. Assume that if
the small state attracts all of the large state's trust business, the small
state will generate a gain of 3 and impose a corresponding loss of 3 on
the large state. Conversely, assume that if the large state attracts all of
165 The same situation exists with respect to competition for corporate business. As
Professor Black has noted:
[F]or any state, large or small, bucking the tide is pointless. If Delaware is
liberal and New York restricts corporate freedom in any important way,
companies will flee New York, New York will lose revenue, and New York's
law will fail of its purpose for lack of companies to operate on.
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Tyivial: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L.
Rsv. 542, 548 (1990).
166 For a more extensive discussion of Nash equilibrium, see Epic RAsMUSEN, GAMEs





the small state's trust business, the large state will generate a gain of 1
(reflecting the smaller size of the small state's business) and impose a
corresponding loss of 1 on the small state. If the small state chooses
to enforce spendthrift provisions, but the large state does not, the
small state receives a positive payoff of 2 (reflecting a gain of 3 from
increased business, offset by a loss of 1 from increased risky activity
within its borders). The large state suffers a loss of 6 (3 from the loss
of trust business, and 3 from increased risky activity generated by the
ability of trust settlors to insulate their assets from potential liability by
creating trusts in the small state).
By contrast, if the large state chooses to enforce spendthrift provi-
sions, but the small state refuses to do so, the large state generates a
net loss of 2, because the increase in trust business (+1) is more than
offset by the increase in risky activity (-3). At the same time, the payoff
to the small state is reduced to -2 (a loss of 1 from increased risky
activity plus a loss of 1 from migration of trusts out of the state). The
matrix demonstrates that whatever position the large state takes, the
small state is better off if it enforces spendthrift provisions. That is,
enforcing spendthrift provisions is a weakly-dominant strategy for the
small state.1 67 If the small state chooses enforcement, the large state's
better strategy is also to enforce, because by enforcing, its payoff is -3,
rather than the -6 it would receive if it chose not to enforce. Onde the
large state chooses to enforce, however, the small state has no incen-
tive to change its position. As a result, the set {enforcement, enforce-
mentl is a Nash equilibrium. By contrast, although the set {no
enforcement, no enforcement} generates higher combined payoffs, it
is not an equilibrium, because the small state always has an incentive
to change its rule to enforcement of spendthrift clauses.
Note this model assumes perfect mobility of trust capital. If not
all California settlors would choose to create Alaska trusts-perhaps
because California lawyers, not admitted in Alaska, are reluctant to
recommend Alaska trusts168 -large states like California might not fol-
low Alaska's lead.169 The point, however, is not to predict the strategy
of each state, but to understand the incentive each state has to ignore
167 A dominant strategy "is a player's strictly best response to any strategies the other
players might pick." Id. at 28 (emphasis omitted).
168 The notion that lawyers might resist crossing jurisdictional boundaries when the
result might be a loss of fees is not peculiar to this area of law. See STUDY OF THE DrvisION
OF JURISDICrION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 158-59 (American Law Institute,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 1963) (noting that forum shopping across state lines is a less serious
problem than forum shopping across the courthouse square because an out-of-state lawyer
would share fees if a lawyer chose to forum shop into another state).
169 If mobility of capital were imperfect, and only one-half of trust settlors chose to
cross state lines, the matrix for a large state might look like this:
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the costs imposed on other states, which result in potentially perverse
outcomes.
D. Implications of Jurisdictional Competition
Competition among jurisdictions will not inevitably lead to effi-
cient regulation of trusts. Due to the externalities and agency costs
associated with asset protection and perpetual trusts, state legislatures
are unlikely to consider all the costs and benefits associated with trusts
created in their states. Competition, however, does discriminate
among rules. It will lead state legislatures to prefer rules that generate








The {enforcement, enforcement} and {no enforcement, no enforcement} payoffs
would be the same as the full mobility matrix, because settlors would have no reason to
choose states based on their legal rules. If the small state enforces, and the large state does
not, the small state will gain, and the large state will lose, 1.5 from the movement of trust
business from large state to small. The small state will lose 1 from the increase in risky
activity, and the large state will lose 1.5 from the increase in risky activity, because only one-
half of its trust settlors will be in a position to take advantage of spendthrift provisions.
Conversely, if the large state enforces and the small state does not, the large state will gain,
and the small state will lose, .5 from the migration of trust business. The large state will
lose 3 from the increase in risky activity, and the small state will lose .5, because only one-
half of its settlors will benefit from enforceable spendthrift provisions.
In game-theory terms, this matrix produces an iterated dominant strategy equilibrium,
with the small state enforcing spendthrift provisions and the large state not enforcing.
That is, no matter what strategy the small state pursues, the large state is at least as well off
not enforcing; if the small state enforces, the large state is neither better off nor worse off
by not enforcing, but if the small state does not enforce, the large state is better off by not
enforcing. Therefore, for the large state, nonenforcement is a weakly dominant strategy.
If the large state pursues that strategy, the small state's best response is to enforce because,
by enforcing, the small state receives a payoff of one-half instead of zero. See generally RAs-
MusEN, supra note 165, at 30-32 (applying iterated dominant strategy equilibrium to war
and economic strategy).
Thus, the hypothesis of imperfect mobility might explain a regime in which small
states enforce spendthrift clauses but large states do not follow their lead.
-1,-3 .5,-3
-1, -2.5 0, 0
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Rules that generate external costs, however, are not inefficient
per se. Any claim about the global inefficiency of a trust law rule is
contingent on assumptions about the broader legal context in which
the rule operates. Whatever inefficiencies a particular trust law rule
might generate, it may perfectly compensate for other inefficiencies
inherent in the background legal regime. Consider, for instance, the
enforcement of spendthrift provisions in self-settled trusts. As we have
seen, enforcement would create incentives for potential tortfeasors to
engage in risky behavior. If the background tort law were perfectly
calibrated to induce economic actors to take all efficient risks and to
eschew inefficient ones, enforcing spendthrift provisions in self-settled
trusts would upset that balance and result in net inefficiencies. If, on
the other hand, background tort law overdeters risky behavior, enforc-
ing spendthrift provisions might counterbalance that overdeterrence,
perhaps leaving the system more efficient as a whole than if potential
tortfeasors were unable to insulate their assets from victims' claims.' 70
Unfortunately, proving that tort law as a whole, or a tort law rule in
particular, overdeters risky behavior is difficult.' 7 ' Moreover, because
evaluating all background legal rules that interact with trust law is
nearly impossible, claims of global inefficiency are difficult to sustain.
Asset protection trusts do, nonetheless, undermine the impact of
background legal rules by sheltering from liability tortfeasors who
would otherwise be required to compensate their victims. If we start
with the assumption that background legal rules generally represent
broadly accepted policyjudgments-often, but not always, incorporat-
ing efficiency concerns-then enforcement of asset protection trusts
undercuts those judgments. Moreover, the very availability of these
devices to avoid background law creates one significant loss: The set-
tlor expends resources on liability avoidance, which generates no new
wealth, when the settlor could instead be using the same resources in
ways that would generate new wealth.
170 The problem here is a "second best" problem. The classic work on the theory of
the second best is R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theovy of Second Bes 24 REv.
EcoN. STuD. 11 (1956-1957). Lipsey and Lancaster established that "there is no aprioriway
to judge as between various situations in which some of the Paretian optimum conditions
are fulfilled while others are not." Id. at 11-12. The legal literature has recently given
more extensive treatment to the theory of the second best, thanks in large measure to
Richard Markovits. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of
First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some
Therefores, 46 CASE W. REs. L. Rxv. 313 (1996); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and
Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KEr L. Rxv. 3 (1998).
171 Indeed, tort law may have little effect on behavior in many circumstances. See Ste-
phen D. Sugarman, DoingAway with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. Rxv. 555, 561-64 (1985) (arguing




The basic conclusion is the following: Jurisdictional competition
is likely to lead a number ofjurisdictions to adopt trust law rules that
those jurisdictions would not otherwise adopt-rules that, historically,
those jurisdictions have long rejected. Those rules may undermine
the policy of the enacting state without generating any compensating
efficiency advantages and are likely to undermine other states' poli-
cies without generating compensating benefits. Because jurisdictional
competition creates these problems, we must look to mechanisms
other than competition for potential solutions.
I
MECHANISMS FOR CONTAINING THE IMPACT OF ASSET
PROTECTION TRUSTS
Most asset protection legislation has been built on the assump-
tion that the enacting jurisdiction can protect, through its laws, any-
one who creates a trust within the jurisdiction. If that assumption
proves incorrect, foreign trusts become less attractive to settlors: Why
go to the trouble of creating a trust out of state or offshore, without
the assurance that the trust will permit the settlor to avoid undesirable
domestic law provisions? This Part examines the assumption that
states may preclude other jurisdictions from interfering with their at-
tempt to afford foreign trust settlors protections not available at
home.
First, this Part demonstrates that courts in a creditor's home state
are not generally bound to apply the asset protection trust rules of-
fered by foreign or sister-state jurisdictions. Jurisdictional limitations,
however, will often prevent these courts from adjudicating the credi-
tor's right to trust assets. Second, this Part shows how federal bank-
ruptcy courts may provide a more attractive forum for reaching asset
protection trusts. Third, this Part explores how a race to the court-
house may determine the creditor's success at reaching trust property
in Alaska and Delaware.
A. State Court Remedies
Suppose a creditor domiciled in a state with traditional fraudu-
lent transfer and spendthrift trust principles seeks to reach assets that
a local settlor has placed in a trust in the Cook Islands or in Alaska. If
the creditor proceeds in a Cook Islands or Alaska court, that court will
almost certainly apply its own law.' 72 Suppose, however, the creditor
172 The Cook Islands Legislature has made it crystal clear that if an action to set aside a
Cook Islands international trust is brought in the courts of the Cook Islands, those courts
are to apply Cook Islands law. See International Trust Act (1984) § 13(H) (1996) (Cook
Islands). The Act expressly provided that no disposition of property to a Cook Islands
international trust is "void, voidable, liable to be set aside or defective in any fashion ... by
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proceeds in her home state. Assuming the creditor can obtain juris-
diction in her home state, what law will the court apply? When will
the home-state court have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute? This
section considers these issues.
1. Choice of Law
When a settlor transfers funds into an asset protection trust, and
a creditor later seeks to reach those funds, two choice-of-law issues
may arise: First, whose law should be applied to determine whether
the transfer is fraudulent? Second, assuming the transfer itself was
not fraudulent, whose law should be applied to determine the en-
forceability of a spendthrift provision purporting to insulate the set-
flor from creditor claims?
a. Fraudulent Transfers
As we have seen, offshore jurisdictions often authorize transfers
that would be fraudulent under the UFTA.' 73 In particular, the Cook
Islands' International Trusts Act precludes a fraudulent transfer chal-
lenge whenever the transfer "took place before [the] creditor's cause
of action accrued."174 No American state goes that far, but Alaska's
fraudulent transfer law is particularly unfriendly to creditors, requir-
ing proof of actual fraud, rather than permitting creditors to rely on
constructive fraud. 175 Suppose then, that a settlor from a UFTAjuris-
diction creates a trust in the Cook Islands, and a creditor from the
same UFTA jurisdiction brings an action in the local courts to set
aside the settlor's transfer as fraudulent. What law will the court apply
to resolve this issue?
Although choice-of-law doctrine is muddled,176 the result in virtu-
ally any American court would be dear: The law of the Cook Islands
reason that... the international trust or disposition avoids or defeats rights, claims or
interests conferred by the law of a foreign jurisdiction upon any person." Id. § 13(I).
Alaska has also expressly provided that a trust provision selecting Alaska law will be
enforced with respect to "the validity, construction, and administration" of a trust having
the requisite connections to Alaska. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 13.36.035(c)-(d) (Michie 1998).
173 See supra Part I.B.
174 International Trusts Act, § 13(B) (4).
175 See supra text accompanying note 92.
176 American courts use a variety of different methods to resolve choice-of-law cases.
One scholar who tracks choice-of-law methodology in American courts has assembled a
table identifying seven different approaches to choice-of-law issues and listing the courts
that have adopted each approach. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1997, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 233, 266 tbl.1 (1998). Symeonides lists the following
seven approaches to choice-of-law issues: Traditional, Significant Contacts, Restatement
(Second), Interest Analysis, Lex For, Better Law, and Combined Modern. See id. These
categories, however, are not airtight, as the "Combined Modern" label suggests. For in-
stance, the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971), heavily relies
on a court's ability to identify which state has the most significant relationship to the par-
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does not apply. Cook Islands' fraudulent conveyance law would frus-
trate the goals of the American tort system by permitting those with
sufficient resources to create a foreign trust to avoid tort liability. In
this situation, no choice-of-law principle is sufficiently compelling to
cause a judge to ignore the forum's substantive law.177 A court con-
ducting "interest analysis" in resolving choice-of-law questions, can
easily reach this result: the forum has an interest in protecting its tort
victims, and that interest should prevail even if the Cook Islands has
an interest in protecting trust beneficiaries. 178 Of course, whether the
Cook Islands has any interest in protecting the trust beneficiaries who
are, in all likelihood, residents of a UFTA state is not at all clear. 179
If a court, on the other hand, purports to resolve choice-of-law
cases by reference to the "better rule of law,"' 80 the result will be the
ties and the occurrence or transaction. Moreover, both the interest-analysis and the better-
law approaches often lead to application of lexfori Joseph W. Singer suggests:
In practice, it is quite clear that what courts ordinarily do in conflicts cases
is to apply forum law. Whatever the scholars say about it, the judges seem
to understand that the point of law is to do justice, and, to the extent they
view themselves as the moral voice of their community, they are likely to
understand forum interests as outweighing nonforum interests.
Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rxv. 1, 59 (1989).
177 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theoy, 142 U. PA. L. REv.
949, 992-93 (1994) (arguing that, "[i]n the ordinary choice of law case, choice of law prin-
ciples take a back seat to the substantive results that are generated by the competing
rules").
178 In a series of articles in the 1950s and 1960s, Brainerd Currie developed a govern-
mental interest analysis for resolving choice-of-law problems. See Brainerd Currie, Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 254 (1958).
Currie argued that when the forum's own policy would be advanced by application of its
own law, a forum court should apply domestic law even if doing so would frustrate the
policy of another jurisdiction:
The sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any court to do, con-
fronted with a true conflict of interests, is to apply its own law... It should
apply its own law ... simply because a court should never apply any other
law except when there is a good reason for doing so.
Id. at 261.
179 See Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that "it is not at all clear what the policy behind the [Jersey Channel
Islands law] is except, perhaps, to augment business," and then concluding that NewYork's
"deep-rooted policies" mandate the application of New York law to a Jersey Channel Is-
lands trust created by a New York settlor). Currie emphasized the interests of states in
protecting their own residents. See Currie, supra note 178, at 233-34 (discussing Massachu-
setts' interest in protecting its own married women). At times, Currie also recognized the
states' interests in regulating behavior within their borders. See Brainerd Currie, Recent
Development, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 1233, 1237-41 (1963)
(discussing intended impact of traffic regulations). However, he did not generally accord
comparable attention to these interests.
180 Robert Leflar popularized the notion that courts should consider which substantive
legal rule is "better" in resolving choice-of-law cases. See Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law:
More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1584, 1587-88 (1966). Leflar did
not suggest that the better rule should always prevail, but rather that the question of which
rule is better should be considered along with a set of other factors. See id. In a recent
survey, Professor Symeonides identified five states that have endorsed Leflar's better law
1076 [Vol. 85:1035
ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
same: application of the forum's law. Courts in UFTA jurisdictions
are unlikely to conclude that the Cook Islands' fraudulent conveyance
law is better than the laws almost universally adopted by American
state legislatures, the UFITA or the UFCA.
The approach of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws' 81 (the
"First Restatement") to fraudulent transfers focuses on the type of
property transferred. If the settlor transfers land or tangible personal
property into a trust, a court must determine whether the transfer is
fraudulent as to third parties in accordance with the laws of the state
in which the property is located at the time of transfer. 82 The First
Restatement has no provision explicitly dealing with fraudulent trans-
fers of intangible property, but does provide that "[t]he validity of a
conveyance of a document in which a right is embodied... [is] gov-
erned by the law of the state where the document is at the time of the
conveyance." 18 3 This provision, however, apparently does not apply to
transfers of shares of corporate stock, which the law of the state of
incorporation governs.18
These rules potentially can generate peculiar results. Consider,
for instance, a New York physician who owns land in New Jersey,
shares of stock in a Delaware corporation, negotiable bonds located in
her safe deposit box in New York, and a bank account in a New York
bank. If she executes a document creating a Cook Islands interna-
tional trust and delivers to the trustee a deed to the land, the shares of
stock, the bonds, and the cash in the bank account, NewJersey fraud-
ulent transfer law would apply to the conveyance of land, Delaware
law to the shares of stock, and New York law to the bonds and the
cash-unless the bonds and cash were first brought to the Cook Is-
approach in the area of torts. See Symeonides, supra note 176, at 266 tbl.1 (identifying
Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin).
181 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
182 See id. § 218 ("Whether a conveyance of an interest in land, which is in due form
and is made by a party who has capacity to convey it, is in other respects valid, is deter-
mined by the law of the state where the land is."). Id. Comment f to section 218 further
provides: "Whether a conveyance valid between the parties to it, is either void or voidable
with respect to third parties, as for instance, where it is in fraud of creditors ... is deter-
mined by the law of the state in which the land is." Id. § 218 cmt. f. Section 257 is identical
to section 218, except that section 257 substitutes the word "chattel" wherever "land" ap-
pears in section 218. See id. § 257. Comment b of section 257 parallels comment f of
section 218. See id. § 257 cmt. b.
183 Id. § 262(3).
184 See id. § 262 cmt. b (referring to section 182, which embodies "the special consider-
ations which apply to the conveyance of a share certificate"). Section 182 provides that
"[w]hether a person is a shareholder or other member of a corporation is determined by
the law of the state of incorporation." Id. § 182; see also 2 JosEPH H. BEALE, A TRArTISE ON
Tm CoNFLICr OF LAWS 985 (1935) ("[Slince the state of incorporation alone can deter-
mine a question of membership in the corporation, the law of the state of incorporation
governs the title to the share.") (footnote omitted).
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lands and then transferred to the trust, in which case transfers to the
trust would be governed by Cook Islands law.
A court likely would not have reached this result even at the time
the First Restatement was drafted. 85 Today, when the physical loca-
tion of many intangibles is far more difficult to identify, it appears
inconceivable that a court would hold that the validity of a transfer
would depend on the physical location of the intangible at the mo-
ment of transfer. Particularly when a property owner brings an intan-
gible to the Cook Islands for the clear purpose of making a transfer
that would otherwise be fraudulent under the law of the property
owner's own domicile, even a court sympathetic to the First Restate-
ment's general approach would almost undoubtedly balk at the appli-
cation of Cook Islands law.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws' 8 6 (the "Second
Restatement"), known generally for its malleability, 87 makes it some-
what easier for a court to reject the Cook Islands fraudulent convey-
ance law. Like its predecessor, the Second Restatement provides that
the effect of a transfer of property interests in documents should be
determined in accordance with "the law that would be applied by the
courts of the state where the document was at the time of the convey-
ance," which is "usually ... local law."8s8 Unlike its predecessor, how-
ever, the Second Restatement employs the adjective "usually," thereby
allowing courts to escape application of the law of the document's
location.189 The Second Restatement's provision dealing with the
identity of corporate shareholders includes a similar escape hatch:
The law of the state of incorporation applies "except in the unusual
case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship... to the person involved and the cor-
poration."1 90 These open-ended provisions make it easy for a court to
apply the law of a creditor's domicile, or of the property owner's dom-
185 Indeed, Professor Beale, the Reporter for the Restatement, hedged the Restate-
ment position in his treatise, suggesting that "in the case of a group of securities... [t]he
change of title is governed by the law of the place where the securities are aggregated." 2
BEALE, supra note 184, at 985. Beale cites Hutchison v. Ross, 187 N.E. 65 (N.Y. 1933), in
which the New York Court of Appeals held that New York law governed the validity of a
transfer into trust of a combination of cash and securities-including corporate stock-
held by the New York branch of a Quebec bank. See id. at 71-72.
186 REsTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONFLiCt OF LAWS (1971).
187 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Devel-
opments, 39 Am. J. CoMp. L. 465, 466 (1991) (concluding that the Second Restatement's
"undirected, multifactor analysis invites post-hoc rationalizing of intuitions about the appli-
cable law").
188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OF LAws § 249 (2) (b).
189 Id.
190 Id. § 303.
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icile, to determine whether a transfer to a Cook Islands trust was
fraudulent as to the creditor. 191
Because most American states have enacted either the UIFTA or
the UFCA, American courts have had few opportunities in domestic-
law cases to engage in choice-of-law analysis in fraudulent transfer
cases; courts understandably are reluctant to spend much time decid-
ing which of two states' laws should apply when the laws are identi-
cal.192 When a creditor challenges a transfer of land as fraudulent,
courts generally look to the law of the situs to determine the effect of
the conveyance-often without exploring how the law of the situs dif-
fers from other possible alternatives. 193 The courts' failure in these
cases to examine the competing legal rules suggests that the parties
were unable to identify significant differences in the laws of the vari-
ous jurisdictions.19 4 When land is not involved, most courts suggest
applying the law of the jurisdiction in which the transfer is likely to
have the greatest impact-generally the state where most of the credi-
tors are located. 195
191 Indeed, the comment to the shareholder provision expressly indicates that the law
of the shareholder's domicile should apply to determine the marital property interests of
shareholders. See id § 303 cmt. e.
192 See Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 667-72 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (con-
cluding that no conflict between California's version of the UFTA and Rhode Island's ver-
sion of the UFTA exists); Ferrari v. Barclays Bus. Credit (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 108 B.R.
384, 388 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (concluding that, when the conveyed property is located
in UFCA states, courts can apply Massachusetts's UFCA law without concerns about frus-
trating the interests of other states).
193 See Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 59 F.3d 942, 948-49 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that Texas law applied to determine whether foreclosure on Texas
land constituted a fraudulent transfer, without discussing the content of California's fraud-
ulent conveyance law, the law of the forum state); Hartsfield v. Lescher, 721 F. Supp. 1052,
1056 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (holding that Arkansas's fraudulent conveyance law applied to the
transfer of Arkansas land without examining the law of Tennessee, the state in which the
creditor and trust beneficiary were domiciled); James v. Powell, 225 N.E.2d 741, 745-46
(N.Y. 1967) (concluding that Puerto Rican law, not the forum state law, must apply to
determine whether the conveyance of Puerto Rican land is fraudulent, and remanding for
examination of Puerto Rican law).
194 Cf Sterk, supra note 177, at 998-99 (arguing that "[t]o persuade [a] judge to alter
her initial conclusions" on choice-of-law grounds, a litigator "would have to demonstrate
that application of the choice of law principle is necessary either to promote some ...
social policy or to vindicate some fundamental right").
195 See In re Consolidated Capital Equities Corp., 143 B.R. 80, 85 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1992) (applying California law to invalidate a fraudulent transfer because the debtor's
headquarters and greatest concentration of creditors were in California); Murphy v. Mer-
itor Say. Bank (In re the O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370, 390-92 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (hold-
ing that Massachusetts law applied because debtor's assets, manufacturing operations, and
greatest concentration of creditors were located in Massachusetts); RCA Corp. v. Tucker,
696 F. Supp. 845, 853-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying choice-of-law principles applicable to
tort cases to hold that NewYork law, under which transfer to wife would be fraudulent, was
applicable because the transfer was made after a New York domiciliary brought an action
against the transferor in NewYork court); Hassett v. Far West Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 40 B.RI 380, 395 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that New
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By creating a Cook Islands trust, a resident of a UFTAjurisdiction
is seeking protection, not from Cook Islands creditors, but from credi-
tors at home. When neither the trust settlor nor his creditors reside
in the Cook Islands, the case law almost conclusively establishes that
no court in a UFTAjurisdiction would apply the Cook Islands fraudu-
lent conveyance law.196 Moreover, even if a court was inclined to ap-
ply the fraudulent conveyance law of the situs of the transferred
property, the court would be unlikely to do so if the property were
transferred in order to defraud creditors.
Chief Judge Fuld's opinion in James v. Powell'97 makes this point
clear. Esther James had obtained a libel judgment against former
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell.198 Powell's wife, acting with her
husband's power of attorney, then conveyed land in Puerto Rico to
her aunt and uncle for allegedly inadequate consideration. 99 James
then brought an action in New York, alleging that the Powells had
made a fraudulent transfer.200 When the case reached the Court of
Appeals, Chief Judge Fuld endorsed the "situs" rule for determining
whether a conveyance of real property is fraudulent, holding that the
parties and the courts below had mistakenly assumed that New York's
fraudulent conveyance law would apply.201 In remanding the case,
however, Chief Judge Fuld expressly announced an exception to the
situs rule:
[I]f, in exploring the law of Puerto Rico, [the situs,] it were to be
found that it was specifically designed to thwart the public policy of
other states-for example, by denying a remedy to all judgment
creditors in the plaintiff's circumstances in order to attract foreign
investment in its real estate-the courts of this State would be privi-
leged to apply the law of New York rather than that of Puerto
Rico. 202
York's fraudulent conveyance law applied in part because a vast number of the transferor's
creditors were located in New York), aff'd 44 B.1L 1023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
For a general discussion of the issue and the suggestion that courts should apply to
each creditor the law of the creditor's home state in determining whether a transfer is
fraudulent with respect to that creditor, see Thomas H. Day, Solution for Conflict of Laws
GoverningFraudulent Transfers: Apply the Law That Was Enacted to Benefit the Creditors, 48 Bus.
lw. 889 (1993).
196 Cf In re Morse Tool 108 B.R. at 386-87 (concluding that, when a transaction's only
relationship to Connecticut is that the transferee is incorporated and does business in that
state, Connecticut fraudulent conveyance law should not apply).
197 225 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1967).
198 See id. at 743.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 745 (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuCT OF LAWS § 218
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1959)).
202 Id. at 746 n.4.
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Chief Judge Fuld's exception applies in full force to transfers to a
Cook Islands trust, and removes any doubt that a court in a UFTA
jurisdiction would ignore the Cook Islands fraudulent transfer law in
considering the validity of such transfers.20 3
This analysis only slightly differs if the settlor has created an
Alaska, rather than a Cook Islands, trust. Although Alaska's fraudu-
lent transfer law is less radical than its Cook Islands counterpart, the
choice-of-law issues are the same: in Chief Judge Fuld's words, Alaska,
like the Cook Islands, would be "denying a remedy to all judgment
creditors in the plaintiff's circumstances in order to attract foreign
investment."204 If the creditor and the trust settlor are both domiciled
in a UFLTAjurisdiction, no substantial reason would exist for a court of
that jurisdiction to defer to Alaska law.
b. The Availability of Spendthrift Trust Protection in the Absence
of Fraud
If a creditor successfully challenges transfers to an asset protec-
tion trust as fraudulent, the provisions of the trust are largely irrele-
vant to the creditor. So long as the creditor can recapture the
transferred assets, the creditor has no reason to worry about the set-
dor's rights in the trust instrument. Suppose, however, the creditor
cannot invalidate the settlor's transfer as fraudulent. Perhaps the
creditor cannot prove actual intent to defraud, even with the assist-
ance of the "badges of fraud,"20 5 and cannot prove constructive fraud
within the meaning of the UF-A.20 6 Alternatively, suppose the statute
of limitations has run on any fraudulent transfer claim. 20 7 Can credi-
tors nevertheless reach the settlor-beneficiary's interest in an offshore
trust? Until the enactment of the Alaska and Delaware statutes, the
answer had long been clear as a matter of American trust law: trust
settlors could not make themselves trust beneficiaries and then insert
in the trust instrument provisions that insulated their beneficial inter-
ests from creditor claims.208
203 See, e.g., Curiale v. Tiber Holding Corp., No. 95-5284, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14563,
at *38-40 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997) (applying NewYork fraudulent conveyance law to trans-
fers made by a Bermuda corporation because New York's interest outweighed Bermuda's
interest).
204 James, 225 N.E.2d at 746 n.4.
205 UNw. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 4(a) (1), (b), 7A U.LA 301-02 (1999).
206 See id. § 4(a) (2).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
208 See RpSTATEMENr (SEcoND) OF TRusrs § 156(1) (1959) ("Where a person creates
for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer
of his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his interest."). Sometimes, the prohibi-
tion is embodied in statute. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT. Po-ERs & TRUSTS LAw § 7-3.1 (a) (Consol.
Supp. 2000). At other times, the prohibition has been recognized in the absence of a
statute. See, e.g., Robbins v. Webster (In re Robbins), 826 F.2d 293, 294 (4th Cir. 1987)
(applying Maryland law). Recently enacted statutes in Alaska and Delaware to some extent
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From a choice-of-law perspective, however, the enforceability of a
spendthrift provision, in the absence of proof of fraud, is a more com-
plicated question. Respectable authority suggests that the validity of a
trust should be determined by the law of the situs of trust property,
not the law of the trust settlor's domicile. In the leading case of
Hutchison v. Ross,20 9 Ross and his wife, domiciliaries of Quebec, had
executed an antenuptial agreement under which Ross agreed to estab-
lish a modest trust fund for the benefit of his wife and children.210
Under Quebec law, neither party to the antenuptial agreement could
modify its terms after the marriage. 21' Nevertheless, after receiving a
substantial inheritance from his father, Ross created a $1,000,000 trust
in New York for the benefit of his wife.21 2 At the time of the trust's
creation, Ross and his advisors were apparently unaware that the more
generous trust was invalid under Quebec law, as a modification of the
antenuptial agreement.213 Later, when he consulted a Montreal bar-
rister to draw up his will, Ross learned of the trust's invalidity.2 1 4 By
that time, Ross had dissipated most of his inheritance and was heavily
in debt.215 Acting on a promise to his creditors, Ross brought an ac-
tion in a New York court to have the trust set aside.21 6 The New York
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the trust, concluding "that the
validity of a trust of personal property must be determined by the law
of this state, when the property is situated here and the parties in-
tended that it should be administered here in accordance with the
laws of this state."217 New York218 and other courts have cited
break with the previously universal prohibition on self-settled spendthrift trusts. For more
on those statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 89-107.
209 187 N.E. 65 (N.Y. 1933).




214 See id. at 68.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 Id. at 71.
218 See Wyatt v. Fulrath, 211 N.E.2d 637, 639 (N.Y. 1965) (citing Hutchison as support
for the law-of-situs rule's application to uphold a survivorship agreement with respect to a
New York bank account against forced heirship claims by relatives of Spanish domiciliar-
ies); In re Bauer's Trust, 200 N.E.2d 207, 211 (N.Y. 1964) (Fuld, J., dissenting) (citing,
inter alia, Hutchison to support the majority's conclusion that New York law governed a
trust indenture executed "against the background of New York law"); Chase Nat'l Bank v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 39 N.Y.S.2d 541, 548 (App. Div. 1943) (citing Hutchi-
son for the proposition that "the intention of the settlor" as to the governing law should
prevail).
On the other hand, in two subsequent cases involving testamentary trusts, the Court of
Appeals held that the law of the settlor's domicile should govern the validity of a trust
created to minimize the inheritance of settlor's spouse. See Clare v. Clark (In re Estate of
Clark), 236 N.E.2d 152, 156-57 (N.Y. 1968) (applying Virginia law to Virginia domiciliaries,




In Hutchison, the trust instrument itself said nothing about the
applicable law.22 0 In its opinion, however, the court of appeals cited a
New York statute providing that when a settlor creates a trust of per-
sonal property situated in New York and expressly selects New York
law as the applicable law, then "the validity and effect" of the trust
must be determined in accordance with New York law.22 ' The rule
that the New York statute embodies, 222 is more or less consistent with
the Second Restatement, subject to some qualifications. 223 The seem-
ing premise for the rule, at least as interpreted in Hutchison, is that the
setflor's intention should be controlling: "Where a nonresident settlor
establishes here a trust of personal property intending that the trust
should be governed by the law of this jurisdiction, there is little reason
York bank); Hemingway v. McGehee (In re Estate of Crichton), 228 N.E.2d 799, 805-08
(N.Y. 1967) (applying NewYork law to permit New York domiciliary's estate to avoid com-
munity property claims with respect to Louisiana bank accounts, stocks, and bonds).
219 See, e.g., Harrison v. City Nat'l Bank, 210 F. Supp. 362,370 (S.D. Iowa 1962); Equita-
ble Trust Co. v. Ward, 48 A.2d 519, 526 (Del. Ch. 1946); Amerige v. Attorney Gen., 88
N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 1949).
220 Hutchison, 187 N.E. at 71 ("Here there is no express declaration of intention ....
221 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute was enacted after Ross estab-
lished the trust and would not have been applicable to the case in any event. See id. The
court cited the statute as evidence that New York's legislature would honor a settlor's in-
tent about applicable law. See id.
222 The current New York statute provides:
Whenever a person, not domiciled in this state, creates a trust which
provides that it shall be governed by the laws of this state, such provision
shall be given effect in determining the validity, effect and interpretation of
the disposition in such trust of:
(1) Any trust property situated in this state at the time the trust is
created.
(2) Personal property, wherever situated, if the trustee of the trust is a
person residing, incorporated or authorized to do business in this state or a
national bank having an office in this state.
N.Y. Esr. PowEPs & TRUSTS LA.w § 7-1.10(a) (Consol. 1979). Section 7-1.10 says nothing
about the power of a trust settlor to create a New York trust and to choose, in the trust
instrument, application of the law of another state. In Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 9 N.E.2d
792, 794 (N.Y. 1937), however, the court of appeals upheld a trust that would have violated
NewYork's prohibition against accumulation of trust income, because the trust instrument
expressly provided that New Jersey law should govern.
223 See REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNLscr OF LAws § 270 (1971). This section in part
provides:
An inter vivos trust of interests in movables is valid if valid
under the local law of the state designated by the settlor to govern the
validity of the trust, provided that this state has a substantial relation to the
trust and that the application of its law does not violate a strong public
policy of the state with which, as to the matter at issue, the trust has its most
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 ....
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why the courts should defeat his intention by applying the law of an-
other jurisdiction. '" 2 24
To focus on the settlor's intention clearly serves the goal of a set-
tlor seeking to insulate his assets from creditor claims, through the
creation of an asset protection trust. The settlor's intent to have the
law of the foreign jurisdiction-whether Alaska, Delaware, or an off-
shore jurisdiction-is typically beyond dispute, because virtually all as-
set protection trust instruments expressly select the law of the favored
jurisdiction. If intent is detenninative, all courts would have to honor
spendthrift provisions in an asset protection trust, even if the trust
setflor is also the protected beneficiary.
However, despite occasional language to the contrary in judicial
opinions,225 the settlor's intent is rarely determinative on the issue of
a trust's validity, particularly when parties other than the settlor and
the beneficiaries are involved.226 Moreover, courts do not invariably
look to the law of the trust's situs to determine the trust's validity,
especially when the law of the situs is significantly different from the
law of the forum. 22 7
In the vast majority of cases in which courts have applied the law
of the trust situs, the sis coincided with the forum.228 Furthermore,
224 Hutchison, 187 N.E. at 70; see also id. at 71 ("The statute makes express declaration
of intention conclusive, but a construction which would deny effect to intention appearing
by implication would be unreasonable.").
225 See Tate v. Hain, 25 S.E.2d 321, 325-26 (Va. 1943) (emphasizing the intent of the
settlor in holding that trustee in bankruptcy was not entitled to beneficiary interests in
insurance trusts because the trusts were created in NewYork, which recognized spendthrift
provisions, and not in Virginia, the beneficiary's domicile, which recognized spendthrift
provision only if limited to beneficiary's support); Shannon, 9 N.E.2d at 794 ("The intent of
the setflor... is expressly stated in the body of the trust instrument. ... The instrument
should be construed and a determination of its validity made according to the law chosen
by the settlor unless so to do is contrary to the public policy of this state.").
226 As one court has put it, "a choice of law provision 'will not be regarded where it
would operate to the detriment of strangers to the agreement, such as creditors or
lienholders.'" Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R 685, 701 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted).
227 See infra notes 247-62 and accompanying text.
228 See Neto v. Thorner, 718 F. Supp. 1222, 1223-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying New
York law to a New York trust, created by a Brazilian domiciliary); Equitable Trust Co. v.
Ward, 48 A.2d 519, 524-26 (Del. Ch. 1946) (applying Delaware law to uphold a trust whose
"intended situs" was Delaware); National Shawmut Bank v. Gumming, 91 N.E.2d 337, 338-
41 (Mass. 1950) (applying Massachusetts law to uphold a Massachusetts trust allegedly cre-
ated in fraud of the rights, under Vermont law, of a Vermont widow); Amerige v. Attorney
Gen., 88 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Mass. 1949) (applying Massachusetts law to sustain a Massachu-
setts trust against the challenge that the trust was invalid under the perpetuities law of New
York, the domicile of the donee who exercised the power of appointment); Wyatt v.
Fulrath, 211 N.E.2d 637, 637-38 (N.Y. 1965) (applying NewYork law to funds in a NewYork
account created by Spanish domiciliaries); In re Bauer's Trust, 200 N.E.2d 207, 208 (N.Y.
1964) (applying NewYork's rule against perpetuities to invalidate a power of appointment
exercised by an English domiciliary with respect to a New York trust); Hutchison, 187 N.E.
at 67-68 (applying New York law to a New York trust). But see Cutts v. Najdrowski, 198 A.
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in some of these cases, the forum court simply ignored the competing
policies of another state with close ties to the trust, perhaps because
those competing policies made little sense to the court.2 29 Thus, the
Hutchison court was never able to articulate a coherent policy for a
Quebec rule that would invalidate a husband's effort to modify an an-
tenuptial agreement by giving his wife more money than the agree-
ment originally provided. Simply put, modem courts tend to depart
from forum law only when one of the parties has given the court a
good reason for doing so. 23 0 If neither party has identified a reason to
apply foreign law, the court will simply apply local law. In other
words, if domestic trust law appears eminently sensible-not to men-
tion familiar-to the court, a lawyer seeking to displace domestic law
will have to demonstrate how some important objective will be
thwarted by application of the forum's law.2 3 1 In cases in which the
forum court has relied on a situs rule to justify application of domestic
law, the party seeking to avoid situs law, which is also forum law, has
given the court inadequate reason to depart from that law.
Moreover, when the situs and the forum do not coincide and
courts nevertheless apply the law of the situs, situs law sometimes dif-
fers from forum law only in form. The New Jersey case of Cutts v.
Najdrowskt" 32 is illustrative. In that case, a New Jersey domiciliary cre-
ated a bank account trust at a New York bank.2 33 Under New York
law, the trust was enforceable.2 34 Under New Jersey law at the time,
the trust was treated as testamentary, and therefore unenforceable.23 5
However, under New Jersey law the settlor could have made the trust
enforceable by executing the trust document in accordance with testa-
885, 885-86 (NJ. 1938) (applying New York law to uphold a New York trust created by a
New Jersey domiciliary).
229 See Hutchison, 187 N.E. at 70; see also Wyat, 211 N.E.2d at 638-39 (appearing unsym-
pathetic to the Spanish policy giving collateral blood relatives a property right in the assets
of a decedent).
230 Brainerd Currie identified and endorsed this principle: "[A] court should never
apply any... law [other than forum law] except when there is a good reason for doing so."
Currie, supra note 178, at 261.
231 See Sterk, supra note 177, at 998. In that article, I argued:
Choice of law cases are not, however, cases in which choice of law is the
only issue; choice of law cases are primarily tort cases, contract cases, or
estates cases. When the judge develops a sense of who should win, the sub-
stantive aspects of the case are likely to predominate-unless ignoring
choice of law issues would offend the judge's sense of justice by, for in-
stance, frustrating expectations on which a party relied or promoting fo-
rum-shopping.
Id.
232 198 A. 885 (NJ. 1938).
233 See id. at 885.




mentary formalities.23 6 Thus, when the NewJersey court applied New
York law and held the trust enforceable, 237 the court in effect held
that when settlors execute documents in New York, they only need to
comply with New York formalities.
By contrast, some courts have chosen to apply situs law to issues
of trust validity without ever exploring the content of forum law.
23 8
Nonetheless, when neither party apprises the court of the conse-
quences of its choice-of-law decision, the decision is unlikely to have a
significant impact on the outcome of the litigation.
Finally, courts have virtually never applied the law of the trust's
situs or the law expressly chosen by the settlor when the settlor chose
situs or the law to evade a strong public policy of the settlor's domi-
cile. In various cases in which the court has applied situs law, the set-
tior was apparently unaware of any difference between the law of the
settlor's domicile and the law of the situs. For instance, the Hutchison
court emphasized the fact that the person who prepared the trust in-
strument was "a Scotchman learned in the law of Scotland, but per-
haps not in the law of Quebec."239 In another leading case, Wyatt v.
Fulrath,240 Spaniards concerned with local instability during the Span-
ish Civil War had "sent cash and securities to New York for safekeep-
ing and investment," not to take advantage of New York inheritance
laws.2 4 1 Similarly, in other cases involving trusts challenged as viola-
tive of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 24 2 of a statutory prohibition on
accumulation of trust income, 243 or of a limitation on enforceability of
Totten trusts, 244 there was little reason to suggest that the settlor had
chosen the trust situs or the law to govern the trust in order to avoid
the otherwise applicable law. Nonetheless, modest modifications in




238 See Harrison v. City Nat'l Bank, 210 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D. Iowa 1962).
239 Hutchison v. Ross, 187 N.E. 65, 67 (N.Y. 1933).
240 211 N.E.2d 637 (N.Y. 1965).
241 Id. at 637-38.
242 SeeAmerige v. Attorney Gen., 88 N.E.2d 126, 130-31 (Mass. 1949) (applying Massa-
chusetts's capture doctrine to determine the distribution of assets after the exercise of a
power of appointment violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, even though the settlor
could have, in either New York or Massachusetts, specified the consequences of invalidity
with appropriate language in the trust instrument).
243 See Equitable Trust Co. v. Ward, 48 A.2d 519, 525-26 (Del. Ch. 1946) (applying
Delaware law after noting that the only effect of applying the Pennsylvania accumulations
statute would be to require payment of income after the expiration of the statutory pe-
riod); Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 9 N.E.2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1937) (noting the similarity
between New York and New Jersey policies on accumulation, and noting that the
"[d]ifference arises only as to the ending of the period during which such power to sus-
pend alienation and to provide for accumulation of income may be permitted").
244 See Cutts v. Najdrowski, 198 A. 885, 886 (N.J. 1938).
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Until the emergence of offshore trusts, little reason existed for
settlors to choose a trust situs to avoid creditor claims. Because every
American jurisdiction refused to enforce spendthrift provisions in self-
settled trusts, 245 no jurisdiction afforded settlors an opportunity to
avoid creditor claims. The closest situations, in which settlors might
have chosen a particular trust situs in order to evade an important
policy of their domicile, involved elective-share provisions.2 46
Although virtually all states now recognize the importance of protect-
ing a spouse against intentional disinheritance, that recognition
manifests itself in different ways, and the law has developed in a vari-
ety of different patterns. 247 As a result, choice-of-law issues arise when
a person dies in one state with property in another. Sometimes, the
decedent's will creates a trust which is voidable by the spouse in one
jurisdiction, but not another. In this situation, New York courts have
refused to look to the law of situs of the trust or the law chosen by the
parties, holding instead that the law of the spouses' domicile should
govern the validity of the trust.2 48
National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming,249 a case applying Massachu-
setts law to sustain a Massachusetts trust against a claim by a Vermont
widow, reached the opposite result.250 However, in that case the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts emphasized a finding by the
trial judge that the trust had not been created with the intent to de-
prive the widow of her distributive share of the property.251 In a
sense, therefore, we might view the language in Cumming as mere dic-
tum. Moreover, the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, com-
pleted long after the Cumming case was decided, makes it clear that
elective-share rights reflect a strong public policy that provides a court
ajustification for ignoring the law of the situs or the law chosen by the
245 See supra Part I.A.
246 See infra notes 247-5 1.
247 Compare, e.g., N.Y. Esr. PowEPs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (Consol. 1979) (elective
share), with ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-3101 (West 1995).
248 See Clare v. Clark (In re Estate of Clark), 236 N.E.2d 152, 158 (N.Y. 1968) (applying
Virginia law to determine a widow's share in the $23 million estate of a Virginia domicili-
ary, even though the estate consisted largely of securities on deposit at a New York bank);
Hemingway v. McGehee (In re Estate of Crichton), 228 N.E.2d 799, 804-05 (N.Y. 1967)
(rejecting the claim of a surviving spouse that Louisiana's community property law should
apply to property owned by decedent in Louisiana, noting that both spouses had been
domiciled in New York during their marriage).
249 91 N.E.2d 337 (Mass. 1950).
250 See id. at 341.
251 See id. at 340 ("One answer to the defendant's contention is that, wholly apart from
what may be the law of Vermont, it was not shown that the trust was created to defraud the
wife of statutory rights in Vermont. Thejudge was not plainly wrong in not making such a
finding."). In Vermont at the time, a surviving spouse could invalidate an inter vivos trans-
fer as fraudulent if the spouse could show that the transfer was made with actual intent to
disinherit. See id. Massachusetts law at the time included no similar rule.
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parties.25 2 In addition, even if the Gumming court frustrated Ver-
mont's public policy, it is critical to remember that the forum in that
case was Massachusetts, not Vermont. In other words, a court is far
less likely to subordinate the strong policy of its own state than that of
another state.
A review of the authorities thus reveals that whatever courts say
about honoring the law that the parties choose or the law of the situs
of the trust, courts have not permitted trust settlors to frustrate impor-
tant forum policies with their choice of law or trust situs. From courts
in jurisdictions that do not enforce self-settled spendthrift trusts one
would expect the same response to creditor claims against a foreign,
self-settled, asset protection trust created by a forum domiciliary.
A series of recent bankruptcy cases confirm this conclusion. In
each case, the court refused to honor spendthrift provisions in self-
settled offshore trusts. In Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re
Portnoy),2 53 the settlor, knowing that his personal guarantee of a cor-
porate debt was about to be called, created a trust in the Jersey Chan-
nel Islands.2 54 The trust instrument gave the trustee broad discretion
over trust distributions, including power to distribute principal to the
settlor, but reserved for the settlor the power, "in his absolute discre-
tion," to remove any or all of the trustees from office.2 55 As a result,
the settlor effectively ensured control over the trustee's behavior: if
the trustee ignored the settlor's instructions, the settlor could remove
the trustee. When the settlor sought a bankruptcy discharge to avoid
his debts, the bankruptcy court denied his summary judgment mo-
tion,25 6 noting that "Portnoy may not unilaterally remove the charac-
terization of property as his simply by incorporating a favorable choice
of law provision into a self-settled trust of which he is the primary
beneficiary."257
252 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF Cormcr OF LA-WS § 270(a) (1971). This section
provides that an inter vivos trust of interests in movables should be governed in accordance
with the law of the state that the parties choose, "provided that this state has a substantial
relation to the trust and that the application of its law does not violate a strong public
policy of the state with which, as to the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant
relationship." Id Comment b to section 270 explicitly provides:
[W]here the settlor creates a revocable trust in a state other than that of his
domicil, in order to avoid the application of the local law of his domicil
giving his surviving spouse a forced share of his estate, it may be held that
the local law of his domicil is applicable, even though he has designated as
controlling the local law of the state in which the trust is created and
administered.
Id. § 270 cmt. b.
253 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
254 See id. at 688-89.
255 Id. at 689.
256 See id. at 703.
257 Id. at 701.
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Two 1998 cases followed Portnoy's lead. In Sattin v. Brooks (In re
Brooks), 258 the court ruled that assets held in Jersey and Bermuda
trusts should be included in the Connecticut settlor's bankruptcy es-
tate.259 The court held that Connecticut would not enforce self-set-
fled spendthrift provisions in a trust created by a Connecticut
domiciliary regardless of the choice-of-law provisions.2 60 Similarly, the
trust instrument in Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence),261 the court
held that the rights of a Florida settlor of a Mauritian trust would be
"governed by Florida and federal bankruptcy law,.., and not the law
of the Republic of Mauritius." 262
These cases confirm that courts in states that are hostile to self-
settled spendthrift trusts are unlikely to enforce the spendthrift provi-
sions in self-settled asset protection trusts, regardless of the effect that
those provisions might have under the law of the trust situs.263 The
principal hope for the trust settlor in using an asset protection trust,
therefore, is to avoid litigation in hostile local courts. We now turn to
a discussion of that issue.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Suppose a creditor is convinced that a court in her home state
will apply forum law to determine her rights in the property of an
offshore or Alaska trust created by a local settlor. The creditor must
still obtain a forum state judgment that will be effective against either
the trustee or the trust property. Once the settlor transfers property
to the asset protection trust, a personal judgment against the settlor is
of limited value,264 because the settlor no longer claims any legal in-
terest in the property. The trustee, not the settlor, becomes the credi-
tor's adversary in the dispute over legal ownership of the trust
property.
258 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
259 See id. at 101, 104.
260 See id. at 103-04.
261 227 B.R. 907 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).
262 Id. at 917.
263 Proponents of asset protection trusts have argued that the courts in these cases
mistakenly characterized the issue in dispute as one of trust validity, where the setflor has
only limited power to choose applicable law, rather than as one of trust administration,
where the settlor may have broader power to choose applicable law. See, e.g., Gideon
Rothschild et al., Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples Spoil the Bunch? , 32
VA, . J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 768-69 (1999). These proponents, however, have offered no
reasons why courts should adopt their proposed characterization to permit evasion of fo-
rum policy against self-settled spendthrift trusts. The opinions themselves indicate that
courts are unlikely to adopt the "administration" characterization.
264 A personal judgment against the settlor may, however, give the creditor some lever-
age if the creditor can preclude the settlor from obtaining a bankruptcy discharge. See
infra text accompanying notes 362-406.
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The creditor, however, has no apparent basis for obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over a foreign trustee, so long as the trustee has
taken care not to solicit business outside the trustee's home jurisdic-
tion. If the trustee is a corporate entity, it almost certainly does no
business outside its home jurisdiction. In the unlikely event that the
trustee is an individual, the individual may never have set foot in the
creditor's state. In these circumstances, Hanson v. Denckla265 appears
to preclude the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the trustee.
In Hanson, a Pennsylvania domiciliary executed a trust instru-
ment in Delaware delivering securities (the trust corpus) to a Dela-
ware trust company.2 66 Under the terms of the trust instrument, the
settlor retained power to appoint the remainder of the trust corpus by
will or by inter vivos instrument.2 67 The settlor later moved to Florida,
where she exercised her power to appoint the trust corpus by inter
vivos instrument, in part appointing a total of $400,000 in favor of
trusts benefiting the children of one of her daughters. 268 On the
same day, she executed her will, which named the same daughter as
executor, and left the residue of her estate-more than $1,000,000-
to her other two children. 269 After the settlor's death, the two residu-
ary legatees challenged the validity of the inter vivos appointment of
trust property to the children of their sister, the will's executor.2 70
They brought an action in Florida court for a declaratory judgment
"concerning what property passes under the residuary clause of the
will."27 1 The Delaware trustee was also named as a defendant and was
served by ordinary mail.27 2 The executor and her children moved to
dismiss, contending that Florida lacked jurisdiction over an indispen-
sable party, the trustee.273
The United States Supreme Court held that Florida lacked juris-
diction.2 74 Although the Court conceded that the settlor's exercise of
265 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
266 See id. at 238.
267 See id.
268 See id. at 239.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 239-40. There was some dispute in the case about whether the residuary
legatees were challenging only the validity of the appointment or whether they were chal-
lenging the validity of the trust as well. See id. at 240. Chief Justice Warren's majority
opinion argues that the Florida courts held that the trust itself, and therefore the power
created in the trust, was invalid. See id. at 253 n.25. Justice Black's dissent, by contrast,
concludes that the Florida courts decided only that the power of appointment had been
ineffectively exercised because the settior had it not executed in accordance with Florida's
statute of wills. See id. at 256 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting).
271 Id. at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272 See id. at 241.
273 See id. at 241-42.
274 See id. at 250. After the residuary legatees brought suit in Florida, the executor
brought a declaratory judgment action in Delaware to determine ownership of trust assets
held in that state. See id. at 242. The Florida trial court rendered the first decision, ruling
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the power of appointment in Florida gave the state a sufficient con-
nection with the case to justify application of Florida law, the court
held that the settlor's unilateral activity could not operate to give Flor-
ida courts personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee.2 75 In
the Court's words, "it is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State."276 More recently, in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,2 7 7 the Court reaffirmed this
"purposeful availment" requirement for personal jurisdiction. 27
Thus, with respect to an offshore trustee that conducts no business
within the United States, the implications of Hanson and World-Wide
Volkswagen seem clear: no personal jurisdiction is available.2 79
The principle articulated in Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen
drew wide criticism, both inside and outside the Court, as being in-
consistent with the notion that fairness, not physical power, should
serve as the foundation for personal jurisdiction.280 Professors von
that the court lacked jurisdiction as to the trustee, but that it had power to render a deci-
sion binding as to the remaining parties. See id. The court held that the inter vivos exer-
cise of the power of appointment was invalid, and that the appointive property passed to
the residuary beneficiaries. See id. The Delaware court then concluded that the power of
appointment had been validly exercised under Delaware law. See id.
On appeal by the executor's children of the Florida judgment, the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the power had been invalidly exercised, but
also concluded that the Florida court had jurisdiction over the trustee because jurisdiction
to construe the will permitted the court to exercise jurisdiction over the absent defendants.
See id. at 242-43. The residuary legatees then moved, in the Delaware proceeding, to com-
pel the Delaware courts to give full faith and credit to the Florida determination. See id. at
243. The Delaware Supreme Court held, however, that the Florida decree was not entitled
to full faith and credit because the Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
trustee and lacked jurisdiction over the trust property. See id On certiorari from both the
Florida Supreme Court and the Delaware Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Florida determination and affirmed the judgment in the Delaware pro-
ceeding. See id. at 256.
275 See id at 253.
276 Id.
277 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
278 See id. at 297.
279 The assumption here is that the offshore trustee has not solicited American busi-
ness. In Hanson, for instance, the Supreme Court was careful to distinguish the previous
year's McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), by emphasizing that in McGee,
the insurance company had solicited California business, although it did not operate in
California. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-52.
280 Hanson was a 5-to-4 decision in whichJustice Black argued in dissent that the major-
ity opinion was too slow to depart from the jurisdictional principles of Pennyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See Hanson, 357 U.S.
at 259-60 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas, also dissenting, emphasized that fairness
to the parties should be the critical factor in the jurisdictional determination. See id. at 263
(Douglas, J., dissenting). More than 20 years later, Justice Brennan, dissenting in World-
Wide Volkswagen, argued that "constitutional concepts of fairness no longer require the
extreme concern for defendants that was once necessary." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Mehren and Trautman have suggested that the traditional distinction
between in personam jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction makes little
sense once fairness has displaced power as the essential requisite for
jurisdiction. 28 ' They instead suggest distinguishing between general
jurisdiction, whereby a defendant's contacts with the state are so ex-
tensive that they justify a court's assertion ofjurisdiction even for activ-
ities unrelated to those contacts, and specific jurisdiction, whereby a
defendant's contacts justify jurisdiction only over disputes that arise
out of those contacts.28 2 Within their analytical framework, whichJus-
tice Brennan shared, a defendant's contacts with the forum should
not assume paramount importance when courts evaluate claims of
specific jurisdiction. Instead, courts must assert jurisdiction in these
cases if the plaintiff and the controversy have a close relationship to
the forum.283 This framework might well suggest that a New York
court should have specific jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between
New York creditors and a Cook Islands trustee over the trustee's
power to pay monies to the New York debtor or his designees.
The criticisms of the approach that the Court took in Hanson and
World-Wide Volkswagen have not yet persuaded the Court to depart
from the principle that a court may not assert personal jurisdiction
For criticism outside the Court, see, for example, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 243-44 (criticizing Hanson); Martin
H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A TheoreticalEvaluation, 75 Nw. U.
L. REv. 111, 112-15 (1981) (criticizing World-Wide Volkswagen for overemphasizing a defen-
dant's contacts with a state and underemphasizing fairness).
281 See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. Rav. 279, 287 (1983). Von Mehren noted:
The traditional terminology has no logical or psychological connection
with ajurisdictional theory based on fairness. Indeed, use of the terminol-
ogy supports intellectual biases-in particular, the central importance of
power in jurisdictional thinking-that are inconsistent with a fairness the-
ory. More importantly, traditional terminology sometimes obscures the pol-
icy issues that such a theory faces in connection with the assertion of
adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Id.; cf Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis 79 HAgv. L. Ray. 1121, 1135-36 (1966) (noting that the distinction between in
personam and in remjurisdiction "does not seem apt or particularly useful").
282 Seevon Mehren, supra note 281, at 288; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 281, at
1164-66. The Supreme Court itself differentiated between specific and general jurisdiction
in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984). In this
case, the Court held that the Texas courts did not have general jurisdiction over a Colom-
bian corporation merely because the corporation had purchased helicopters and parts
from a Texas company, and had sent personnel to Texas for training and technical consul-
tation. See id. at 418-19. The claim in Helicopteros arose out of a Peruvian air crash. See id. at
410.
283 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer,
433 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing the
need for "minimum contacts among the parties, the contested transaction, and the forum
state") (emphasis added); von Mehren, supra note 281, at 311-12 (emphasizing the impor-
tance of the plaintiffs or the controversy's close relationship to the forum, as well as other
factors unrelated to defendant's activities within the forum).
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over a defendant who has not engaged in purposeful activity within
the state's borders.28 4 Moreover, whatever the principle's merits in
purely domestic cases, it makes substantially more sense in the context
of offshore trusts, where the jurisdictional issues have international,
rather than merely interstate, implications. After all, if the Supreme
Court had decreed in Hanson that Florida had power over the Dela-
ware trustee, then the Full Faith and Credit Clause would have com-
pelled Delaware to honor the Florida judgment. By contrast, even if
the Court decreed that a New York court has power over a Cook Is-
lands trustee, that decree would have little impact on the trustee, who
would be free to ignore it with the knowledge that the courts of the
Cook Islands would never enforce it.28 5 In this sense, at least, physical
power remains an important force in shaping the law of personal juris-
diction. Courts serve no significant purpose and undermine their au-
thority if they take jurisdiction over cases in which they would be
powerless to afford a victorious plaintiff an effective remedy.28 6
Thus, if a trust settlor transfers assets to a Cook Islands or Alaska
trustee, which in turn ensures that all assets are held in cash or liquid
investments, the settlor may effectively insulate those assets from
claims by American creditors. Many property owners, however, are
unwilling to go so far to avoid claims by potential creditors. If the
setflor's property consists of local real estate, a medical practice, or a
closely held business, the settlor may seek to transfer these assets into
an asset protection trust. With respect to trusts funded with these as-
sets, the question is whether the property itself can serve as a basis for
jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction Over Trust Property
Suppose, as is often the case, that the settlor of an asset protec-
tion trust purports to transfer property that remains at home into the
trust. Can the property itself serve as a basis for jurisdiction to deter-
mine a creditor's claim that the transfer was fraudulent? Before Shaf-
fer v. Heitner,28 7 it was clear that a state in which the property was
located had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the owner of that
284 Indeed, the Court's reaffirmation in Bumham v. Supeior Cour 495 U.S. 604, 628
(1990), of the principle that personal service within the state, without more, is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the state's courts, provides substantial evidence that the power the-
ory of jurisdiction is far from dead.
285 See International Trusts Act (1984) § 13(D) (1996) (Cook Islands). But cf 515 S.
Orange Grove Owners Ass'n v. Orange Grove Partners, Plaint No. 208/94 (High Court of
the Cook Islands 1995) (giving narrow construction to statute).
286 Cf von Mehren, supra note 281, at 288, 305 n.71 (concluding that, even under a
fairness-based approach to jurisdiction, the court's power and the effectiveness of its exer-
cise ofjurisdiction remain important).
287 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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property, even if the owner never had set foot in the state.28 Thus, if
the trustee of an offshore trust owned property in New York, the New
York courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the trustee,
and had power to seize and apply the trustee's property if the trustee
did not comply with the court's orders. Moreover, the New York
courts enjoyed this power even if the trustee had no other contact
with New York: the reasonableness of the jurisdiction was not a factor.
Shaffer did little to change the situation. If a creditor brings suit
in a New York court to set aside as fraudulent a transfer of New York
property from the trust settlor to an offshore trustee, Shafferwould not
deprive the NewYork court of thejurisdiction it previously enjoyed. 28 9
In a fraudulent conveyance action, the property the settlor conveys is
the subject of the litigation between creditor and trustee. The credi-
tor would allege that the trustee is not the owner of the property be-
cause the settlor never had power to convey title good as against the
settlor's present or future creditors.290
In many ways, the dispute is akin to an action to quiet title, in
which one party with a claim to property brings an action against an-
other party with an adverse claim to the property.29 ' Some scholars
argue that, in the quiet title context, Shaffer does not deprive courts of
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against nonresident claimants with
property in the forum.2 92 In part, the justification for conferring juris-
diction on the situs of the property to determine claims against non-
residents rests on the common sense notion that some procedure
must be available for a state to determine who owns property within its
288 See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 224 (1905), overruled by Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186.
Haris represents a logical extension of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part
by Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186, in which the Supreme Court sharply distinguished between two
bases for jurisdiction: jurisdiction over persons and jurisdiction over property. See id. at
722. That distinction rested squarely on a power theory of personal jurisdiction: a court
could enforce its orders by seizing or attaching defendant's property if that property was
within the state's borders. See id. at 723.
289 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 ("[W]hen claims to the property itself are the source of
underlying controversy... it would be unusual for the State where the property is located
not to have jurisdiction.").
290 Cf Julie Sirota Kourchin & Juli J. Kempner, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a
Property Right; 9 Coaozo L. REv. 843, 848 (1987) (characterizing fraudulent conveyance
right "as a 'property' or 'in rem' right").
291 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-1 (1996) ("An action may be brought by any
person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property or an interest or
claim to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse
claim."). Unlike Utah, most states limit quiet-title actions to real property. See John T.
Soma et al., The Use of Quiet Title and Declaratory Judgment Proceedings in Computer Software
Ownership Disputes, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 543, 567 (1994).
292 See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State CourtJurisdic-
tion, 1980 Sup. CT. Ruv. 77,97; JosephJ. Kalo, The Meaning of Contact and Minimum National




borders, a justification equally available when the issue is whether the
creditor or the offshore trustee owns local property that the settlor
attempted to convey to the offshore trust.293
If a creditor does not bring an action to set aside a transfer to the
offshore trust as a fraudulent conveyance, but instead challenges the
validity of a spendthrift provision in a self-settled trust, the debtor or
the trustee has a somewhat more plausible, although ultimately unper-
suasive, argument that the court in which the trust property is located
lacks in remjurisdiction. If the creditor concedes that the initial con-
veyance was not fraudulent-perhaps because the statute of limita-
tons has expired on a fraudulent conveyance claim-the debtor or
the trustee can argue that the dispute is not over title to the trust
property itself. In that case the creditor would have to concede that
the debtor's conveyance to the trustee was valid, challenging only the
terms of the trust instrument that defines the rights of settlor and
trustee. The debtor or the trustee might argue, therefore, that the
challenge to the spendthrift trust, unlike a fraudulent conveyance
claim, is not a situation in which "claims to the property itself are the
source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant."294 Hence, the claim is not one over which Shaffer endorsed
continued use of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.
This argument, however, ultimately fails. First, the Court indi-
cated that "the presence of property [in the state] may also favor juris-
diction in cases... where the defendant's ownership of the property
is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and
duties growing out of that ownership."2 95 A challenge to a self-settled
spendthrift trust precisely presents this situation: the creditor con-
cedes the trustee is the legal owner, but questions the trustee's right to
make payments to the settlor-beneficiary. 296 More importantly, how-
293 See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208. The power of a state to regulate common trust funds
furnishes another analogy. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950). In holding that NewYork hadjurisdiction to settle a trustee's account in
a NewYork common trust fund, even if many of the beneficiaries of the fund were nonresi-
dents of New York, Justice Jackson wrote:
It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition of its cho-
sen procedure, the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts
that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervi-
sion of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond
doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resi-
dent or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to ap-
pear and be heard.
Id-
294 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
295 Id. at 208. The Court used the example of "suits for injury suffered on the land of
an absentee owner," id., but a dispute over the effect of a spendthrift provision in a self-
settled trust fits the Court's category equally well.
296 Moreover, some authority exists to support the proposition that when a trust settlor
creates a spendthrift trust for his own benefit, the trust is invalid at its inception. See supra
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ever, the Shaffer Court made it very clear that its opinion did not im-
pair the ability of creditors to realize the obligations incurred by
debtors. 297 The Court acknowledged that the primary rationale for
treating the presence of property as a basis for jurisdiction has been
the desire to prevent a wrongdoer from placing his assets in a state
that lacks personal jurisdiction over him.298
The need to protect creditors against fleeing debtors may no
longer serve as a justification for in remjurisdiction when the debtor
hides his property in a state in which the creditor will be unable to
obtain a personal judgment against him. Creditor protection remains
important, however, when the debtor conveys the property to an off-
shore trustee, who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in any of the
fifty states. Indeed, the Court in Shaffer left open the possibility that
the presence of property-even if unrelated to the claim-might be
"a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to
the plaintiff."299 In other words, the Court tried to ensure that its
opinion would not be used to insulate wrongdoers from claims by
their creditors-the very problem that arises in the context of off-
shore trusts.30
note 49 and accompanying text. Thus, a challenge to a spendthrift provision becomes a
challenge to the trust itself and for jurisdictional purposes, a challenge to the trust as a
fraudulent conveyance.
297 See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210.
298 See id. In justifying its departure from traditional in ren rules, the Court empha-
sized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects against attempts by debtors to avoid
their obligations. See id. So long as the creditor may obtain personal jurisdiction over the
debtor somewhere, all other states are obligated to enforce judgments rendered by the
state with personal jurisdiction. See i. The Court stated:
[We know of nothing to justify the assumption that a debtor can avoid
paying his obligations by removing his property to a State in which his cred-
itor cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid in personam judgment of one State
enforceable in all other States.
Id. (footnotes omitted). As the court implicitly recognized, creditors have found it signifi-
cantly easier to obtain personal jurisdiction over debtors with the expansion of bases for
personal jurisdiction over the course of the twentieth century. Today, personal service
within the state is no longer required. Jurisdiction can be based on the debtor's domicile.
See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940). It can also be based on other minimum
contacts between the debtor and the state. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). As a result, Harris v. Balk-type attachment jurisdiction is no longer
necessary to provide creditors with an appropriate forum for recovery of debts.
299 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
300 See Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise ofJurisdiction Over and Enforce-
ment ofJudgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 799, 823 (1988) (noting that the
Court in Shafferreservedjudgment on 'vhether the attachment of property alone was suffi-
cient to provide jurisdiction if no other forum were available" and observing that Shaffes
conclusions "implicitly rested on the notion that it was not necessary to rely on territorial
principles because the defendants properly might be sued in some state in which they had
minimum contacts and any judgment reached there could be enforced through the full
faith and credit clause").
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Moreover, the problem is similar when the trust settlor creates an
asset protection trust in a rogue American jurisdiction; without in rem
jurisdiction, no effective forum would be available to vindicate a claim
against a debtor who has moved his assets to an accommodating state.
Thus, because the premise on which Shaffer rests is that jurisdiction
based on the presence of property is no longer necessary to protect
creditors, Shaffer should not be read to constrict jurisdictional power
when a creditor has no alternative forum for vindication of rights rec-
ognized under local law.
Nevertheless, a creditor who relies on the presence of property
within a state as the basis for asserting jurisdiction still faces an impor-
tant, and often fatal obstacle: establishing that the property is indeed
present within the state. When tangible property, particularly real
property, is involved, establishing the location of that property will
generally be straightforward. However, when intangible property-
partnership interests and corporate shares-is at stake, the creditor
faces serious difficulties.
Many of these difficulties are codified in Revised Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which deals with investment se-
curities. All corporate equities are securities within the scope of Arti-
cle 8, and partnership interests are within the statute's scope if the
partnership agreement so provides.301 The drafters of Revised Article
8 recognized three separate systems for holding securities, applying
significantly different legal regimes to them: (1) the traditional system
of holding securities through physical certificates; (2) the uncertifi-
cated securities system, in which ownership is reflected in the records
of the securities issuer, but no certificates are issued; and (3) the indi-
rect holding system, which now accounts for the majority of shares of
all publicly traded companies.30 2 Although the traditional system
prevails in most closely held companies, and the indirect system has
become increasingly important with respect to publicly traded compa-
nies, the uncertificated securities system remains undeveloped for
most categories of securities.303
301 See U.C.C. § 8-103(a) (2000) ("A share or similar equity interest issued by a corpo-
ration, business trust, joint stock company, or similar entity is a security."); see also id. § 8-
103(c) ("An interest in a partnership or limited liability company is not a security unless it
is dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or in securities markets, its terms expressly
provide that it is a security governed by this Article, or it is an investment company security
[as defined in section 8-102(b)].").
302 See generally id. art. 8 prefatory note IA-C (2000). At the time of the UCO revision,
the drafters reported that one common depository "is listed as the shareholder of record of
somewhere in the range of sixty to eighty per cent of the outstanding shares of all publicly
traded companies." Id. at I.C.
303 See id. at I.B.
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Section 8-112 of the UCC governs creditors' legal process against
the interest of a debtor in a security.30 4 With respect to certificated
securities, a debtor's interest "may be reached by a creditor only by
actual seizure of the security certificate by the officer making the at-
tachment or levy." 305 That is, once a trust settlor transfers his shares
to an out-of-state or foreign trustee, the setflor's creditors may not
attach those shares in the settlor's home state because the officers of
the home state's courts lack power to seize the out-of-state assets.
With respect to securities held through the indirect holding system,
which Article 8 calls "securities entitlements," the interest of the
debtor "may be reached by a creditor only by legal process upon the
securities intermediary with whom the debtor's securities account is
maintained."306
Suppose, then, that a trust setflor orders his broker to transfer
securities to an out-of-state securities intermediary who acts as broker
for the trustee. Legal process against the settlor's broker will be fruit-
less. Section 8-115 of the UCC provides that once a securities interme-
diary has transferred a financial asset at its customer's direction, the
securities intermediary is not liable to adverse claimants, unless the
intermediary "took the action after it had been served with.. . legal
process" enjoining the transfer, has "acted in collusion with the
wrongdoer," or, in the case of stolen certificates, has "acted with no-
tice of the adverse claim."307 Legal process against the trustee's bro-
ker will be fruitless: first, the creditor may be unable to obtain
jurisdiction against the out-of-state broker; and second, the UCC
treats the broker as a "purchaser for value." 08
Hence, whether the settlor has transferred into the trust securi-
ties certificates or a securities entitlement, Article 8 of the UCC leaves
the settlor's creditors unable to attach those assets within the settlor's
jurisdiction, even if those securities are shares in a closely held corpo-
ration that does business only in the settlor's home state. Moreover, if
the settlor chooses to do business in partnership form, the settlor can
obtain the same protection from creditors by "opting in" to Article 8
through language in the partnership agreement.
804 See id. § 8-112.
305 Id. §8-112(a). The statute includes two exceptions, neither of which is important
for present purposes. If the certificate has been surrendered to the issuer, a creditor may
reach the security "by legal process upon the issuer." Id. If the certificate is "in the posses-
sion of a secured party," the creditor may reach the security "by legal process upon the
secured party." Id. § 8-112(d).
306 Id. § 8-112(c).
807 Id. § 8-115.
308 Id. § 8-116 (making the securities intermediary a "purchaser for value"). UCC § 8-
303(b) provides that a purchaser who gives value, does not have notice of any adverse




UCC Article 8 is not, and does not purport to be, ajurisdictional
statute. The statute limits a state's power to attach assets, not the
state's power to assert judicial jurisdiction over a claim to the assets.
Attachment is not constitutionally necessary to establish judicial juris-
diction over property within the state. 30 9 A number of states have ju-
risdictional statutes that give their courts 'Jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States."310 Especially in a state with such a statute, there is little reason
to believe that a court would treat Article 8 as an implied limitation on
judicial jurisdiction. Thus, if the settlor operates a local business
owned in partnership form or as a closely held corporation, the local
court would very likely assert jurisdiction over the settlor's interest in
the business even if the settlor has conveyed his partnership interest
or corporate stock to a foreign trustee.
Even if Article 8 would not prevent a court from asserting judicial
jurisdiction, the statute does create enforcement problems for local
courts. Once a creditor establishes that he, and not the trust, owns
the partnership property or the corporate shares, the UCC appears to
309 Historically, courts thought attachment was essential to permit the assertion ofju-
risdiction quasi in rem if the property that served as the basis for jurisdiction was unrelated
to the plaintiff's claim. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Shaffer in regard to Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977):
Attachment was considered essential to the state court's jurisdiction for
two reasons. First, attachment combined with substituted service would
provide greater assurance that the defendant would actually receive notice
of the action than would publication alone. Second, since the court's juris-
diction depended on the defendant's ownership of property in the State
and could be defeated if the defendant disposed of that property, attach-
ment was necessary to assure that the court had jurisdiction when the pro-
ceedings began and continued to have jurisdiction when it entered
judgment.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 198 n.16. Even before Shaffer, however, attachment was not necessary to
support quasi in remjurisdiction when the plaintiff sought to establish his interest in prop-
erty against the claim of some other designated person. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 3, topic 2 introductory note (1971) (distinguishing between two
forms of quasi in remjurisdiction and mentioning attachment as a prerequisite only for "the
second type" of quasi in rem proceeding-the type in which plaintiff seeks to apply unre-
lated property to satisfaction of his claim).
The Shaffer Court's opinion purports to change the law only in this "second type" of
quasi in rem proceeding. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208-09. That is, in cases in which attach-
ment was not required before Shaffer, it appears not to be required after Shaffer. Moreover,
the Court's analysis, with its focus on the relationship between the property and the cause
of action asserted, makes it unlikely that attachment is currently necessary to support quasi
in renjurisdiction.
Indeed, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrED STATES
§ 421 (2) (k) (1986), drafted after the decision in Shaffer, concludes that exercise ofjurisdic-
tion with respect to a thing is reasonable if the claim is reasonably related to the thing and
the thing "is owned, possessed, or used in the state." Id. That is, use within the state is
sufficient to serve as a basis forjurisdiction even if the property is not owned or possessed
within the state.
310 CAuL. CwV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
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limit significantly the remedies available to the creditor.3 1 ' Matters
may not, however, be so simple. Article 8 is not the only body of law
that purports to govern creditor remedies with respect to personal
property. State law often authorizes appointment of receivers to en-
able a creditor to enforce a judgment against the property of a
debtor.3 12 When the judgment debtor's property is a partnership in-
terest, both the Uniform Partnership Act3 13 and the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act3 14 contemplate charging the interest of the debtor
partner with payment of ajudgment debt and appointing a receiver to
collect money due the creditor with respect to the partnership.
Because section 8-112 of the UCC does not explicitly repeal state
law provisions making broader remedies available to judgment credi-
tors, courts may be tempted to conclude that other creditor remedies
survive enactment of Article 8. If so, creditors may be able to reach
partnerships or closely held businesses whose physical operations are
located within the state and who are therefore subject to state judicial
power, even if the partnership agreement or stock certificates have
been transferred to an offshore trust. Nevertheless, the creditor's
road will be a difficult one, and if the settlor has been willing to fund
the trust with cash or with publicly traded securities, the creditor's
road may be blocked entirely.
4. Jurisdiction over the Trust Settlor: Civil Contempt Sanctions
Suppose an American court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction
over the trustee or in remjurisdiction over the trust property. Can the
court impose contempt sanctions on the trust settlor to induce the
settlor to apply trust assets toward repayment of the settlor's obliga-
311 See U.C.C. § 8-112; supra text accompanying notes 277-78.
312 See, e.g., CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 708.620 (West 1987) ("The court may appoint a
receiver to enforce the judgment where the judgment creditor shows that, considering the
interests of both the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, the appointment of a
receiver is a reasonable method to obtain the fair and orderly satisfaction of the judg-
ment."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5106 (Consol. 1978) (authorizing a court to "appoint a receiver of
property which is the subject of an action, to carry the judgment into effect or to dispose of
the property according to its directions").
313 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1994) § 504, 6 U.L.A. 70 (1995); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
Acr (1914) § 28(1), 6 U.LA. 744 (1995). The two versions of the Uniform Partnership Act
are in force in variousjurisdictions. Section 28 (1) of the original act and section 504 of the
revised act each make provision for charging orders and the appointment of receivers.
314 See UNIF. LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP Aar (1976) § 703, 6A U.LA 235 (1995) (not ex-
pressly providing for the appointment of receivers, but suggesting in commentary that the
statute was not intended to restrict a court's power to appoint receivers); UNn. LIMrrED




tions? In Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media, LLC,31 5 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court order that did just that.31 6
In July 1995, the Andersons, a married couple, created an irrevo-
cable Cook Islands trust, naming themselves and a Cook Islands com-
pany as co-trustees, and naming themselves as "protectors" of the
trust.3 17 The trust instrument provided that upon the happening of
"an event of duress" within the territory in which a trustee is resident,
the trustee's title to the property would be immediately divested in
favor of the remaining trustees.8 18 The trust defined the issuance of a
court order "which in the opinion of the protector will or may...
restrict or prevent the free disposal by a trustee of any... property
which may from time to time be included in... this trust" to consti-
tute an event of duress.3 19
Two years after creating the trust, the Andersons embarked on a
Ponzi scheme which allegedly defrauded thousands of investors.3 20
The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint, and, on motion by
the Commission, the federal district court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting the Andersons from making false or misleading state-
ments in connection with the marketing of investments.3 21 The
injunction also required the Andersons to repatriate all assets outside
the United States.32 2 When the Andersons faxed a letter instructing
the Cook Islands trustee to repatriate the assets to the United States,
the trustee notified them that the court order was an event of duress
under the trust3 23 As a result, the Cook Islands trustee removed the
Andersons as trustees and refused to repatriate the assets.3 24 On the
Commission's motion, the district court held the Andersons in civil
contempt.32 5 After continuing the hearing three times to permit the
Andersons to purge themselves of contempt, the district court judge
ultimately ordered the Andersons taken into custody.326 The Ander-
sons appealed both the preliminary injunction and the contempt
order.32 7
In affirming, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Andersons' principal
argument: that their inability to comply with the district court's order
315 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
316 See id. at 1243.
317 See id. at 1242.
318 Id, at 1232.
319 Id. at 1239 n.9 (citing Anderson trust agreement).
320 See id, at 1231.









constituted a defense to the charge of civil contempt.3 28 The court
observed that, in a civil contempt proceeding, the defendant bears the
burden of proving impossibility of compliance: "In the asset protec-
tion trust context, ... the burden on the party asserting an impossibil-
ity defense will be particularly high because of the likelihood that any
attempted compliance with the court's orders will be merely a charade
rather than a good faith effort to comply."3 29 Then, observing that
the district court's determination that the Andersons remained in
control of the trust was a finding of fact, the court affirmed the find-
ing as "not clearly erroneous."330 The Ninth Circuit noted that the
Andersons were not only trustees, but also protectors of their trust,
positions they retained at the time of the district court order.331 Be-
cause the trust instrument provided the protectors with discretion to
determine whether an event of duress has occurred, the court con-
cluded that the Andersons had not established that the district court
had committed clear error in finding that they retained power to
force repatriation of trust assets33 2
Affordable Media undoubtedly will dampen the enthusiasm for off-
shore trusts among some potential settlors and their advisors. Indeed,
a federal bankruptcy court recent followed Affordable Media and im-
posed civil contempt sanctions on another settlor of an offshore
trust 3 3 3-the infamous Stephan Jay Lawrence, whose saga we encoun-
tered in the Introduction of this Article.334 Using its common sense
to conclude that Lawrence had power to repatriate the assets in his
Mauritius trust, the court adjudged Lawrence in civil contempt. 335
Civil contempt sanctions, however, do not appear to offer a stable
long-term solution for the problems associated with asset protection
trusts. First, when the Andersons created their Cook Islands trust,
they retained broad powers over the trust funds as trust protectors. 3 36
In particular, the trust instrument gave the protectors power to ap-
328 See id. at 1243.
329 Id. at 1241.
330 Id.
331 See id. at 1242.
332 See id.
333 Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence), 238 B.R 498 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
334 See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
335 See In re Lawrence, 238 B.R. at 500-01. The court wrote:
[T]his Court's finding is based as well on the entirety of the record before
the Court in this case and in the Adversary proceeding, and the Court's
own common sense: it defies reason-it tortures reason-to accept and be-
lieve that this Debtor transferred over $7,000,000 in 1991, an amount then
constituting over ninety percent of his liquid net worth, to a trust in a far
away place administered by a stranger-pursuant to an Alleged Trust which
purports to allow the trustee of the Alleged Trust total discretion over the





point new trustees and to determine when an event of default had
occurred. 3 7 The Ninth Circuit seized upon these powers, which set-
tlors typically do not include in offshore trusts, as evidence that the
Andersons had power to arrange repatriation of trust assets. 338 More-
over, the Andersons' trust instrument had initially named them not
merely as trust protectors, but also as co-trustees. 339 Although In re
Lawrence suggests that these features may not be necessary to trigger
use of the civil contempt sanction, it remains to be seen how often,
and in what circumstances courts will be willing to impose contempt
sanctions on settlors who retain fewer powers.
Second, Affordable Media fails to answer one critical question: For
how long will a court be willing to incarcerate an offshore trust settlor
for civil contempt?340 In Affordable Media itself, for instance, "the dis-
trict court ordered the Andersons released from custody" before the
Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on their appeal. 341 Penalties for
civil contempt are designed to coerce the contemnor into compliance
with the court's order. If incarceration will not induce compliance,
the foundation for imprisonment collapses.342 Moreover, a settlor's
failure to purge his contempt after sitting in jail for months or even
weeks may establish to a court's satisfaction that the settlor is indeed
337 See id.
338 See id. The court wrote:
A protector can be compelled to exercise control over a trust to repatriate
assets if the protector's powers are not drafted solely as the negative powers
to veto trustee decisions or if the protector's powers are not subject to the
anti-duress provisions of the trust. The Andersons' trust gives them affirma-
tive powers to appoint new trustees and makes the anti-duress provisions
subject to the protectors' powers[;J therefore, they can force the foreign
trustee to repatriate the trust assets to the United States.
Id. (citation omitted). Implicit in the court's distinction between affirmative and negative
powers is the conclusion that, if the protector retains only negative powers, contempt sanc-
tions might not be available for failure to repatriate assets.
339 See id.
340 A court also might impose criminal contempt sanctions on a settlor who disobeys a
court order to repatriate offshore trust assets. Criminal contempt sanctions, however, cre-
ate problems of their own. First, in order to impose a prison term of longer than six
months, the court must first offer defendant due process protections, including ajury trial.
See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
Second, although trial judges have broad discretion to employ the contempt sanction for
disobedience of court orders in federal courts, see 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994), many state legis-
latures have defined criminal contempt and severely limited the penalties courts may im-
pose. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 206 n.8 (presenting survey of state limitations on criminal
contempt penalties). As a result, it is highly unlikely that any state or federal court would
impose criminal contempt sanctions in excess of six months on a recalcitrant trust settlor.
341 Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1233 n.3 (stating that upon release, the district court
held that the Andersons remained in contempt of court).
342 See, e.g., United States v. Lippitt, 180 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a
civil contempt order could "lose its coercive force if there were simply no reasonable possi-




unable to arrange repatriation of trust assets, establishing a defense to
civil contempt. Finally, even if a court remains convinced that the
settlor has the power to arrange repatriation and that enough incar-
ceration might induce the settlor to repatriate, the court might simply
believe that indefinite incarceration is inappropriate without express
statutory sanction.
Affordable Media serves as a reminder that a court's power over the
trust settlor's person may indirectly operate to induce repatriation of
trust assets, even without the power to directly reach offshore trust
assets. Moreover, judicial power to incarcerate the settlor, particularly
if augmented by legislatively imposed criminal sanctions, may reduce
the incidence of offshore trusts; imprisonment is a risk that potential
trust settlors may be unwilling to take. Civil contempt sanctions alone,
however, may not be adequate either to deter creation of offshore
trusts or to induce compliance with court-ordered repatriation.
B. Bankruptcy Court as an Alternative
Federal bankruptcy courts are not subject to the same jurisdic-
tional limitations as state courts.343 To what extent, then, does bank-
ruptcyjurisdiction operate as a check on the power of states or foreign
jurisdictions to export asset protection trust legislation?344 The bank-
ruptcy courts have two powers that limit the usefulness of asset preser-
vation trusts to potential settlors. First, unlike state courts, bankruptcy
courts have the power to reach a debtor's assets throughout the
United States.345 Second, bankruptcy courts have the power to deny a
settlor a discharge. 346 Nationwide jurisdiction makes involuntary
bankruptcy petitions attractive to creditors. On the other hand, the
power to deny a discharge makes a voluntary bankruptcy petition less
attractive for many debtors.
1. Involuntary Petitions
Under § 303(b) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a single creditor
with a claim of at least $10,000 against a debtor may commence an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding if fewer than twelve creditors hold
claims against the debtor.3 47 If more than twelve creditors hold claims
that aggregate at least $10,000, at least three of those creditors must
join in filing the petition.348 If the court finds that "the debtor is gen-
343 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
344 Because dynasty trusts typically do not result in more creditor claims than other
trusts, bankruptcy jurisdiction is unlikely to have any discernable impact on dynasty trusts.
345 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).
346 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328.
347 See id. § 303(b)(2).
348 See id. §303(b)(1).
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erally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due," the
Code instructs the court to order relief against the debtor, "unless
such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute."3 49
Once the case has commenced and a bankruptcy trustee has
been selected, § 544(b) of the Code gives the trustee the power to
"avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor ... that is voidable
under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim."3 50
The applicable law for this purpose is state law.35' Thus, if a transfer
from the settlor-debtor to a trust would be fraudulent under state law,
the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to avoid that transfer. Moreover, if
the transfer is not itself fraudulent, but, under state law, a creditor of a
settlor-debtor could reach the settlor's interest in a self-settled spend-
thrift or discretionary trust, the bankruptcy trustee can also reach that
interest.3 52
Furthermore, unlike state courts, bankruptcy courts enjoy nation-
widejurisdiction. In bankruptcy cases, Congress conferred on the fed-
eral district courts exclusive jurisdiction "of all of the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case,
and of property of the estate."353 The Bankruptcy Rules, promul-
gated pursuant to the Supreme Court's rulemaking power,354 provide
for nationwide service of process.3 55 They also expressly provide that,
when a party is served in accordance with the Rules, the court has
personal jurisdiction over that party if jurisdiction is consistent with
the Constitution and federal statutes, 356 thereby eliminating any
doubts about congressional intent. Jurisdiction will be consistent with
349 Id. § 303(h)(1).
350 Id. § 544(b).
351 The Bankruptcy Code includes a separate provision giving the bankruptcy trustee
power to avoid transfers defined as fraudulent in the Code itself. See id. § 548. Section
548, however, permits the trustee to avoid only those fraudulent transfers made within one
year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition-a period shorter than the period avail-
able under most state statutes, and particularly the UFTA. See UNir. FRAUDuLENT TRANSFER
Acr § 9, 7A-2 U.L.A. 359 (1999) (providing a four-year limitation for claims other than
those arising under § 5 (b) of the statute, which applies to insider claims). Hence, from a
creditor's standpoint, § 544(b) is likely to prove more useful.
352 See U.S.C. § 541(a) (providing that "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property" are included in the bankruptcy estate, except as provided in §§ 541(b) and
541(c) (2)). Section 541(c) (2) provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is
enforceable in a case under this title." Id. § 541(c) (2). Thus, to the extent that a spend-
thrift provision in a trust is enforceable under applicable state law, the spendthrift provi-
sion is enforceable in bankruptcy. Conversely, if a spendthrift provision would not be
enforceable outside of bankruptcy, the debtor's interest in the trust becomes property of
the bankruptcy estate.
353 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).
354 That power emanates from the Rules Enabling Act. See id § 2072.
355 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d) ("The summons and complaint and all other process
except a subpoena may be served anywhere in the United States.").
356 See FED. R. BANKxa P. 7004(f). This section provides:
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the Constitution and federal statutes if the defendant has the requisite
contacts with the United States as a whole, even if the defendant has
no contacts with the state in which the bankruptcy court sits. 357 The
bankruptcy courts' nationwide jurisdiction does not enable creditors
to reach assets in offshore trusts, except in the unlikely event that the
offshore trustee can be subjected to personal jurisdiction in the
United States. Nationwide jurisdiction, however, significantly dimin-
ishes the utility of Delaware and Alaska asset protection trusts.
As we have seen, § 544(b) gives the bankruptcy trustee the power
to avoid transfers that would be voidable under applicable law.358 The
applicable law is state law. The natural question, however, is which
state law? Whether a bankruptcy court is bound to apply the choice-
of-law rules of the state in which it sits remains an unresolved ques-
If the exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service in accord-
ance with this rule or the subdivisions of Rule 4 F.R. Crv. P. made applica-
ble by these rules is effective to establish personal jurisdiction over the
person of any defendant with respect to a case under the Code or a civil
proceeding arising under the Code, or arising in or related to a case under
the Code.
Id.
Rule 7004(f) was added in 1996 to make clear "that service or filing a waiver of service
in accordance with this rule or the applicable subdivisions of F.R1 Crv. P. 4 is sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Id. at 7004(f) advisory committee's
notes; see also Goodson v. Rowland (In re Pintlar Corp.), 133 F.3d 1141, 1144-47 (9th Cir.
1998) (discussing personal jurisdiction under Rule 7004(f)), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 933
(1998). Before the 1996 amendment, a few courts had suggested that the Bankruptcy
Rules provided for nationwide service of process, but might still require minimum contacts
with the forum state to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nordberg v.
Granfinanciera, SA. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd
on other grounds, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
357 With the enactment of Rule 7004(f), it is now clear that the exercise ofjurisdiction
only requires contacts between the defendant and the United States. Congress certainly
had the power either to localize all bankruptcy jurisdiction in a single federal court or to
create bankruptcy courts that cross state lines. Had Congress done so, a court would have
had the power to subject defendants to jurisdiction even if they had no contacts in the state
in which the court was located. If these hypothetical bankruptcy courts lacked such power,
some defendants would not be subject to bankruptcyjurisdiction anywhere. On the other
hand, if these hypothetical courts do not raise due process concerns, it is hard to see how
the nationwide bankruptcy jurisdiction explicitly conferred in Rule 7004(f) could raise
constitutional concerns-at least with respect to defendants who have some connection
with the United States. Thus, any remaining fairness concerns about subjecting out-of-
state defendants to the bankruptcy jurisdiction involve questions of venue, not personal
jurisdiction. See Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984). The Hogue
court noted:
The propriety of process issuing from federal courts sitting in cases arising
under federal law is not tested by the same yardstick as is the constitutional
limitation upon service of process issuing from state courts because the is-
sues involved necessarily are often national in character. Rather, the defen-
dant must look primarily to federal venue requirements for protection
from onerous litigation.
Id. at 991 (citation omitted).
358 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994).
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tion.359 Ultimately, however, resolution of the question is unimpor-
tant, because no state, except perhaps Delaware or Alaska, would
apply a choice-of-law rule that would permit local settlors to evade
claims by local creditors simply by creating out-of-state trusts3 6° In
other words, choice-of-law analysis might lead a court to look to the
law of the settlor's domicile or to the law of the state in which most of
the creditors are situated. No choice-of-law analysis, however, would
lead a court in any state that frowns on asset protection trusts to apply
the law of a rogue jurisdiction that authorizes out-of-state setflors to
create such trusts. As a result, if a creditor of the settlor of a Delaware
or Alaska trust brings an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against
the settlor, the elaborate statutory protections designed by the Dela-
ware and Alaska legislatures are unlikely to be of value to the settlor.
2. Voluntary Petitions
Involuntary bankruptcy petitions are not particularly helpful for
creditors when the debtor's assets are tied up in offshore trusts. The
bankruptcy court has no power to compel the holder of those assets to
turn them over to the bankruptcy trustee. 361 On the other hand, the
settlor of an offshore trust may bring a voluntary petition 3 62 to obtain
one of the principal benefits of American bankruptcy law: the dis-
charge of debts.
Section 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code commands the bank-
ruptcy court to give the debtor a discharge unless one of ten enumer-
ated exceptions applies. 363 The fact that the debtor has at some time
359 Klaxon Co. v. Stentorlectric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) established that,
in diversity cases, a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it
sits, rather than developing independent federal choice-of-law rules. See id. at 497. Bank-
ruptcy cases, however, are not diversity cases. As a result, the Klaxon doctrine does not
directly apply. Nevertheless, a number of courts have suggested that, when the issue
before a bankruptcy court is the scope of a state-created right, the bankruptcy court should
look to the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the court sits. See Koreag, Controle et
Revision S.L v. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. (In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.4.), 961 F.2d
341, 350-51 (2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that state choice-of-law rules apply when the issue
turns on state-created rights and should be displaced only if "important concerns implicat-
ing national bankruptcy policy" are implicated); Compliance Marine, Inc. v. Campbell (In
reMerritt Dredging Co.), 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[Iun the absence of a compel-
ling federal interest which dictates otherwise, the Klaxon rule should prevail where a fed-
eral bankruptcy court seeks to determine the extent of a debtor's property interest").
360 See supra Part IILA (analyzing the choice-of-law processes that state courts are
likely to follow).
361 Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code requires persons who are in control of prop-
erty the bankruptcy trustee might "use, sell, or lease" to deliver that property to the bank-
ruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994). If, however, the court's process cannot reach
the trustee of an offshore trust, the court has no direct means for enforcing a turnover
order directed at the trustee of the offshore trust.
362 See id. § 301 (providing for the filing of voluntary cases).
363 See id. § 727(a).
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in the past made a fraudulent transfer is not a ground for denying
discharge. Instead, the Bankruptcy Code deals with transfers that are
fraudulent under state law by giving the bankruptcy trustee power to
avoid them.364 With the aid of the bankruptcy court's nationwide ju-
risdiction, the trustee can exercise this avoidance power by bringing
an action in bankruptcy court to recapture the fraudulently trans-
ferred property for the bankruptcy estate.36 5 The trustee's exercise of
the avoidance power, however, provides little assistance to creditors if
the assets are beyond the nationwide jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.
Perhaps in recognition of this problem, and frustrated by the use
of offshore trusts to frustrate local creditors, bankruptcy courts have
begun to find that settlors of offshore trusts fall within one or more of
the exceptions to the general rule entitling debtors to bankruptcy dis-
charges. Three exceptions have proved popular so far. First,
§ 727(a) (2) precludes discharge when the debtor, within one year
before filing the petition, transfers, removes, destroys, mutilates, or
conceals property (or permits the property to be transferred, re-
moved, destroyed, mutilated or concealed) "with intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud a creditor."3 66  Second, § 727(a) (3) precludes
discharge when "the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsi-
fied, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information... from
which the debtor's financial condition or business transactions might
be ascertained."36 7 Third, § 727(a) (4) provides that discharge is un-
available if "the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connec-
tion with the case.., made a false oath" or "withheld from an officer
of the estate.., any recorded information... relating to the debtor's
property or financial affairs. '3 68
In Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy),3 6 9 the court in-
voked the "continuous concealment" doctrine to hold that a debtor
who transferred assets to an offshore asset protection trust could be
denied a bankruptcy discharge based on § 727(a) (2) of the Code,
even if the initial transfer had occurred more than a year before the
petition date.370 In 1989, Portnoy created a trust in Jersey, Channel
Islands, and over the course of several months, transferred his assets
to that trust.3 71 He named himself as principal beneficiary of the trust
364 See id. § 544(b).
365 See generally 1 DAVID G. EPsrEN ET AL., BANxRuprcy § 6-2 (1992) (discussing who
can avoid transfers in bankruptcy cases).
366 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
367 Id. § 727(a)(3).
368 Id. § 727(a) (4).
369 201 B.1. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
370 See id. at 692-701.
371 See id. at 689.
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and his two children as additional beneficiaries.37 2 He also gave the
Jersey trustees power to transfer all or part of the trust principal for
the benefit of all or any one of the trust beneficiaries "as the Trustees
shall in their absolute discretion think fit."373 In 1991, a creditor ob-
tained ajudgment against Portnoy for $183,891, and in 1995, Portnoy
filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.374
The judgment creditor objected to the discharge, contending
that, within one year of the date of the petition, Portnoy had contin-
ued to maintain unlimited control over the trust assets while conceal-
ing those assets from his creditors.375 Portney raised two arguments.
First, he claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction to determine
whether he had control over trust assets. Second, he asserted that
Jersey law should be applied to determine his rights under the decla-
ration of trust 3 76 The court rejected both contentions.377
The court held that it had jurisdiction to determine issues rele-
vant to Portnoy's eligibility for discharge even if it had no jurisdiction
over the trust itself.378 The court went on to hold that New York law,
not Jersey law, should be applied to determine whether Portnoy re-
tained an interest in the assets of the offshore trust for purposes of
ascertaining his eligibility for a bankruptcy discharge.37 9 The court
also observed that under New York law, the creditors of a settlor or
beneficiary of a discretionary trust can reach the maximum amount
that the trustee would be entitled, under the terms of the trust instru-
ment, to pay out to the settlor-beneficiary, "even though the trustee in
the exercise of his discretion wishes to pay the settlor/beneficiary
nothing."3 0 The court determined that Portnoy's interest in the trust
372 See id.
373 Id.
374 See id. at 691.
375 See id. at 695. The judgment creditor also objected to discharge on other grounds
unrelated to the creation of the trust; the creditor contended that Portnoy had also con-
cealed transfers of his paychecks to his wife. See id. at 692-95.
376 See id. at 696.
377 See id.378 Se i&.
379 See id. at 700. The court relied on the strong and widely shared public policy that a
debtor should not be able to retain control over trust assets while shielding those assets
from creditors. See id. The court also rejected the notion that the creator of a trust ought
to be able to select the law applicable to the trust for all purposes:
Whereas under normal circumstances parties are free to designate
what state's or nation's law will govern their rights and duties, where an-
other state or nation has a dominant interest in the transaction at issue, and
the designated law offends a fundamental policy of that dominant state, the
court may refuse to apply the foreign law.
I& at 699.
The court also offered "a second basis upon which to apply New York law-a choice-
of-law provision will not be regarded where it would operate to the detriment of strangers
to the agreement, such as creditors." Id. at 701 (internal quotation marks omitted).
380 Id. at 701.
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constituted property of the estate, and that Portnoy had not made that
property available to creditors or to the trustee in bankruptcy. Thus,
the court concluded that Portnoy had concealed, or permitted to be
concealed, property of the debtor.38s The only remaining question
under § 727(a) (2) of the Code was the question of Portnoy's intent:
Was the concealment accomplished "with the requisite intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud" his creditor or an officer of the estate?38 2 That
question, in the court's view, presented "[cilear issues of fact" to be
resolved at trial.383
The Portnoy court also invoked § 72 7 (a) (4) as a basis for denying
Portnoy a discharge.38 4 That section provides for denial of a dis-
charge if the debtor "knowingly and fraudulently" makes "a false oath
or account" in connection with the bankruptcy case.385 Portnoy had
not listed his interest in the offshore trust, especially his control pow-
ers, on his bankruptcy schedules.386 Once the court concluded that
Portnoy did have control powers over the trust, the only question re-
maining was whether Portnoy's failure to list the assets had been
knowing and fraudulent.38 7
Stephan Jay Lawrence met the same fate.m8 Recall that Goldberg
v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence)3 89 involved an options trader, Lawrence,
who had transferred four to seven million dollars to ajersey trust, just
sixty-six days before an arbitrator awarded Bear, Steams twenty mil-
lion in its forty-two-month dispute with Lawrence.390 Apparently not
satisfied that Jersey law provided adequate protection, Lawrence
amended it within a month after creating the trust to include spend-
thrift language and to provide that the law of the Republic of Mauri-
tius should govern its terms.3 91 More than six years later, Lawrence
filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition and sought discharge.3 92
The court held that Lawrence was not entitled to discharge.3 93 It
relied upon Lawrence's unwillingness to acknowledge that he had es-
tablished the Mauritius trust for protection against creditors and on
381 See id. at 695.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 701.
384 See id. at 701-02.
385 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (4) (1994).
386 See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 701-02.
387 See id. at 702.
388 See supra INTRODUCTION.
389 227 B.R 907 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).
390 See id. at 912-13.
391 See id. at 912 n.10. The court observed that Mauritius provided two advantages for
Lawrence: its debtor-friendly lav and out-of-the-way location. See id. at 912 n.1l. The court
joked that "it appears the Debtor (Lawrence] would have set the trust up on Mars if he
could have." Id.
392 See id. at 911.
393 See id. at 915.
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his inability to advance any other plausible explanation for creating
the trust.39 4 The court also relied upon a variety of inconsistencies in
Lawrence's testimony and on his failure to provide satisfactory answers
to interrogatories served on him by the bankruptcy trustee.39 5 In the
court's view, the dereliction by Lawrence brought him within the
terms of §§ 727(a) (2), (a) (3), (a) (4), and (a) (5) of the Bankruptcy
Code, and therefore justified denial of the discharge Lawrence had
requested.396 As we have also seen in a subsequent proceeding, the
Florida court imposed civil contempt sanctions on Lawrence.397
The approach taken by the courts in the Portnoy and Lawrence
cases mirrors the position other bankruptcy courts appear to have
taken in recent cases involving slightly different issues. In Sattin v.
Brooks (In re Brooks) ,398 a Connecticut bankruptcy court held that as-
sets transferred by the debtor to his wife, who subsequently trans-
ferred them to trusts in Bermuda and Jersey,399 were part of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate.40 0 The court rejected the debtor's argu-
ment that the assets were outside of the estate because the spendthrift
provisions were enforceable under the laws of Bermuda andJersey.40 1
Moreover, it held that the law of Connecticut was applicable to the
trusts40 2 and that, under Connecticut law, the spendthrift provisions
were not enforceable.40 3
394 See id. at 914-15.
395 See id. at 909 n.l. For instance, when asked about the value of the trust property,
Lawrence responded that he had no knowledge of the trust corpus as of the date of the
interrogatory, and that the trustee of the trust had refused to provide the information. See
id. When asked to set forth the disbursements he had received from the trustee, Lawrence
responded that he did not know whether there were such dispositions, and that if there
were any, they would have been deposited in accounts maintained by a former book-
keeper. See id.
396 See id. at 918. The Laurence court did not carefully identify which of Lawrence's
actions constituted a violation of each of the statutory provisions the court cited. See id. In
general terms, the court concluded that Lawrence had failed to supply records that would
provide creditors with adequate information to ascertain his financial condition and to
track his financial dealings, noting that § 727(a) (3) imposes an affirmative duty to main-
tain and retain comprehensible records. See id. at 915-16. The court then appeared to rely
on § 727(a) (2)'s prohibition of transfer or concealment of assets within one year of bank-
ruptcy, but the court did not specify what acts constituted transfer or hiding within the
prescribed period. See id. The court then moved to the "false oath or account" language of
§ 727(a) (4) and, finally, invoked § 727(a) (5), which prohibits discharge if debtor has
failed to satisfactorily explain a loss of assets. See id.
397 See In re Lawrence, 238 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
398 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
399 See id. at 101.
400 See id. at 104.
401 See id. at 101-03.
402 See id. at 101-02.
403 See i& at 104.
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Another case, Dzikowski v. Edmonds (In re Cameron),404 involved a
domestic self-settled spendthrift trust. The court in that case, reiter-
ated the general New York rule that "a debtor may not avoid his credi-
tors, or future creditors, by placing his property in trust for his own
benefit. '40 5 The court went on to hold that, because the spendthrift
provisions in the self-settled trust were unenforceable, the trust prop-
erty was not excluded from the bankruptcy estate.40 6
Denial of the bankruptcy discharge, thus, provides some check
against use of offshore trusts to avoid creditor claims. Debtors who
might want to avail themselves of the discharge may find that asset
protection trusts do not help them achieve their objectives. On the
other hand, not all settlors will care about obtaining a bankruptcy dis-
charge. If an offshore trust can provide generously for a settlor's rela-
tives and, indirectly, for the settlor, the settlor may be willing to live
indefinitely with a judgment debt hanging over his head-even if the
settlor will consequently be unable to purchase and maintain tangible
property within the United States.
C. Preemptive Strikes by the Trustee
We have explored the avenues that a creditor might pursue to
reach the assets in an asset protection trust. But the creditor cannot
expect that the trustee, acting in conjunction with the trust settlor,
will always take a purely defensive posture, waiting passively for the
creditor to challenge the trust's effectiveness as an asset protection
device. Especially if the trust has been established in an American
jurisdiction friendly to asset protection trusts, the trustee might strike
first, either in a declaratory judgment action or in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, to preclude further litigation by settlors.
If the settlor has created a trust in Alaska, or Delaware, and later
faces litigation in another state by a creditor seeking to reach the trust
assets, the creditor's home state, as we have seen, is likely to be recep-
tive to the creditor's position. Nonetheless, suppose the trustee first
seeks a judgment in Alaska declaring that the trustee is not obligated
to make payments from the trust to any of the settlor's creditors. If
this action is brought in an Alaska court, the court would be obligated
by statute to apply settlor-friendly Alaska law.407 Furthermore, if the
judgment is binding in Alaska, the Constitution's Full Faith and
404 223 B.RL 20 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).
405 Id. at 24.
406 See id. at 27.
407 See AiAsKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (Michie 1998).
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Credit Clause would require other states to enforce the Alaska judg-
ment, thereby precluding creditor claims. 408
The trustee's principal difficulty in pursuing this course of action
may be establishing the jurisdiction of the Alaska court. If the credi-
tor has no connection with Alaska, the trustee will be unable to obtain
personal jurisdiction over the creditor. Personal jurisdiction, how-
ever, is unnecessary if the Alaska court has jurisdiction over the trust
property. Moreover if some or all of the assets are deposited in Alaska
and are administered by an Alaska trustee, as Alaska law requires40 9
Alaska will likely have sufficient connection with the trust property to
exercise jurisdiction. 410 So long as the creditor receives notice of the
trustee's proceeding, the creditor will be bound by the Alaska judg-
ment with respect to property in the Alaska trust.41 This possibility of
a preemptive strike should lead creditors to act quickly, perhaps by
bringing an involuntary bankruptcy petition, to foreclose litigation in
the Alaska court.4 12
408 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, andjudicial Proceedings of every other State.").
409 See ALAsKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (1)-(2) (requiring both that some or all assets be
deposited in the state and that trustee be a "qualified person"); id. § 13.36.390 (defining
"qualified person" to include Alaska residents, trust companies, and banks).
410 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (holding that "fair play and sub-
stantial justice" standard applies to in rem jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
247 nn.16 & 17 (1958) (sustaining Delaware court's exercise ofjurisdiction in declaratory
judgment action to determine ownership of trust assets deposited with Delaware trust com-
pany); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("[Tlhe
vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement can
be served only if interests or claims of individuals who are outside of the State can some-
how be determined."); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OFJUDGMENTS § 6 (1982) ("A state
may exercise jurisdiction to determine interests in a thing if the relationship of the thing to
the state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.").
411 A more problematic question would be the effect of a declaratory judgment, issued
before any creditor claims have arisen, that purports to establish that the trustee holds
trust assets free of all future creditor claims. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 103 (1971) (providing that the judgment of one state "need not be recognized or
enforced in a sister State if ... it would involve an improper interference with important
interests of the sister State"); cf. Elkind v. Byck, 439 P.2d 316, 320 (Cal. 1968) (holding that
California courts were not bound by a Georgia judgment that precluded further child sup-
port awards because Georgia "should not be permitted to determine the welfare of the
child for all time and in all states"). But cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 212
(1933) (noting that a child's residence within a state does not give that state the power to
impose additional duties on a nonresident father, who has complied with the judgment of
a court in his domicile).
412 Commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding would not automatically
stay litigation brought by the trustee to establish that a creditor has no rights in the trust
proceeds, because the action would not be one brought against the debtor within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court retains general equitable powers to issue orders or pro-
cess necessary to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. See id. § 105.
Note also that the settlor could not bring a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding in Alaska
unless the settior was a resident of Alaska or unless most of the settlor's assets were in
Alaska. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408. Even if the settlor created an Alaska trust with most of his
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The preemptive strike strategy, however, is not available to trust-
ees of offshore trusts. Because the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not require American courts to enforce foreign judgments, a declara-
tory judgment by a Cook Islands court purporting to establish that a
creditor has no rights to trust proceeds would not be binding and
would not likely be persuasive in an American court. In this respect
(although, as we have seen, not in many others) creditors are in a
better position when the settlor has transferred assets offshore.
IV
SLOWING THE RACE: WHAT ROLE FOR LEGISLATION?
We have seen that if individual jurisdictions are free to compete
for trust business by offering attractive packages of trust law provi-
sions, many of them will have incentives to adopt inefficient, external-
ity-generating trust law rules. Especially if relatively few local settlors
make use of the trust law rules, few of the costs of the rules will be
borne at home. Furthermore, if the trust law rules can be made avail-
able only to outsiders, 413 the jurisdiction has significant incentives to
adopt rules that are attractive to outside settlors, whatever the costs
those rules generate in the settlors' home jurisdictions. This race to
capture trust business has been in progress offshore for at least a dec-
ade.4 14 We are now seeing the start of the race within the United
States itself.4 15 Should the race trigger a legislative response?
Federal legislation to prohibit or restrict asset protection trusts is
problematic. Congress has historically left the states free to choose
which debtor assets should be exempt from creditor claims, and those
exemptions survive even a federal bankruptcy proceeding.416 Federal
restraints on asset protection trusts would represent a significant
break with that long-standing position. Moreover, if Congress were to
restrict asset protection trusts, the appropriate shape of those restric-
tions would remain controversial. Finally, federal legislation on the
assets, the settlor would not be able to claim that most of his assets were in Alaska; the
point of creating the trust was to establish that the assets were not, in fact, his assets. See id.
As a result, venue in Alaska would be improper, and the settlor would not have the oppor-
tunity to argue that the federal bankruptcy court was bound, under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), to apply Alaska law. Cf. supra note 359.
413 The Cook Islands' International Trusts Act, for instance, applies only to trusts
whose "beneficiaries are at all times non-resident." International Trusts Act (1984) § 2
(1996) (Cook Islands) (defining "international trusts").
414 See supra Part I.B.
415 See supra Part I.C.
416 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1) (providing for federal exemptions in bankruptcy, but
permitting state law to disallow an exemption otherwise authorized); id. § 522(b) (2) (A)
(exempting property that would be exempt under state law). More than two-thirds of the
states disallow the use of federal exemptions. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knip-
penberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Viliains or Victims of the
Fresh Start, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235, 241 (1995).
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substantive law of trusts would not reach many offshore trusts, simply
because the United States as an entity lacks power to compel the for-
eign trustee to act in accordance with American law.
Moreover, with respect to domestic asset protection trusts, federal
legislation may be largely unnecessary. If states sanction asset protec-
tion trusts primarily to attract the dollars of out-of-staters whose home
states do not provide comparable protection, that market might well
collapse as settlor-debtors realize that bankruptcy courts, armed with
nationwide jurisdiction and power to apply the law of the settlor-
debtor's home state, can reach the trust assets to satisfy creditor
claims. Of course, some states might continue to authorize asset pro-
tection trusts to protect local setflor-debtors against their creditors,
but that decision does not generate the same externalities and
presents a less compelling case for federal intervention.
The bigger problem is with offshore trusts. With respect to these
trusts, American courts have fewer tools to enable creditors to reach
trust assets. As a result, offshore trusts remain attractive to some
classes of debtor-settlors. The states, through the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, could collectively im-
prove the lot of creditors by revising Article 8 of the UCC to make it
possible for creditors to reach interests in closely held corporations or
partnerships, without obtaining physical possession of the stock certifi-
cates or other indicia of ownership. These revisions, however, would
make those interests less liquid, and the adverse impact that the revi-
sions might have on commercial transactions could outweigh any ben-
efits they would have with respect to tort claimants. A similar problem
would accompany federal legislation that makes it easier for creditors
to attach a debtor's interest in an American corporation or
partnership.
Indirect sanctions against offshore trust settlors are somewhat
more promising. As we have seen, courts have already imposed one
such sanction on recalcitrant settlor-debtors: denial of the bankruptcy
discharge. Another option is the modern-day equivalent of debtors'
prison: criminal sanctions for persons who establish trusts in jurisdic-
tions that enforce spendthrift provisions in self-settled trusts. Some
commentators have argued that the legal framework is already in
place for incarcerating settlors of offshore trusts and that courts cur-
rently have power to imprison uncooperative settlors for civil con-
tempt, criminal contempt, or bankruptcy fraud.417
417 See Stacey K. Lee, Piercing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts in the Cayman Islands: The
Creditors' riew, 11 TRANSNAT'L LmW. 463, 497 (1998).
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In FTC v. Affordable Media,418 the Ninth Circuit affirmed civil con-
tempt sanctions against the settlor of an offshore trust.419 However, as
we have seen, civil contempt remains problematic as a basis for incar-
ceration. 420 Because civil contempt is designed to induce compliance
with a court order, it is inappropriate if the settlor-debtor can prove
that compliance was impossible for lack of control over the trust as-
sets. 421 Criminal contempt is a punishment meted out for willful vio-
lation of a court order. Again, if the settlor lacked power to comply,
the basis for punishment would be undercut.42 2 Moreover, bank-
ruptcy fraud could be difficult to establish if, in connection with the
bankruptcy proceeding, the settlor-debtor voluntarily disclosed all of
the details surrounding his offshore trust.423
If criminal sanctions are appropriate, legislation that explicitly
targets offshore trusts would be preferable. Moreover, the notion that
criminal sanctions can effectively deter asset concealment is not novel.
Congress has recently added criminal penalties to its strategy for
preventing property owners from making transfers that would qualify
them for Medicaid assistance.424 As in the Medicaid context, Con-
gress or state legislatures could make the sanctions even more effec-
tive by imposing them on persons-including lawyers-who aid and
abet a settlor who transfers assets to an offshore trust.4 25
418 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
419 See id. at 1228.
420 See supra text accompanying notes 340-42.
421 For discussion of the impossibility defense to civil contempt, see Linda S. Beres,
Civil Contempt and the Rational Contemnor, 69 INn. L.J. 723, 727 (1994) and Michele Dickey,
Authority of the Tial Judge 86 GEo. LJ. 1659, 1669-72 (1998).
422 For a discussion of the requirement that criminal contempt be willful, see Dickey,
supra note 421, at 1674.
423 Two statutes govern bankruptcy fraud. The first, 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998), prohibits knowing concealment of assets in connection with a bankruptcy case. If
the law of the offshore jurisdiction, together with the terms of the trust instrument, de-
prives the settlor-debtor of power to control trust assets, and if the debtor discloses the
trust's terms to the bankruptcy court, it might be difficult to find that the debtor had
"knowingly and fraudulently conceal[ed] . . . property belonging to the estate of the
debtor." Id.
The second bankruptcy fraud statute, see id. § 157, makes it criminal for a debtor to
file a bankruptcy petition "for the purpose of executing... a scheme" to defraud. Id.
Again, if the debtor is entirely truthful before the bankruptcy court, it may be difficult to
conclude that the petition was filed with the requisite intent to defraud.
424 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1181-1182 (Supp. III 1997), imposes criminal penalties on any person who "for a fee
knowingly and willfully counsels or assists an individual to dispose of assets (including by
any transfer in trust) in order for the individual to become eligible for medical assistance
under a State plan under subchapter XIX." 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (6) (Supp. 1998).
425 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (6) (imposing aider and abetter liability). Not surpris-
ingly, many lawyers object to the prospect of such liability. See, e.g.,John M. Broderick, To
Transfer or Not to Transfer:. Congress Failed to Stiffen Penalties for Medicaid Estate Planning, but
Should the Practice Continue2, 6 ELDER LJ. 257, 277-85 (1998).
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We must also consider if prison is a sanction too draconian for
creditor avoidance. As Lynn Lopucki has observed, "[iun contempo-
rary society, governments enforce law by essentially two mechanisms:
incarceration and liability. '426 The efficacy of a liability system, how-
ever, requires either voluntary compliance by the judgment debtor or
sovereign power over the debtor's property. Indeed, so long as the
state has sovereign power over the debtor's property, voluntary com-
pliance is likely, because a recalcitrant debtor would realize limited
returns on his failure to comply. So long as most Americans regard
moving assets outside the United States as too costly, either because of
potential political or economic upheaval abroad or because of the
time and expense involved in transferring assets to and from foreign
jurisdictions, the liability system is generally effective. 427 The growth
of the offshore trust, however, suggests that the cost of exporting as-
sets no longer seems so daunting to many people. If that trend ex-
pands, incarceration may well be the only available brake any
individual government has on trust law's international race for the
bottom.
In one federal district court case, the judge issued a preliminary injunction, on First
Amendment grounds, against enforcement of a statute's imposition of criminal liability on
aiders and abetters. See NewYork State Bar Ass'n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710, 716 (N.D.N.Y.
1998).
Even without criminal penalties, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct restricts
lawyers from counseling clients to engage in behavior "that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent." See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2(d) (1999).
426 LoPucki, supra note 34, at 3.
427 LoPucki also catalogues a variety of other constraints on liability avoidance, many
of which, in his view, are dissolving. See id. at 38-54.
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